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There had. been little chan e in ritish naval ordnance between
the mid-sixteenth and. late ei hteenth centuries. The adoption
of the carronad.e in 1779, however, to eth r with adv ces in gun
casting and. po d.er milling after 1783, provided safer, more
dependable weapons, well suited to the close-quarters, rapid-fire
en agements preferred. by the Royal Navy. Brilliantly successful
against the French Republic and. Empire, these weapons and. tactics
proved. inadequate against the ion -guns and. long-range skills
of the Americans.
British losses in ship co bat during the War of 1812 caused
European navies, including the Royal Navy, to adopt gunsights and.
vent tubes, gunnery manuals and. intensive gunnery training. They
also adopted. heavier ships capable of mounting more powerful
ordnance, arid, attempted to standardize both ships and. ordnance.
During the 1820's ritain and. France introduced, uniform calibre
of maximum effect, thus bringing the sailing ship of the line to
its apogee in size and po er.
It was also during the twenties that steamers mounting shell
guns first demonstrated their usefulness for warlike purposes.
In 1829 the Ad.miralty commenced building war steam re and. ordered.
that they, together with ships of the line, receive shell guns.
3The shell eventually revolutionized naval architecture; it revo-
lutionized. naval gunnery immedi tely. A gunnery school was
established, aboard H.M.S. Excellent to provide seaman gunners
capable of firing shells safely and accurately. Excellent also
served as an experimental depot. Thus not only did. she train
gunners, but she provided the navy with an unprecedented
opportunity to study armament problems peculiar to naval service.
By 1853 smooth-bore ordnance and smooth-bore gunnery had achieved
something like perfection.
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6PREFACE
My purpose in this thesis is to describe the development
of British naval ordnance and naval gunnery between the years
1815 and. 1853.
Many authors have pointed out the influence of the War of
1812 on the development of naval armaments; others, notably
J.P. Baxter in The Introduction of the Ironclad Warship, and.
F.L. Robertson in The Evolution of Naval Armament, have dioussed.
the influence of the adoption of shell guns on the development
of naval architecture. But there has been no adequate account
of the precise nature and. extent of the American influence on
British. gunnery; neither has any close study been made of
British research and experimentation on shells before or after
their adoption in 1829. Practically nothing has been written
on armaments developments between 1830 and. 1853.
There is thus need. for a straightforward. narrative account
of the improvements in naval ordnance and. gunnery between 1815
and. 1853. From this narrative conclusions will be drawn
concerning the Admiralty's attitude towards innovation, and. the
7manner in which development was carried out in a period of
peace and. economic restraint.
There ar. many people to whom I am indebted. for assistance
in the preparation of this thesis. I should. like to thank the
members of The Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire for the
financial support they gave me during two years of research.
I would. like to express my appreciation to Professor G.S. Graham
of King's College for the help and encouragement he gave me while
writing these chapters. I am also indebted. to Mr. N. Bridges
for giving me access to the surviving persona], papers of his
ancestor, General Sir oward. Douglas, and to Professor Michael
Lewis for his suggestions concerning the last two chapters of
this work.
Most of the research has been carried out at the Public
Records office and. I should. like to thank the directors and. staff
for their help. I am also appreciative of the services of the
staffs at the British Museum, the National Maritime Museum, and
the Admiralty Library. Finally, I thank Mr.. Jane Barton for
the conscientious and. abLe manner in which she has carried out
a difficult typing chore.
aINTRODUCTION
Infinitesimal as naval progress in the first half of the
nineteenth century might appear compared. with that of the second.,
the increasing tempo of warship and. armament development between
1815 and. 1853 was nevertheless unmistakable. During these years
the shell system was adopted. and. steam machinery introduced. and
greatly improved.. By the time of the Crimean War many ships
of every class in the navy mounted. shell guns and. were fitted.
with steam engines By that time, too, the Royal Navy had.
replaced. the completely unsophisticated. attitude toward gunnery,
commonly held. before 1812, with a scientific andL precise approach.
Smooth-bore ordnance, and. the ship of the line with which this
ordnance is generally associated, were alike brought to their
highest development in size and power.
Despite these innovations and. the considerable amount of
study and experimentation necessary to bring them about, con-
temporary writers give the impression that the years under study
comprised a period. of cautious and. reluctant experiment carried.
out by a succession of Admiralty Boards with a shared. prejudice
against progress. This was simply not the case. The passing of
9the ships and tactics and armaments that had defeated Napoleon
was undoubtedly observed with reluctance by many, and even
ignored by the diehards; the Admiralty, generally speaking, was
more hard-headed. Every new device, every improved device and
many suggested devices, whether discovered in England or abroad,
were subjected to official consideration, and if promising, to
official experiment. Every ten years a special review was held
of armament equipment in service or suggested for service, during
which the best material was selected and introduced gradually
into naval service.
The Royal Navy thus had a definite policy regarding the
introduction of improvements into service. With few exceptions
it was strictly adhered to, and. as the following chapters
reveal, it served Britain well during these years of unprecedented
armament development. For between 1815 and 1853 many changes
took place in naval artillery and gunnery, whereas during the
long war against the French Republic and. Empire there had been
few innovations or improvements in naval armaments. Before the
war there had been some slight improvement in the 17 80 ' s , and
before then there had been very little development since the
middle of the sixteenth century.
10
It was in the reign of Henry VIII that oared. war galleys
were finally abandoned for the gun-carrying, ocean-going sailing
ship. The earliest of these ehipa were no more than platform.
built to charge and. grapple the enemy so that the soldier.
aboard. could. engage in hand-to-hand fighting and. board. Armament,
too, was anti-personnel rather than anti-ship in nature. It
consisted of large numbers - as many as 200 - of small, breech-
loading guns firing projectiles of very little weight, and was
intended to repel boarders.1
Early in Henry's reign, however, the potential broadside
strength of great-ships was recognized. Heavy ordnance, usually
in the form of bombards, became increasingly popular. Bombards
were hollow cylinders constructed of longitudinal bars, commonly
of wrought iron, clamped. together by forcing red hot iron rings
1. Much information on early naval ordnance is to be
found in J.S. Corbett, Drake and the Tudor Navy (London, 1912),
vol.1., pp. 1-59, 358-72 ; C. Pfoulkes, The Gun-Pounders of
England (Cambridge, 1937), passim; Puller, J.P.C., Armament
and History (London, 1946), pp. 90-96 ; U. Lewis, Armada Guns
A comparative study of English and Spanish Armaments (London, 1961)
passim.
11
over them. They were mounted in bed. of solid. timber and.
loaded. from the breech which was another cylinder shaped. to
fit tightly into the barrel when wedged. from the rear.
Guns other then bombards were at first imported from
Italy and. Prance. By 1512 thi. trade had largely ceased in
favour of importing gun-founders from the same two countries;
bronz. guns were BOOfl being cast at the Tower of London, and.
in 1543 cannon of cast iron were produced at Brazstea4 in the
Weald. of Kent. Cast guns were much stronger than the bombards
assembled. from wrought iron bars, and. increased. strength was
given by casting them with a solid breech making it necessary
to load. from the muzzle. Cast upon a core until the early
eighteenth century, drills imported from Switzerland. sad.e it
possible to cast the gun solid. and ream out smooth and. precise
bores.
Muzzle-loading guns cast in brass or iron rapidly
superoeded. breech-loaders, and by the end. of Henry's reign
more than forty different patterns and sizes of gun were being
cast in England, both in bronze and iron, which were not greatly
12
1inferior to those used. by Nelson at Trafalgar. In an attempt
to standardize armaments, this unwieldy number was in 1559
reduced to six classes of heavy ordnance wi$h seieral varieties
of lights? guns.
Broadly speaking, the largest great-ships of Elizabeth I,
such as the Triumth, carried 40 to 50 heavy cannon and a
secondary armament of 25 to 30 light breech-loading guns. This
excess in numbers and weight of armament strained. Tudor ships,
causing them to sail badly and to leak. After a temporary
reduction in weight under Elizabeth 1, a Commission of Reform
in 1618 upheld. the use of heavy artillery for naval service. By
this time most of the gun models that were to serve the Royal
Navy throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth and much of the
nineteenth centuiis had appeared.. The bastard cannon, demi-
cannon and cannon-'petro, the culverin and d.emi-cu].verin had
merely changed. their identity to 42-, 32-, 24-, 18- and. 9-pdrs.
1. There were a number of different methods of classifying
ships' guns at this period.. For one example see Corbett, I.
364-65, 372.
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And. although broadeid.e strength was slightly increased, in
1716, and. again in 1733, by replacing some guns with the next
higher calibre, there were no alterations in the actual guns.1
Not until the last quarter of the eighteenth century was
there any significant change or improvement in naval ordnance.
1. See dm.7/677, "Establishment of Ordnance", Orders in
Council of 6 July 1716 and. 21 Feb. 1733.
14
Chapter One
AUAWWI LESSONS 07 1779 AND 1812
The last quarter of the eighteenth century was a period of
great improvement in the quality of British sea artillery.
Advances in gun casting and powder milling, together with the
adoption of the carronad.., provided safe, dependable weapons,
well suited to the close-quarters, rapid-fire engagements pre
ferred by the Royal Navy. Brilliantly successful against the
Prenoh Republic and. Empire, these weapons and tactics were to
prove inadequate against the heavy guns and long-range skill of
the Americans. American successes in ship combat during the
Jar of 1812 prompted other navies to adopt more powerful ship.
and armament., to strive for the skill and scientific precision
that long-range combat required, and. by these activities to
commence the nineteenth century's armaments race.
During the Seven Tears War the Royal Navy had. shattered the
neglected fleet. of France and Spain. In the peace that followed
1763 these powers rebuilt their navies, while the British,
largely for economic reasons, carried on with existing ships.
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This policy played some part in Britain'. los, of the seas during
the American Revolution; for the patched-up 50- and. 64-gun ship.
of 1763 were opposed. in 1778 by European counterparts mounting
164 and. 78 guns.
After 1783, considerable effort was mad.. to bring British
ships up to European standards. Th. 50-gun ship was discontinued,
the ubiquitous 64 of the eighteenth century was deemed. too small
to serve in the line, and by 1793 it had. become clear that a
similar fate awaited. the 74•2 But not only were ships capable
of fighting those of France and Spain laid. down after 1783; a
close examination of naval armaments was also undertaken.
In 1779, Captain Sir William Congreve, later Superintendent
of the Royal Laboratory, inspected. ship's gunpowder at Plymouth.
Re found only four serviceable barrels in the whole division.
1. G.S. Graham, Empire of the North Atlantic the )fritiae
Struggle for North America (Toronto, 1950), pp. 202-03.
R.G. Albion, Forests and Sea Power. The Timber Problem of the
Royal Navy s 1652-1862 (Harvard, 19 26 ), pp. 390-91 . Sir William
Bowl.., Paathlets on Naval Subjects (London, 1854), pp.27-33.
1.1. Mah-i, The Influence of Sea Power u pon History 1660-1783
(Boston, 1890), pp.259-60, 331-32 , 336-47, 428, 493-94.
2. Boyle., 27-33. Sir Charles Napier, The Na'vyz Its Past end
Present State (London, 1851), pp . 64-66. R.J. Paixhans, Nouvelle
Force Maritime (Paris, 1822), pp. 55-56.
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The following year the newly appointed Inspector of Artillery,
Sir Thomas Blomefield, discovered that, like gunpowder, the
navy's artillery "had degenerated to the lowest point in quality."
Bursting guns were frequent, and would have been more frequent,
reported Blomefield, had "the roguery of contractors in
gunpowder ... not kept pace with the roguery of contractors in
1guns."
Immediately the war was over, resolute steps were taken to
improve the quality of armaments. Congreve, who had revealed
the poor quality of gunpowder, was appointed Superintendent of
p
the Royal Laboratory in 1783. Under his direction government
powder mills were established at Peversham in 1784, and at
Waltham Abbey in 1788. This effectively removed production from
the hands of private contractors and gave Congreve th. opportunity
1. LW. Lloyd and A.G. Hadcook, Artiller y, Its Progress
and. Present Position ( portsmouth, 1893), p, 24, P.L. Robertson,
The Evolution of Naval Armament (London, 1921), pp. 85-86
and motes.
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to manufacture his own improved. gunpowd.ers.1
The casting of heavy guns, on the other hand., was left
largely to private firma. The Ordnance Department, responsible
for aupplying weapons to all the services insisted. ho'rever that
contractors improve the quality of their weapons In 1797 an
in.apector of found.ary guns was appointed. to entorce the rigorous
proving procedure to be undergone by every heavy gun supplied.
by contract. The high stand.ard.a imposed. forced. contractors to
improve their casting, and to introduce new machinery that would
bring the surfaces o bore a4 shot "nearer athematiccl precision."2
1. Sir Howard. Douglas, A Treatise, on Taval Gunnerr (let ed.,
London, le2a),.pp. 194, 201-02, 210-211,. ? I C.P. Dupin, 'View of
the istory and Actual State of the Mil'itary Force of Great
Britain, Cranslated. by- "An Officer" (London, 1622), ti. 82-85.
It. Glover, Peninsular Preparationa The eform of the ritish
Army 1795-1809 (Camb2id.ge, 1963) pp. 67-68, 86. O.P.G. Rogg,
The Royal Arsenal its Background, Origin and. Subsecinent Ristory
(Oxford, 1963), i. 481. See also W.O.47/llO , foe. 530, 570, and.
Sir William Congreve, I Statement of the Pacts relatFve to the
Savings which have arisen from Manufacturin g Gunpowder at the
Royal Powder Mills; and of the Improvements which have 'been made
tn i+,s Stenth n*'abi1ity since the year 1783 (London, 1811),
especially pp.. Li, 25-26.
2. Dupin, Filitary Force, ii. 239, 287-91.
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Improvement. in guns and. gunpowder were accompanied by
improvements in carriage.. In l8O the Royal Carriage Department
was established. Although it. greatest triumph lay in providing
the best field. artillery of the day, it also brought improved
quality to naval gun carriages. 1 In 1810, the Second. in Coum
of this department, Colonel William Cuppage, wrote glowingly of
"the great improvements in Gun Powder, in the purity and. perfection
of Bra.. and. Iron Ordnance, and in the economy and. uniformity
in the preparation of Gun Carriages.2
The Ordnance Department had. thus succeeded in providing the
navy with safe and dependable weapons. The fear of guns
bursting or misfiring, a fear that added. to the demoralization
of other fleets, practically disappeared. from the Royal Javy.
This increased power, accuracy and dependability, resulting in
increased. confidence, gave the British an incalculable advantage
over other navies.3
1. Ibid. ii. 287-314. Rogg, Arsenal, i. 507-10.
2. Add.. 185. 37889, 1. Cuppage to 1. Windham, 6 April 1810.
3. Clowes, vi. 28. Douglas, let ed. pp. 7-8.
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Yet it is well to recall *ith Mahn that it was the
"efficient tactical bearing of ... improvements in the materiel
of war" that was paramount.1 There can be litti. doubt that
the British used their improved weapons efficiently during the
Napoleonic Wars, or that their celebrated close-quarters, rapid-
fire tactics reflected in some measure the navy 1 s confidenc. in
its weapons. But to an increasing degre. British tactics
reflected. the growing dependency on a new weapon particularly
suited to close-quarters action. This was the carronade. The
first major innovation in sea artillery for two centuries, the
carronad. became the weapon moat responsible for establishing
the close-quarters pattern of naval warfare in Europe during the
Napoleonic Wars.
Designed in 1774 by General Robert Melville, the carronade
has been described as a "very short, light, carriage gun of
relatively large bore, made to take a standard size of long-gun
shot and project it, by means of a small charge of powder, against
1. Mban, The Influence of Sea Power upon Kistory, p. 495.
20
an enemy at close rang.." 1
 It was first produced in 1779 by
the Carron Company of Scotland a. a defensive weapon for
merchantmen unable to rely upon the Royal Navy for convoy
protection. It was well suited for this purpose. A 32-pdr.
carronad., for example, fired the same projectile as a 32-pd.r.
gun; yet the gun was nine feet six inches long and, weighed
55 owt., whereas the carronade measured four feet aM weighed
only 17 cwt. The gun required. a crew of fourteen to operate it,
the carronade a crew of five.2
These qualities were invaluable in small, crowded merchant
vessel. where the great sacrifice in range was of email
importance. A merohantman's objective was to avoid combat,
and reducing armament weight through the use of carronades
enhanced the possibility of escape by permitting faster sailing.
Moreover, almost certain destruction awaited the privateer that
1. Robertson, p. 125-26. Much of the information on the
carronad.e is taken from Robertson, Chapter Five. See also
P. Cowburn, The Warehip in History (London, 1966), pp. 149-50.
2. For comparativ, weights of other calibre. see 1.0.44/498,
Royal Arsenal Return of Sea Guns, 29 March 1813.
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did. manage to pull alongside. For the oarronade was much more
destructive within its rang. than was the same calibr, long-gun.
This surprising superiority resulted from the small
oarronad.e charge projecting the regulation shot at low velocity.
It had long been known that maximum effect was gained when the
projectile had. just sufficient velocity to penetrate the target.
Thus 24-pd.r. shot was more effective Vhsn fired. from carronades
than from a high velocity gun, owing to the fact that in high
velocity penetration, a clean, easily repaired. hole resulted..
The low velocity projectile, on the other hand., smashed large,
jagged holes, and. scattered. splinters inboard. Before carronad.es
this splintering effect of low velocity fire had been achieved.
by double-shotting long-guns. The single impact of the carronade
shot was much greater than that of double-shotting, and much
greater accuracy was poseible.
The carronade was therefore particularly well suited to the
1. Robertson, pp. 128-29. sih-ne, Nouvelle Force, p. 12,
note. J.L. Dahigren, Shells and Shell-Guns (Philadelphia, 1857),
pp. 8-13.
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needs of merohantmen. But naval officers d.ieagreed on its
suitability as a naval weapon. Many disliked it becaus. the
flash from it. short barrel set fire to the ports and rigging.
They also pointed out the tendency of these weapon. to break
their bed., and to tpset, owing to the lightness of their
construction. But those who opposed the carronad. did. so
primarily on it. limited ranging power. These wer, the captains
who preferred to retain the tactical maneuverability provided
by long-guns. They did not relish having a large part of their
armaments rendered impotent by th. long-guns of an enemy skilfully
keeping beyond carronade range.1
There were, on the other hand, those officers who contend..d
that the great majority of decisive combats were settled within
easy carronade range. Kistory afforded much supporting evidence
1. For the controversy over the carronade, see Douglas,
3rd. ed., p. 148. Paihans, Nouvelle Force, pp. 18-19. Robert-
son, pp. 128-34. Y.C.P. Dupin, Voyagee dans La Grancle-Bretagne
(Paris, 1820-24), ii. ii. 103-07. T.F. Simmons, Ideas as to the
Effect of Keavy Ordnance Directed Against and Applied b y Ships
of War. etc. (London, 1837), pp. 2-5.
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for thi, contention. Thile adnitting the carronade's various
defects, its supporters were convinced. that these wer. more than
compensated for by the weapofls destructiveness.
It was further argued that a ship armed. entirely with
carronades could. serve well provided. she sailed. quickly enough
to escape unequal combat. This Idea was put to the teat. An
old. 44-gun frigate, the Rainbow, was rearmed with large caUbre
oarronad.es that practically quadrupled. her broadside weight of
metal. In 1782 she sighted. the French frigate Hb(, lured her
within rang., and. silenced her with one massive broadside. The
supporters of the carronad. appeared vin&icat.d.
A mor. realistic assessment of the new weapon was provided
at the Battle of the Saints, also in 1782. During the moon-
elusive engagement of 9 April, the French Second. in Command,
Do Vaudreuil, deliberately fought from a point just beyond.
carronade range. On 12 April Rodney succeeded in bringing the
action to close quarters and. to a successful conclusion.
1. Robertson, p. 134. Dahgren, Shell-Guns, p. 11 and
notes.
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Do Vaudreuil believed it was the carronad.. that had. "so badly
crippled." hi. fleet. But if Do Taud.reuil correctly assessed
the weapon's effectiveness at close-range, his tactics of
April 9 had. certainly revealed. it. limitations at long-range.1
The carronade had nevertheless proved a valuable addition
to the fleet. The Admiralty took immediate steps to arm the
quarter decks and. forecastle. of all 36- and. 38-gun frigates
with 24-pd.r. carronad.es . 2 On the average this clas, of frigate
wisely retained. three guns to one carronade. Many of the faster
small frigates and, lesser vessel,, however, received, as had
the Rainbow, an exclusively carronade armament. By the turn of
the century every class of ship mounted. a large proportion of
the light weapon.3
The proliferation of carronades to all rates was moot marked.
in the last decade of the eighteenth century. It was not until
1. Robertson, p. 134. Mahan, pp. 494-95.
2. Ada.7/677, "Establishments of Ordnance", Admiralty to
the Master General of the Ordnancs, 16 July 1779, and. Admiralty
Order of 17 Dec. 1779.
3. Robertson, p. 131.
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1779, for example, that they were mounted. on the quarter decks
and. forecastisa of ships of the line. This was in part owing
to the comparative cheapness of the carronad.e, and to the
desirability of reducing both the number of crew and. weight of
armament carried. so high above th. waterline. 1 But the
carronade proliferated largely because it proved. so effective
against the French and. Spanish. In fact, the weapon originally
intended as defensive armament for merchant ships became, in the
hands of the Royal Navy, the most effective offensive armament
of the day.
This surprising fact resulted from the definite pattern of
naval warfare that had. developed. in Europe throughout the
eighteenth century. This pattern was largely determined by the
strategy of Franc.. The succession of humiliations inflicted
on her fleet by Britain in the first half of the eighteenth
century convinced Francs that she could not be supreme both as
a maritime and continental power. During the Seven Tears War,
1. Ada.7/677, Admiralty Orders of 25 Nov. 1782, 17 March
1797, 4 June 1799, 24 June and. 4 Oct. 1805. Adm.160/l50,
Proportion Tables of LU. Ships, 1781-1828 , fo. 12.
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therefore, the French changed their strategy from grand wax to
cruising war. In other words, rather than fight fleet actions,
the new role of	 Navy was to attack commerc. and
inferior enemy warships. French Admiral Griv.l described the
strategy $
If two maritime powers are at strife, the one that has
the fewest ships must always avoid doubtful engagements;
it nuat run only those risks necessary for carrying out
its missions, avoid action by maneuvering, or at worst,
if forced to engage, ensure itself of favourable
conditions.1
British strategy was exactly opposite to that of Franc..
The objective of the Royal Navy was to control the seas by
destroying enemy fleets. In this manner Britain inevitably
became the pursuer, Prance the pursued, and maritime warfare
between the two came to consist largely of British ship.
pressing the reluctant French for action. Even during the
American Revolution the French clung to their defensive
strategy despite opportunities to engage inferior British forces.
The British too, outnumbered and often outclassed, fought a
1. Mahan, pp. 289-90. On French strategy see also Ibid.
pp. 371-72 , 376 , 386; Douglas, 3rd.. ed., pp. 614-16.
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largely defensive war. At that point, in 1779, the Admiralty
introduced the carronade.
It was at the battle of the Saints, deecribel above, that
the carronad.e proved itself, not as a defensive, but as an
offensive weapon. During the wars against the French Republic
and Empire, British shipe continued to press for close action,
but now when close-quarters was attained, murderous oarronad.e
fire hastened the conclusion of the combat.
The French did not adopt the oarronad.e until 1790. Of
such poor construction that they endangered their crews, their
adoption was not calculated to embolden the demoralized French
sailors) The British found Napoleon's ships easy game, a fact
that increased their disdain for the enemy. Nelson was not the
only British officer to regard the French with a "contemptuous
confidence that characterized ... to some extent his tactics
toward them 2 Ke was, however, the most brilliant practitioner
of these tactics. The "Nelson touch" became synonomous with
daring, even reckless approach to close-quarters. , The carronad.e
1. Dupin, Voyages, ii. i. 71, ii. ii. 104-06. See also
Graham, Empire of the North Atlantic, pp. 218-19.
2. Mahan, p. 506.
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1
was particularly well suited to these tactics.
Thus the "yard-arm tactics" long preferred by most British
captains, and previously adopted when opportunity permitted,
became practically obligatory under all circumstances. French
demoralization and incompetence had seemingly proved 'that no one
can do wrong who lays his ship alongside an enemy." 2 British
captains adhered slavishly to this maxim; through u3linterrupted
success from "being feebly opposed", the confidence of the
Royal Navy in its armaments and. tactics increased to the point
of over-confidence after Trafalgar.3
In November 1811, the American frigate Conetitution called
at Spithead.. She immediately attracted the attention of
J. Wilson Croker, First Secretary of the Admiralty. More stoutly
built than many 74-gun ships, the ConItitution measured twenty
1. Simmons, Effect, pp. 2-5 . See alio Michael Lewis, The Navy
of Britain A Historical Portrait (London, 1949), pp.545-46.
2. Commander U. Jermingha3a, Remarks on the Means of
Directing the Fire of Shi ps' Broadsides (London, 1851), p. 34.
3. Douglas, 3rd ed., p. 3.
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feet ion er than a standard. British frigate, opposed 24-pdr. guns
to British 18-pd.rs., and. carried two hundred more crew. Croker
fe red. no ritish frigate could stand. up to her in battle.1
While visiting Portsmouth, the First Secretary expressed.
his concern to Captain S.J. Pechell. Pechell, an experienced
naval officer and. gunnery expert whose opinion commanded. respect,
"vauntingly remark d. th t he would. take h r he Constitution]
in half an hour." 2
 This attitude was sh red. by Peohell's
fellow officers on the North American station. They had
observed the Co'stitution's sister frigates United. States and.
President at close hand, and. eagerly sou lit an opportunity to
fight them.3
1. N.R.S. Dillon, ii. 182.
2. Ibid. Pechel]. (1785-1849) entered the n vy in 1796, serving
most of his first ten years in th Channel and off the coast of
Prance. Re served. on the North American station from 1807-14,
and as Captain of Warren's flagship San Domingo and. later
Sybille, had a reputation as a stickler for good. gu.nnery. An
M.P. 1830 and. 1833, Lord of the Admiralty, 1830-34, 1839-41.
O'Byrne. D.LB.
3. Sir W.L. Clowes, The Royal Navy. A Fistory from the
Earliest 'Pimes to the Present (London, 1903), vi. 37.
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This opportunity materialized in June 1812, when President
Madison declared war on Great Britain. In the event, Croker's
fears were realized. Pechell's professed ability to capture an
American frigate in thirty minutes did not extend to those
officers engaging the United States and Constitution. During
the first months of hostilities three British frigates, Guerr1re,
Macedonian and Java, were completely crushed by the two Americans
in single-ship-combat.1
Captain Peohell's boast to Croker that he would capture an
American super frigate in thirty minutes reflected the genera).
British overconfidence. Yet Pechell was an authority on gunnery;
he knew well that advances in British ordnance following 1783
made it superior to the armaments of all other navies, including
the American. 2 Nor was he greatly impressed by the American
long 24-pdri, guns. Frigates mounting this heavy armament had
fallen to the Royal Navy in the past. In 1782 the South Carolina,
formerly the French L'Indien, and carrying 36-pdrs., had. been
captured from the American colonists, as had the French 44's
1. See below.
2. Douglas, let ed., 6-8. Dupin, Military Force, ii. 239.
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Pomone, Egyptienne and. Fort:, all mounting 24-pclrs. The Forts'
fell to Sibyl, a standard British 38 mounting l8-pd. guns,
while the Pomone provided the model for such British frigates
mounting 24-pd.r. guns as Leol)ard and Endymion)
Thus, not only was there evidence that 24-pd.r. frigate. were
not invulnerable to those mounting l8-pdrs., but the British
pOese.8ed more 24-pdz. frigates than did. the Americans. Apart
from those surrendered by the French and Dutch, and. those built
on the lines of the Poinone, the Admiralty in 1794 had commenced
cutting down such unsatisfactory 74-gun ships as the Aneon,
Magnanime, Indefatigable and Barhan to 40-gun frigates mounting
24-pd.rs.2
The Americans possessed only three large frigates. Indeed
the modest size of the American fleet was another reason for not
taking it too seriously. Apart from a number of one-gun boats
that capsized. immediately the gun was discharged, the United.
States Navy in late 1811 consisted of six brigs, two 18-gun
aloopa, and. ten frigates. There were no ships of the line.
1. LI. Chapelle, "The Ships of the American Navy in the War
of 1812", LM.xviii. 288-89. Clowes, vi. 17-18, 28, 37.
2. Napier, The Navy, pp. 64-66.
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The frigate was thus nominally the largest else. of American
warship, and. the newest one had been completed in 1800. On the
day Madison declared war, only two frigates of the ten 'were at
sea; two lay in ordinary, three were repairing, one rebuilding,
and two were condemned hulks. It was not an impressive navy.1
Having destroyed the fleets of Spain, Holland and Denmark,
and having driven the remnants of the French Navy from the seas,
the Royal Navy was not unduly alarmed by the challenge of the
modest American Navy in June 1812. "Contemptuous confidence"
had., through uninterrupted success, yielded to what Canning
later called in Parliament, "the sacred spell of the invincibility
of the British Navy."2
In the autumn of 1812 this "spell" was broken. The British
frigates Macedonian and Java fell in quick succession to the
Americana, proving that Gnerrire's defeat in August had not been
mere chance. In addition to losing three frigates, the two sloop.
Frolio and Peacock surrendered to their American counterparts
Wasp and Hornet. The Royal Navy had not lost so many vessels in
1. Chapelle, M.M.xviii. 287-88. Clowes, vi. 95.
2. Clowes, vi. 60.
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single-ship-combat during twenty years of war with European
navies. Moreover, they had lost these five ships in spectacular
fashion. The Constitution had so riddled. Guerriere and. Java
that they had to be sunk; neither Constitution or the United.
States, captor of Maced.onian, suffered damage of any consequence.
In the three frigat.Aotions, British casualties numbered. over
three hundred killed and wounded., compared with about sixty
1
on the American side.
The impact of these British losses was electric. Indignant
letters in the British press were matched by Parliamentary
speeches clamouring for the resignation of naval administrators.2
"Nothing chases, nothing intercepts, nothing engages them fhe
Ainerioazi7 but to yield them triumph", mourned the "Pilot" a
leading maritime authority. Canning speaking in Parliament,
1. Ibid. pp. 34-37, 41-43, 48-53 . Douglas, 3rd ed., pp.
147-50 , 523-52. Sir Nathaniel Barnaby, Naval DeveloDm ent in the
Nineteenth Century (London, 1902), pp. 436-47.
2. L.J. Jennings, ed. The Correspondence and Diaries of
Joh.n Wilson Croker (London, 1884), i. 44.
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observed. "it cannot be too deeply felt that the sacred. spa11 of
the invincibility of the British Navy was broken by these
unfortunate captures." 1 Not only were the Americans encouraged
by their victories to successfully prolong resistance to the
British blockade, "A Post Captain" (Sir Charles Napier) informed.
Melville, but British defeat had "opened the eyes of ether
nations, and shewn them that we are not invincible at sea."2
Observers other than Japier, notably the Surveyor of the Navy,
Sir Robert Seppings, were quick to attribute a revival of French
agressivenesa in single-ship-combat to the American successes.3
To avoid. further embarrassments, the Admiralty were
determined that no further risks be run against the American
super frigates. In the first instance, British 38's on the North
1. Both these quotations are taken from Clowea, vi. 60.
Melville, the First Lord, also expressed concern at the blow to
British confidence. I.R.S. Barhain, iii. 387; C.J. Bartlett,
Great Britain and Sea Power l8l5-l85 (Oxford, 1963), p.32.
2. lapier, The Navy, pp. 1, 6, 9, 14, 29-30.
3. Sir Robert Seppings, A Letter Addressed to the Right
Ronourable Viscount Melville on the Circular Sterns of Ships of
, (London, 1822), p.14.
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American Station were ordered. to cruise in pairs. When the
American. ventured further afield, Croker persuaded both Cabinet
and Admiralty to issue the following secret order to all
Commanders-in-Chiefs
-	 My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having
received intelligence that several of the American ships
of war are now at sea, I have their Lordship.' commands to
acinaint you therewith, and. that they do not conceive that
any of His Majesty's frigates should attempt to engage,
single-handed, the larger class of American ships, which
though they may be called frigates, are of a size,
complement, and. weight of metal much beyond that class,
and more resembling line-of-battle ships.1
This strategy of avoiding combat, together with a practical
refutation of Jeff er5fl5 contention that America's seaboard
defied blockading, effectively neutralized the American threat.
Although British commeroe continued to lose heavily to
privateers, United States trade practically ceased altogether.
More important from the standpoint of morale, no further
spectacular refutation. of British invincibility occurred.2
1. Adm.2/1377, Admiralty to Commanders-in-Chief, secret, 10/12
July 181 3. Jennings, ed., Croker, i. 44-45. Bartlett, p. 31.
2. Clowes, vi. 59-65, 69. Japier, l{a'vy, p.9.
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In what way, then, were the American frigates so superior to those
of Britain that the latter were ordered to avoid. them? The
answer is quite simple a they were superior in practically every
way. In the first place, they were larger. The extent of this
advantage in size has, unfortunately been obscured for two reasons:
firstl7 defeated British captains tended to magnify American
superiority while the Americana preferred to minimize it;
secondly the American methods of ship mensuration, "carpenters'
tonnage" and "registered tonnage W , were not comparable with each
other, with the two equivalent forms of British mensuration, or
with present day measurement by displacement. 1 The moat
convenient criterion of comparison is, therefore, that used. by
LI. Chapelle in his definitive study of the American fXtgates
in the War of 1812.
Chapelle resorted to measuring the length of the ships
(f
between	 drawn from the extremities of their main
decks. In this respect all the American 44' s measured 174 feet
1. Chapelle, I.Lxviii. 233-34. Clowes, vi. 27-28. See also
Andrew Murray, Shi-Bui1d.ing and Steamships - the Theory and.
Practice of Shipbuilding (London, 1861), pp.157-6O.
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l0 inches; the Macedonian on the other hand, was only 157 feet
3 inches, the Java slightly shorter, and the Shannon 150 feet
2 inches. The British 24-pd.r. gun frigate Cambrian, built in
1797, measured only 154 feet. In comparison, the British 74,
Mars, was exactly l3 inches longer than the American super
frigates. The latter thus consistently enjoyed a superiority
in length over all British frigates, a superiority that was
accompanied by increased breadth and depth of hold. In both
cases these measurements were only about five feet less than
those of the Mars.1
But American frigate construction embodied a mor. significant
advantage than that of size. They were much more stoutly built.
Professor Albion, in his study of the Royal Navy and. its timber
problems, revealed the extent to which British ship construction
depended upon light fir during the Napoleonic struggles. Even
when valuable oak was made available for frigate construction,
the ecaxitling was light and the walls thin. The Americans on the
other hand. had. 22-inch walls of live Virginia Oak, an.d. the
1. Chapelle, M.IL. xviii, 290 , 296 , 301, and The History of
the American Sailing Navy (New York, 1949), pp. 312-19.
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timbering throughout was heavier than many British ships of the
1line.
I British visitor found the United States "a tremendous
frigate ... a bed of timber", and pronounced her mor. stoutly
built than his own 82-gun ship. 2 British officers inspecting the
captured President were equally impressed. The United States
was, in Chapelle's estimation, as heavy as the best British
74; the President and. Constitution he considered "slightly
lighter than the better class of 74-gun ships in the Ro;ai. Navy."3
They were therefore heavier than the other half-dozen types of
74 comprising this rat..
The Admiralty were thus quite justified in comparing the
American super frigates to ships of the line in size and con-
struction. These qualities in turn provided, the basis for the
superiority in armament and. complement of crew also referred to
in the secret order of November 1814. For a warship is no more
than a floating gun platform; and. the heavier that platform is
built, while providing for proper sailing ability, the heavier
1. Ilbion, pp. 389-94.
2. Bartlett, Sea Power, pp. 31-32. NJ.S. Dillon, ii. 325.
3. Chapelle, 11.1. xviii. 290.
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the armaments it can mount. Thus the longer American frigate
could. carry tour guns more than its British opponent. Owing to
greater displacement and. stout construction it could. also support
a heavier armament without strain or loss of stability. More
important, as the contests of 1812 were to prove, this stability
contributed immeasurably to the accurate fire of the American
gunners working quickly and. efficiently behind. the immense
protection afforded. them by their ships' strong walls.
All these advantages were revealed. on August 19, 1812, when
Constitution fought and. completely destroyed. Guerrire. The
American carried. 54 guns and 456 men, the British 50 guns and. a
crew of 282. ConstitutIon's thirty-two long 24-pdr. guns and.
twenty-two 32-pd.r. carronades opposed thirty long l8-pd.r. guns,
two long 12-pd.r. guns, and. eighteen 32-pd.r. carronad.es . A single
American broadside thus weighed 736 pounds compared. with
Guerrire 570 pounds. The United. States, mounting 42-pdr.
rather than 32-pdr. carronades, threw 856 pound. broadsides
against Maced.onlan, the latter's weight of metal being slightly
smaller than uerrier•)
1. Clowes, vi. 34-37, 41-43, Douglas, 3rd. ed.., pp.403-24,
523-50.
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American frigate superiority was obvious; not only were
they superior to British 38's, they were more formidable than
any of the 24-pd.r. frigates, such as the Pomone and. Por't, that
Britain had successfully fought more than a decade befere.
Despite this fact, the superiority of the American frigate-might
never alone have turned. British success in Europe to resounding
defeat in America. To recall Mahan's phrase, it was the
"efficient tactical bearing" of improvements in materiel that
mattered. The French had. not used. their heavy frigates to good
advantage; the Americans had.. Moreover they had succeeded. where
Prance had failed by using exactly the same strategy.
It will be recalled. that during the Seven Tears War, Prance
had. adopted. a defensive strategy. Based. on the premise that the
power having the fewest ships must always avoid. doubtful
engagements, this strategy pitted French warships against British
commerce and inferior naval forces. After Trafalgar the French
reverted to this "desultory system of naval warfare" with
considerable success. 1
 In. 1812 the Americans possessedi by far
1. Douglas, 3rd. ed., pp.6l5-16 . Graham, pp. 233-34.
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the fewest ships, and they adopted. the same defensive strategy.1
Indeed, it was this defensive strategy- that had. brought
about the American super frigate in the first place. For in
order to offset their numerical inferiority the Americans built
vessels larger than their European counterparts. Such vessels
not only enhanced. the chances of breaking through a blockade,
but could be assured. of favourable conditions if forced. to fight
a European ship of nominally the same rate. It was with this
strategy in mind. that the American Government in 1793 had Joshua
Humphrey-s draw up plans for even heavier frigates than those the
French had adopted for the same reasons.2
It is evident then, as Chape].le asserts, "that the Americans
did. not originate the idea of the heavy frigate; they merely
improved it.' 3 They also proved. notably more successful with
heavy frigates than had. their French masters. This was largely
owing to the fact that whereas France's adoption of defensive
strategy arose from a defeatist attitude, the Americans adopted.
1. Bow]es, p. 41. Clowes, vi. 172. Mahan, pp.538-40.
2. Bartlett, Sea Power, p. 32. Chapelle, M.M. xviii. 289.
3. Chapelle, M.M. xviii. 289.
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the same strategy out of pure necessity. In Prance's case, with-
drawal from action increased the demoralization and incompetence
that had. inspired the policy in the first place. The British had.
found them easy gain.. In America's case there was no such
demoralization or incompetence; when they chose to fight, they
fought well. For this reason they succeeded where Prance had tailed..
It was precisely at this point, when the British engaged
the Americans, that the1found. the yard-arm tactics so successful
against the French in similar circumstances, to be totally
inadequate. In fact the British frigates found it impossible to
get within effective range of the Americana. The latter, with
their long 24-pdr. guns stood off beyond. the range where the
British could fire accurately with their 18-pdrs. They then
proceeded to dismast the enemy and. silence many of his guns with
impunity. lith the British frigates sufficiently crippled, the
Americans came to close-quarters to end the engagement with
murderous point-blank broadsides.1
1. Clowee, vi. 41-43, 48-53. Dupin, Voyages, ii. ii. 137.
Lloyd and Hadcook, Artillery, p. 55. Commander James Marshall,
A Description of Commander Marshall's New Mode of Mounting and
Working Ships' Guns (London, 1829), p. 47.
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The British appeared. to be helpless in the face of the
American tactics. So attached. were their captains to the tactic.
that had defeated. France that they persisted in pressing
fruitlessly for closei.quarters rather than maneuvering to attain,
if not victory, at least survival. Most of the accusation. of
inoompetenoe directed at British officers by naval historians
were based on this obsession with obsolete tactics, and. the
seeming inability to develop a more flexible response to the new
situation posed. by American gunnery)
For it was upon gunnery that the ultimate success of
American strategy and. tactics rested.. The Americans drilled
incessantly, first on land, and. then at sea, and their guns were
equipped with guneights and vent tubes to provide a higher degree
of accuracy at long-range.2
1. Bowles, p. 41. Chapelle, M.M. mIx. 233-34. Clowes,
vi. 41-43, 172. Douglas, 1.t ed., pp. 265-66. Rapier, The Ravy,
pp. 24-25.
2. Adin.1/402l, Ordnance to Admiralty, 22 June 1814 and.
enclosure. Clew.., vi. 53. Rapier, The Navy, p.3.
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The British, on the other hand, never drilled on land, and
rarely at sea; eights and. tubes were practically unheard of, and,
as already mentioned, there existed in the Royal Navy a firm
prejudice against long-range action.
This prejudice was strikingly illustrated by the fact that
it was not until 1813, after the Americans had. demonstrated the
possibilities of long-range fire, that the Admiralty discovered
the range tables of 1790 and 1798 had. become obsolete through
advances in casting and. gunpowder. 1
 This belated. d.eacovery also
provided eloquent comment on the inflexible dependence on yard.-
arm tactics to defeat the French, and. by extension, the failure
of the latter to use their long-guns effectively at long-range,
as did the Americans.
The Americans, therefore) enjoyed many advantages in the
frigate engagements of 1812. In site and. stability of ship,
in number and calibre of guns, and in efficiency and. accuracy of
1. 1dm. 1/4021, Ordnance to Admiralty, 26 April and
28 May 1813.
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gunnery, they exercised. a great superiority over the British.1
These advantage., combined, with their choice of tactics -
choosing the enemy and. the range - made the British defeats
practically inevetable.
But if stout shipa and. heavy guns counted. for mach in the
frigate actions, they had. no bearing on the outcome of early
sloop actions. Here American superiority was confined solely to
gunnery. In October 1812, U.S.S. Waei carried. on a running
fight in rough seas with H.M.S. Frolic. Size and. armament of the
two eloope were practically equal, the range only sixty yards.
Yet the Americans suffered. only ten casualties compared with over
ninety aboard. the riddled. Frolic. Four months later, U.S.S.
Hornet carrying twenty 32-pd.r. carronad.es sank, with two broad-
sides, H.M.S. Peacock mounting nineteen 24-pdr. oarronad.es .
Admittedly the American sloop had. a considerable ad.v'antage in
metal; more significant was the fact that not once did. Peacock
1. It i. impossible to accurately express the mathematical
proportions of this superiority, although Clowee, vi. 48-53,
estimates it was in the order of 5 to 4, and. Bowles, Pamph1ets,
pp. 27-33, sets it at 3 to 2.
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even touch her adversary)
American gunnery skill from both long- and close-range was
therefore a decisive factor in the naval engagements of the War
of 1812, and came to be recognised as such by the British. Thus
at a court-martial aboard EJ.S. Surprise in January of 1814,
the defeat of H.M.S. Boxer by V.S.S. Enterprise was attributed
to "a superiority in the enemy's force, principally in the
number of men, as well as to a greater degree of skill in the
direction of her fire, and to the destructive effects of the
first broadsides."2
Nor were the Americans the only ones to demonstrate the
effects of accurate gunnery. Shannon's celebrated defeat of
U.S.S. Chesapeak was widely attributed to the gunnery skilla
instilled by Sir Philip Broke, H.M.S. Phoebe's defeat of the
Essex, attained by staying beyond the range of the latter's
complete carronade armament, was again attributed to intelligent
tactics and good gunnery, and also demonstrated the çeils of
1. Clowes, vi. 38-41, 53-55. Douglas, 3rd.. ed., pp. 413-15.
2. Clowes, vi. 89-91.
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the carronade as primary armament. 1 But while the need for more
Shannons with superb gunnery was recognised., the task of introducing
the necessary training end. mechanics in the midst of war was too
great, and had to await the coming of peace. This task is
discussed in Chapter Two.
At the same time, the shock of the American victories spurred.
immediate Admiralty effort to match the Americans in other respects.
Some attempt was made to augment the crews of frigates on the North
American Station, notably in the oases of Java and Shannon.2
These efforts were severely restricted by the size of the vessels,
and. by the limited. number of trained seamen that could be spared.
from the global struggle against France. In any case, such aug-
mentation as did. take place was temporary; after the war, manning
the Royal Navy's much reduced peace establishment still posed. an
apparently insuperable problem.3
1. Robertson, pp. 137-39. Lewis, Navy of Britain, p. 546.
2. Cloves, vi. 78.
3. Bartlett, Sea Power, 47-49, 123, 138-39, 143, 164, 229-30,
283, 304-315. Bowles, Pamphlets, 15-19, 99-100, 109-21 , 165, 213,
215-16 , 220-39, 299. Napier, The Navy, 24-26, 32, 41-42. N. Taylor,
"Manning the Royal Navy, The Reform of the Recruiting System: 1852-62"
N.M. xliv. 302-13, xlv. 46-58.
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Another attempt to match the Americans, during the war had
more far-reaching effect. This was the decision to build a
daBs of super frigates. The Admiralty, after first resisting
the idea, had two 60-gun frigates ready for the last six months
of hostilities, and. planned five others of 50 guns. The two
60-gun frigates, Leander and Newcastle, played no important part
in the war apart from fumbling an opportunity to intercept
Constitution. Built in haste, and of inferior timber, th r lacked.
the stability, strength and durability of the American super
frigates. Disappointing ships, they were nevertheless to have
a considerable influence on French and American frigate construction
after 1815.1
The most far-ranging of the Admiralty's activities in 1813,
however, was their search for a gun to counter the American
24-pd.rs . Perhaps for the first time in the history of naval
warfare, a series of combats had been decided by- naval artillery
at long-range. Britain's end.eavours to provide her navy with a
1. Adm.1/4021 , Ordnance to Admiralty, 26 Feb. 1813, enclosing
Sir Thomas Blomefield to Ordnance, 25 Feb. 1813, minute. Albion,
Pp. 390-93. Bartlett, Sea Power, pp. 31-3 2 . Bowles, Pamphlets,
pp. 41-44. See below Chapter Three.
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similar capacity completely reversed the trend of naval warfare
that had, for the last two centuries, been leading towards light,
handy artillery fired at close-range, and. that had culminated
in the carronade and the "Nelson touch". In reversing this
trend, Britain sounded the modest opening note in an armaments
race that reached its crescendo in the late nineteenth century.
The superior range of the American long-guns over th.
British 18-pd.r., demonstrated in the frigate and. sloop actions
of 1812, also proved a significant factor in American victories
on the Great Lakes. Chaunoey on Lake Ontario, and. Perry on Lake
Erie, displayed the same skill in their use of tactics and. long-
range as had the officers of the Constitution and United States.1
Thus in September 1813, finding his flotilla outmaneuvered and
at the mercy of the wind and. American 32-pd.rs. Sir James Teo
reportedt
I found it impossible to bring them he Americans) to
close action. We remained in this mortifying
situation five hours, having only six guns in the
fleet that would reach the enemy.
1. Cloves, vi. 110-30.
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In November, Yeo requested long 24-pdr. guns for his flotilla.1
This was not a very realistic request. For it was improbable
that many of Teo'e tiny ships could have carried the tremendous
weight of 24-pdre. British guns of this calibre were of two
eizes the nine-foot model weighing 47 owt., and. a nine-foot six-
inch model of 50 owt. 2 Only the most stoutly built ships in the
Royal Navy could carry them. They were in 1813 provided only
for the middle decks of first-rates, the upper decks of "some"
74-gun ships, the lower decks of 64-gun ships, and "sometimes the
larger class of frigate." 3 Thus if Britain were to provide these
heavy weapons to all vessels, down to and including the brigs on
1. Douglas, 3rd.. ed., p. 48. Guns in the lakes engagements
were heavier than those in the frigate engagements. The Americans
mounted mostly 32-pdrs. and. the British short 24-pdrs. and long
18-pdrs. C. Winton-Clare, "A Shipbuilder's War", LM.XXIX, 139-48.
See also C.P. Staoey, "Another look at the Battle of Lake Erie",
C.H.R. XXXIX, I.
2. W.O.44/49 8 , Royal Arsenal Return of Sea Guns, 29 March,
1813.
3. Adm.1/402l, Ordnance to Admiralty, 21 July 1813.
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Lake Ontario, she would have had to either reduce drastically the
number of guns per rate, or rebuild the greater part of her navy.
Neither of these alternatives was palatable. The Admiralty
sought some form of compromise. In January 1813, 24-pd.r. guns
six feet six inches in length and weighing 33 owt. were tested
aboard LM.S. Venerable and. K.M.S. Daeilalus. Not only did.
these guns not have the desired range, but the vd.Olence of their
recoil rendered. them both unsafe and inaccurate. In any case they
were too short to permit the muzzle to project safely beyond.
the wall of an average frigate. For these reasons no tests
were mad.e on an even shorter model, ix feet long and weighing
1
only 31 cwt.
It was obvious that as none of the existing 24-pdrs. met the
requirements of long-range and light weight, new models capable
of equaling the Americans in range, but light enough to serve
in British frigate., would have to be devised. A month following
the disappointing tests aboard Venerable and Daedalne, the
Inspector of Artillery, Sir Thomas Blomefield., submitted plans
1. Ibid. 12 Feb. 1813, enclosing Select Committee Report to
Ordnance, 25 Jan. 1813.
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for a new eight-foot model weighing 42 ewt. The Admiralty
rejected. Blomefield.'a propose]. on the grounds that, while "it
would be of great importance to have a 24-pdr. gun which might
be carried by frigates .. their Lord.shipe envision that such
guns ought, if possible, not exceed. 40 owt."1
Plans for such a gun had. already been submitted. by Colonel
William Congreve. The son ot the Royal Laboratory Super-
intendent of the same name, Congreve had received. the grand title
of Superintendent of Military Machines for his work in perfecting
the war rocket. His inventive mind was also to provide great
improvements in gunpowder and its storage, gun and carronade
carriages, gunsights, and nuntbrous other contributions to the
advancement of artillery.2
Recognising the need for a gun with which to oppose the
1. Ibid. 26 Feb. 1813, enclosing Sir Thomas Blomefield to
Ordnance, 25 Feb. 1813 and minute.
2. Congreve ( 1772-1828 ) spent most of the war years with
experimental rocket battalions and directed rockets at Leipzig in
1813 . Attached to the Royal Laboratory in 1791, he succeeded. his
father as Comptroller and second baronet in 1814. He wrote many
articles on his work, and on currency, and was also Member of
Parliament from 1812-28. D.N.B.
53
Americans, Congreve submitted. his proposals early in 1813.1
Unlike Blomefield's projected. gun, that of Congreve involved.
more than producing a new model of the old pattern 24-pdr. In
fact his proposals of February 7, 1813 involved. a completely
new approaoh to the design and. casting of heavy guns. So
revolutionary was Congreves proposed gun, that it attracted.
immediate and. violent criticism fromny influential
artillerists, a fact that prevented. its appearance in time to
seriously oppose the Americans. Yet so great a part did this
gun play in the rearmament of the Royal Navy after 1815, and
such was its influence on the future design of heavy guns, that
it deserves close study.
Congreve was convinced "not only that no serious improvement
has been made in the construction of cannon for the last two
hundred years, but that in fact up to the present period. no
1. Adm.1/402l, Congreve to Rear Admiral Kope, 7 Feb. 1813,
and Congreve memo of 31 Jan. 1 813, both documents enclosed. in
Admiralty memo of 10 Feb. 1813. See also William Congreve,
A Concise Account of The Origin of the New Class of 24-pdr.
Medium Guns, at reduced Length and Weight, Proposed. by Colonel
Congreve, for the Arming of prigates,(London, 1814).
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fixed principle appears to have been acted upon..." 1 He
immediately set about providing both the improvement and the
principle. The principle used to determine the length of his gun
was the Prussion artilleriet Euler's "theory of coincidence of
length to weight of charge." As the shot weighed 24 pounds, and
the British regulation charge was established at one-third the
weight of the shot, Euler's theory indicated that existing
British 24-pd.rs. were either too long or too short for their charge.
The correct length should have been seven feet six inches.2
Congreve thus proposed that his 24-pdr. gun be seven feet
1. W.O.44/498 , Congreve to Ordnance, 9 March 1814, in packet
"Correspondence, Reports and Experiments relative to the New
Construction for Ordnance proposed by Sir. Wm. Congreve, 1813,
1814, and 1815."
2. It would be difficult for a layman to explain Euler's
theory and in any case, Congreve himself did not see any necessity
for doing so. Tet it is of interest to note that Congreve's
gun was the first to have its length based on scientific
principles, the lengths previously being determined by the
capacity of the various ships' decks. (See W.O . 55/1823, manu-
script entitled "A Treatise on Artillery", 1780 (?), by C.D.
(Charles Douglas?), foe. 10-li.)
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aix inches long, and weigh "not less than 40 cwt." The moat
distinctive feature of the weapon however, was in its shape end
distribution of metal. By "making it in the carronad.e figures
Congreve removed the traditional tulip and much of the metal that
distinguished the muzzles of common pattern guns. This weight
he redistributed, at the breech to give added strength, velocity,
and, it was hoped, range.1
This great preponderence of weight at the breech of the gun
necessitated moving the trunnions toward that part in order to
maintain proper balance on the carriage. Placing the trunnions
near the breech in turn solved one difficulty inherent in short
iff.) c4) t1'j &i1ic1 u*.c
guns, ..4 demonstrated when testing the aix-foot six-inch model;
that was the problem of having the muzzle project a safe distance
beyond the ship's side. With the trunnions further inboard,
Congreve's gun would project about the same distance as existing
long-guns. Thus if it did. possess the ranging power of a long
24-pd.r., while weighing two hundred pounds less than the long
l8-pdrs. common to frigates, Congreve's gun would. provide
1. Adm.1/402l , Admiralty memo. of 10 Feb. 1813, enclosing
Congreve to Hope, 7 Feb. 1813.
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equality with American weaponry. Moreover, it would provide
this equality without necessitating expensive alterations to
the ships of the Royal Navy.1
There was little need to remind the Admiralty in 1813 that
the weapofls suitability as an armament for frigates was "not
the least important point of consideration." 2 Immed.iate. orders
for experimental models were placed with the Carron Company of
Scotland.. Early in June the first Congreve guns, thirty in
number, were allocated to the frigate Cy-d.nue.3
Not until September 1813 did the new guns see action. In
a sharp frigate engagement, E.M.5. Eurotas, carrying Congreve
24-pd.rs. and standard long 18-pdrs., captured the French frigate
La Colinde mounting 18-pdrs. Captain Phillimore's report on the
new gun was highly favourable. Apart from a somewhat harsher
recoil than the 18-pd.r., Congreve'. gun had a better range,
enjoyed a g:reater horizontal sweep owing to its tapered muzzle,
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Adm.1/402l , Ordnance to Admiralty, 12 Feb. 1813;
- 12 April 1813 enclosing Congreve to Ordnance, 9 April; 9 June
1813 and minute.
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and, with two fewer crew, fired. three round.a in th. same time as
the l8-pdz fired. two. Encouraged by this report, the Admiralty
reiuested. the Ordnance Department to fit out several additional
frigates with Congreve guna.
Ord.nance refused. to do so. In fact they refused to have
any more Congreve guns cast until exhaustive testing could. be
carried. out at Sutton Heath. Instead. the Admiralty were advised.
to arm six new frigates with guns of the same size and. weight
designed by Sir Thomas Blomefield, Inspector of Artillery. 2 The
Admiralty were outraged.. In a memorandum later delivered to
Ordns"ce, they deplored that department's casting new guns
"without any authority". They were further incensed. by the
proposal to arm aix frigates "without any experiment aM yet with
Captain Phillimore's favourable report, and. this Board's
directions, they will not cast a gun of Colonel Congrev.'s."3
1. Ad.m.1/4021, Ordnance to Admiralty, 8 Oct. 1813;
enclosure and. minute. W.O.44/498, Select Committee Report to
Ort3n-nce, 25 April 1814 and enclosures. Add. MSS.41367, los.
86-93; 41406, fos. 71-72.
2. Adm.1/402l , Ordnanc. to Admiralty, 13 Oct. 1813.
3. Ibid. Admiralty Memo. later sent to Ordnance, 14 Oct. 1813.
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The reply to this rebuke was equally testy. After pointing
out that the Blomefield. guns had. not been provided, for naval
service only, Ordnance concluded,
... without commenting upon the terms in which the
communication of their Lord.ships' sentiments is couched...,
or upon the inadiniasable and. unpreo.dented tone of
authority assumed. in it, the Board. desire to remark, with
regard. to the provision of these guns, that it i. not
necessary for them to justify that measure to the Lords
of the Admiralty, and that they receive orders from the
Master General of the Ordnance only.1
The Admiralty rejoined. that regarding naval matters, "their
Lodshipa cannot but think that their opinion i.e of the highest
authority whenever they shall see occasion to express it."2
The relationship between these two departments, and. the
authority of each regarding the provision of naval armaments, is
discussed in Chapter Five. It is sufficient to say at this point
that the diametrically opposed opinions of the two boards expressed.
above, were both substantially correct. This did not expedite
matters, however, for this inter-departmental conflict seriously
delayed the fulfillment of the Admiralty's desire for a 24-pdr.
1. Ibid.. Ordiane&to Admiralty, 18 Oct. 1813.
2. Ibid. minute.
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to combat the American..
The conflict began within the Ordnance Department. It will
be recalled that shortly after Congreve submitted his plane to
the Admiralty, an eight-foot 24 .-pdr. weighing 42 cvt. had been
submitted by the Inspector of Artillery, Sir Thomas Blomefield.
The Admiralty ha.d. rejected Blomefield's plan, stipulating that
guns proposed for frigate armament should not weigh more than
40 owt. They then proceeded to order Congxeve guns despite
Ordnance reluctance and in the face of criticism from several
naval otflcer..1
Blomefield promptly designed and had cast several gun.
exactly equal in length and weight to those of Congr.ve, but in
the traditional mould. He had this done through his own
authority within the Ordnance Department, and without consulting
the Admiralty. The latter thus felt "some degree of surprise"
when informed in September 1813 that a number of Blomefield. guns
2
were ready for service. Surprise gave way to th. extreme
1. Ibid. Ordnance to Admiralty, 12 Feb. 1813, enclosing Sir
Home Popham and. Rear Admiral David June to Ordnance, both dated
26 Jan, 1813.
2. Ibid.. Ordnance to Admiralty, 27 Sept. 1813, minute.
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displeasure, already described, when subBeuently informed, that
only Blomefield. guns were available, and. that no more Congreve
guns were to be cast until existing ones were thoroughly tested.
by Ord.nance.
Blomefield's furtive activity had probably begun out of
pique at Congreve's intrusion into his domain; it culminated in
a thunderous defence of the existing pattern of heavy gun against
Congreve 5
 new style. In this defence he did not stand alone.
Moat of the committees involved in testing Congreve's gun
revealed a marked. prejudice against it. In their opinion, its
distinctive shape blended the "four acknowledged imperfections"
of shortness, trunnions near the breech, thin metal at the muzzle,
and heavy metal at the breech. That a heavy breech could. impart
increased range was "repugnant to theory", while the conception
of the gun was "against nature."3'
In November, 1813, tests were carried out at Sutton Heath
before a mixed committee of naval and artillery officers. Not
1. W.0.44/49 8 , Select Committee Reports, 25 March, 7 April
and 12 Dec. 1814. Ada.1/4021, Ordnance to Admiralty, 26 June
1815 and enclosures.
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only did. Congreve's gun outrange those of Bloinefi.ld., it also
outranged. the largest 24- and 32-pdr. guns in service. It did,
however, have a harsh recoil, and. its superiority over the
larger guns was not consistent. The committee pointed out the
extreme regularity of the heavier guns, and intimated, that such
success as the gun did enjoy could be imputed to accidental
causes. If short guns were absolutely necessary for the navy,
the committee advised. that Blomefield's gun with its "established
configuration" be adopted.1
The Admiralty and Colonel Congreve appeared to be the only
enthusiastic supporters of the new weapon. 2 Colonel Henry
Shrapne].l, inventor of the shell bearing his name, concluded,
probably correctly, that the trials at Sutton Heath were too
inconclusive to warrant attaching much importance to them.3
1. Adm.1/4021, Ordnance to Admiralty, 29 Mow. 1813 and.
enclosures; 4022, Ordnance to Admiralty, 26 June 1815 and
enclosures.
2. W.O.44/498 , Congreve to Ordnance, 9 March and. 12 Aug. 1814,
1 June, 1815.
3. Ibid. Colonel Henry Shrapnell to Lord Keith, 25 March
1814. See also Douglas, 3rd ed., p.216, and. Dupin, Voyages,
ii.ii. 99-100.
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The Admiralty, however, believed these trials had proved.
Congreve's gun the best available with which to fight the
Americans, and. stoutly insisted that they be mounted. on the
Montreal, Niagara and Star preparing on Lake Ontario. 1 The
order was placed. in January 1814. Shortages and Ordnance pro-
orastination delayed. the first shipment until late summer, when
sixty-eix were embarked on the transport Stranger, and. promptly
captured by an American privateer.2
There is no evidence to indicate that the Congreve gun
played. any important role against the Americans. As was the case
with the super frigates Leander and Newcastle, they were to
exercise much more influence in the peace following the war that
brought them into being. Nevertheless, by introducing these
guns and frigates, the Admiralty indicated. they were capable of
learning from the Americans. The most significant lesson froa
the War of 1812, and the one most reluctantly accepted., was the
fact that the yard-arm tactics employed. in Europe could no longer
1. Adm. 1/4021 , Ordiiance to Admiralty, 28 and. 31 Jan., 4 Feb.
1814 and. minutes, 9 July 1814 and enclosures.
2. Ibid. 19 Oct. 1814.
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be relie& upon to provid.e victoriee. Long-rang. skill was also
necessary. To attain this skill demanded. that attention be
paid to the gunsighta, vent tubes and. gunnery training, that had.




SIR HOWARD DOUGLAS AND THE GuT LESSONS 07 1812
The War of 1812 brought about a remarkable transformation
in the Admiralty's attitude toward naval gunnery. Before 1812
it had shared with other European navies the belief that long-
range accuracy at sea was impossible, and that any effort to
attain such accuracy would be wasted. Training had. consequently
been restricted. to teaching the mechanics of loading and firing
quickly and. efficiently for close-quarters combat. The Americans
on the other hand. had proved. that the use of heavy artillery,
combined. with sighting aids and intense gunnery training, resulted
in a considerable degree of accuracy at long-range, and. maximum
utilization of fire-power at close-range. This lesson was not
lost upon the Admiralty. Between 1815 and 1820 steps were taken
to improve guns and to train gunners. Gunaights and. vent tubes
were introduced to increase the accuracy of the weapon, and.
gunnery manuals and gunnery training to increase the skills of
the men. Heavier guns were mounted. The Admiralty's new
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enthusiasm, while bringing about many significant gunnery reforms,
was not sufficient to overcome the hurdles of retrenchment and
conservatism. In particular the navy was not prepared to accept
the many suggestions of Sir Koward. Douglas for improving naval
gunnery, and. Douglas's suggested gunnery training ship, windage
reduction and new flint looks were not adopted until much later.
In 1820, however, these and numerous other suggestions of Douglas
were published in his immensely influential treatise on naval
gunnery.
Overall American success in ship combat was largely
attributable to the superior accuracy of American gunnery, an
accuracy attained. through constant drilling and through the use
of such small but important improvements as gunsights and. vent
tubes. The benefits to be derived from the use of gunsighte,
especially where long-range was concerned, are obvious; the
value of vent tubes perhaps requires some explanation. To
discharge heavy artillery required some means of conducting
fire from outside the gun into the gunchamber housing the charge.
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In earliest days this had. been accomplished by the simple but
dangerous expedient of inserting a red hot spike into the vent,
a practice that, by the middle of the fifteenth century, had
given way to igniting loose powder trailed across the top of the
gun and. into the vent. This method, practically as dangerous as
that it replaced, was also useless in wet or win&y weathe 	 By
the late seventeenth century, therefore, quio1onatch was inserted
into the vent and. touched off, at first by portfiree, but after
1790 by flintlock..1
But q.uickmatch required priming, thereby necessitating on
deck loose powder with its attending dangers. Moreover, quick-
match burned slowly; on a pitching deck this meant that the
interval between touch and discharge could find the muzzle in a
totally different relationship to the target than at the time of
aiming. By enclosing rapid-burning priming powder in vent tubes,
the dangers of loose powder on deck could be done away with, and
the moment of aim and. ignition made more nearly simultaneous. Thus
gunsights improved. the accuracy of aim while vent tubes helped to
1. T.D. Majendie, Ammunition for Smooth-bore Ordnance
(London, 1867), pp. 187-92. Douglas, 3rd. ed., pp. 384-90.
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ensur, that the gun discharged at the proper moment.
Both these devices had been rejected by the Admiralty when
suggested to them prior to 1812. Thus tubes submitted
independently by Captain J.A. More, R.M.A., and a Captain
Robinson, R.N., were in 1810 declared unnecessary for naval guns,1
and captains requesting gunsights were advised that such
novelties were "not according to the regulation of the service.w2
Nelson himself reflected the British attitude to sights when
their introduction was suggested to him in 1801*
As to the plan for pointing a gun truer than we do at
present, if the person comes, I shall, of course, lodk
at it, or be happy, if necessary, to use it; but I hope
we shall be able, as usual, to get so close to our
enemies that our shot cannot miss the object.3
Certainly British reluctance to adopt sights and tubes had
considerable justification. The inaccuracy of heavy guns
throughout the eighteenth century, owing not only to ship motion,
but also to defects in gunpowder as well as to imperfeotioma in
1. Ind.4938: 59-4, 15 Nov. 1817.
2. Robertson, Naval Armament, p. 154
3. Nelson to Sir K. Berry, 9 March 1801, cited in Lloyd
and. Had.cock, Artillery, p. 33, note.
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the casting and reaming of shot and. bore, rendered. effective long
range accuracy practically impossible. William	 sixteenth
century dictum "for he that ehooteth far off at a ship had as good
not shot at all", 1 was still largely applicable in 1801. More-
over, as Nelson had observed in connection with gunsighte,
European naval tactics rendered. long range accuracy unnecessary
in any case. Thus improvements in gunpowder and. gun casting
immediately before and. during the Napoleonic Wars, improved gun
- accuracy, but did. not convince the A&miralty that a comparable
increase in sighting accuracy was called. for. 2 But American use
of sights and. tubes, in addition to thorough gunnery training, had.
resulted. in highly effective gunnery both at long- and. close-range,
and. convinced the British of the need for something more sophieti-
cated than their existing rough line of metal sighting and. truimion
elevating scales.3
In August of 1813, Sir Thomas Blomefield. of the Ordnance
1. NJ.S. Monson, iv. 43.
2. Robertson, p. 154. For improvements in gun casting, eto.,
see above Chapter One.
3. Douglas, 1st ed., pp. 223-27.
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Department believed an "ingenious contrivance" suggested by
Captain Truscoit, RJ., while not sufficiently accurate for
pointing land. artillery, was adequate "to draw the attention of
sailors to so essential a part of their duty." 1 The Admiralty
ordered. that one hundred. of these tangent sights be tested
aboard Med'way, Rivoli and. Benbow at Portsmouth. Blomefield. alsO
had. a graduated sight of his own construction tested. aboard.
Med.way. Neither sight was satisfactory.2
The Admiralty, undeterred. by these disappointments, continued.
to encourage "any attempt which leads the attention toward. good.
1. Adin. 1/4021 , Ordnance to Admiralty, 2 Aug. 1813, snolosing
Sir Thomas Blomefield. to Ordnance, 31 July 1813 and minute.
2. Adm.1/4021 , Ordnance to Admiralty, 13 Aug. and. 8 Oct.
1813 and. minutes, 12 Jan. and. 22 June 1814 and. enclosures,
30 Dec. 1814. Por further information on sights around. this time,
see V.0.44/498 , packets entitled. "Tangent Sights for Naval Guns -
Captain Truscott - 1814", and "Sights for Naval Guns - John
Hookhain". See also Douglas, 1st ed., pp. 223-27, 3rd. ed.,
pp .374-79; H. Garbett, Naval Gunnery (London, 1897), pp. 22-23;
J.H. Stevens, Some Description of the Methods used in Pointing
Guns at Sea (London, 1834), pp. 8-12, appendix.
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direction in pointing Sea Service Ordnance." 1 Nor were they
discouraged by those officers who defined such refinements as
gimcrack.. Blomefield, though he sought adequate eights, felt
them to have limited naval value, especially between decks 2 while
a critic of Congreve's new gun remarked that its cast foresight
would be useless in sea practice. 3 The Admiralty, on the other
hand, wondered if all guns and carronad.es for naval service
should not be cast with such a eight. Ordnance did not feel this
would be practical.4 Despite disappointments and criticisms,
the Admiralty continued the effort to improve British gunnery,
and by 1816 a number of experimental gunsighte and vent tubes were
undergoing trials.
In the autu.inn of that year, Lord Exmouth's bombardment of
1. W.O.44/498 , John Hookham to Ordnance, 31 Jan. 1815 and
minute. See Ibid. 3 Feb. 1815, and Ind.4933 i 59-4, 19 Oct. 1816.
2. Adm.1/4021, Ordnance to Admiralty, 22 June 1814, enclosing
Sir Thomas Blomefield to Ordnance, 21 Juiie 1814. Concerning
opposition to innovations that were "not coarsely simple", see
Douglas, 1st ed., pp. 10-11.
3. Add. 185. 41367, Martin Papers, foe. 86-93, undated and
unsigned reports on Congreve's gun.
4. Ad.m.1/40 21 , Ordnance to Admiralty, 26 June 1815.
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Algiers presented. the opportunity to test these and other
innovations in action. Apart from gtznaight., vent tubes and
other innovations such as chain cable., Congreve's improved
carronade carriages and powder magazines, war rocket and 24-pd.r.
medium ship gun, took part in the engagement. Congreve guns had
been allocated to the upper deck of the flagship, Queen Charlotte,
while sights designed by Captain Farquahar, BJ., and. tubes by
Lieutenant Pynmore, R.M.A., were issued to three frigates and.
three ships of the line.1
So far as the sights, tubes and Congreve guns were concerned,
only the first-mentioned failed to receive favourable reports
from Algiers. This was owing to the fact that while guneighta had.
appeared promising in pre-battle exercise, the action itself was
fought at close range and largely obscured by smoke, so that no
proper assessment of their value could. be made. 2 Fynmore tube.
and Congreve guns, on the other hand, received generous praise.
l.W.O.44/49 8 , Admiralty to Ordnance, 14 May 1816. md.. 4933s
59-4, 10 May, 10 July, 19 Sept., 11 Oct. 1816. N.R.S. Martin,
iii. 69-70. C.I. Parkinson, Edward Pellew, Viscount Exmoath
(London, 1934), pp. 439-62.
2. N.R.S. Martin, iii. 69-70.
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Not only had. the tubes worked well, but their quill construction
made them safer to use than those of tin used, by the Americans
and by H.M.S. Shannon. 1
 Exmoutb recommended these tubes, and
with his flag captain, Brisbane, expressed "unqualified
approbation" for the Congreve guns, although gunnery lieutenant
Cairns complained that their recoil was dazigerous, and. so harsh
as to frequently smash their muzzles against the deck.2
The reports from Algiers encouraged. the Admiralty to continue
working towards the American standard of gunnery. In the first
place they were satisfied. that Congreve's light 24-pdr. would
match the range and. weight of metal of American artillery, and.
relied upon this gun to an increasing degree for upper deck
armament. First ordered to the upper decks of all first-rates in
April, 1815, Exmouth's favourable report caused the Admiralty to
replace with Congreve guns the 12- and l8-pdre. forming the upper
1. Ind.4933z 59-4, 12, 20 Oct. 1816. oug1as 1st ed.,
2 32-35; Dupin Voyages, ii.ii. 124-26.
2. Ind.4953s 59-4, 12 Oct. 1816. Exmouth had specifically
requested these guns for the upper deck of his flagship, md.
4926, 6, 16 April 1815.
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deck armaments of second- and third-rate ships of the line.
By 1819, no such ship unable to mount at least Congreve 24-pdrs.
was to be rated higher than a 74-gun ship. As the 74 was no
longer considered sufficiently powerful to serve in the line,
this meant that the 24-pdr. was to be the minimum battery calibre
in ships of the line.1
Thus, despite continued controversy over its design and
harsh recoil, and notwithstanding fears expressed by Byam Martin,2
Controller of the Navy, that the weight of these guns, together
with the increased ballast required. to support them so high above
the waterline, would impair the navy's sailing qualities, Congreve's
gun became possibly the most common upper deck armament in the
Royal Navy. Not until new armaments were issued in 1829 was it
1. md. 4926, 6, 10, 12 and 16 April 1815; 4938 : 6, 20 and.
26 June 1817; 4947: 6, 8 Nov. 1819.
2. Martin (1773-1854) first served in the navy in 1786 and.
commanded various ships off Irish and French coasts and in the
West Indies - Rear Admiral in 1811, Comptroller of the Navy
1815-31 , M.P. For Plymouth 1818-31. His private paper. ar. most
useful for this period. DJ.B.
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largely discontinued., although it continued to form practically
the entire heavy gun armament of East Indiamen until ..11 into the
1830 ' s , and served. with the Royal Navy as a bored-up 32-pdr. as late
as 1852. Moreover its heavy breech and. tapered. muzzle were to
furnish the pattern for the shell guns of th. eighteen twenties, and.
for practically all heavy artillery after the eighteen thirties.1
Experiments following Algiers also brought about the intro-
duotion of gunsights and, vent tubes. Throughout 1817 trials were
successfully carried. out on Fynmore and. Congreve tubes at Portsmouth,
Plymouth, Sheerness and. Cork, and in the summer of 1818 both
patterns were approved. for service. 2 The following year a
1. Ind.4926. 6, 10 and. 12 April 1817, Douglas 3rd. ed., p. 212.
Marshall, Ships' Guns, pp. 71-73. Paixhans, Nouve].le Force
Maritime, pp. 66, note, 171-82. Dupin, Voyages, ii. ii. 148-49.
T.F. Simmons, A Discussion on the Present Armament of the Navy. etc.
(London, 1839), p. 70.
2. W.O.44/498, Sir William Congreve to Ordnance, 27 June and.
3 July 1817, 20 July and. 28 Aug. 1818. Adm.1/4023, Ordnance to
Admiralty 10 Dec. 1817. During the first six months of 1818,
37,000 tubes of both descriptions were issued. to eleven ships and.
thr.. depots. W.0. 44/498 , Return of the Royal Laboratory, 24
July, 1818.
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committee of naval and. artillery officers at Woolwich concluded.
that eights, too, were necessary for the naval service. Prom
the variety of guneights tested at that time, the committee
selected two patterns for service and. further comparison, one
of them by the indomitable Congreve, the other by Captain Renry
Duncan,
But although vent tubes and gunsighte had been adopted. by
1819, all ships in the Royal Navy did. not receive the former
until 1824, and. as late as 1828, many guns in the fleet were still
without sights. There were three reasons for these delays.
Piretly, as mentioned above in connection with gunsighta, there
existed. considerable prejudice on the part of some authorities
against innovation in general, and. againe 3c refinements in he
rough-and-tumble of sea combat in particular. Secoadly, the
realization that any innovation was open to further improvement
1. Ad.a.1/4024, Ordnance to Admiralty, 10 Nov. 1819,
enclosing Select Committee Report of 4 Nov. 1819. See also
ibid.. Ordnance to Admiralty, 12 Nov. 1819, enclosing Lieutenant
General William Cuppage to Ordnance, 5 Nov. 1819, and.
encloBurea.
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discouraged the too hasty introduction of one pattern of
guneight	 t	 -e to do so would render the introduction
of improved patterns confusing and. prohibitively expensive.
The third reason for the delay in introducing sights and
tubes was simply the matter of expense in a period of severe
economic depression and reduced military spending. Thus tubes
did. not become general in the Royal Navy until 1824 for the
simple reason that it required six years to wear out the powder
horns they were replacing. Similarly, the sights approved in
1819 were not issued in quantity because Ordnance, with the
responsibility for paying for them, bluntly informed the
Admiralty that perhaps better but certainly cheaper sights could
be devised.1
To be sure, the financial savings realized from the gradual
1. Adm.1/4024, William Cuppage at the Royal Carriage Depart-
ment to Wellington, 5 Nov. 1819. V.0.44/498 , Admiralty to Ordnance,
28 Aug. 1818. The cost of outfitting one 74-gun ship with
Eookham sights was estimated at £312. V.0.44/498, packet
entitled "Inventions - Sights for Naval Guns - John Bookham,
Jan. - Dec. 1819", John Rookham to Ordnance, 11 Nov. 1819.
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introduction of eights and. tubes was an insignificant part of
the economics effected. in British military spending between the
years 1815 and. 1820, and. indeed beyond. those years. But t1ere
could hardly be a better illustration of the effect of economic
qftsSv'1 asd pc5inw' %J	 'uflt
pressure o-the aa.La-aia., -t_.7e'm the Royal Navy. If the need
for economy could. delay something as cheap and uncomplicated as
a Tent tube for six years, what was to be the effect of retrench-
ment on the casting of new and more powerful ordnance, on the
building of super frigates, and. on the setting up of gunnery
schools and. depota? Although it is beyond the scope of this work
to study thoroughly the economic situation after 1815, some
attention to the effect of retrenchment on naval armaments is
necessary.
Britain faced. in 1815 a situation remarkably similar to that
of 1763. On both occasions the problem had been to ensure the
continuance of wartime naval supremacy during a peace marked. by
severe economic depression when funds were not readily voted by
Parliament. After 1763, as discussed elsewhere, 1 naval spending
1. See below Chapter Three.
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had. been so drastically reduced as to contribute to Britain's
loss of the seas during the American Revolution. Having learned
from this experience that defeated navies replaced their losses
with improved vessels and armaments, and. doubtless aware that the
example of Amerioan victories in 1812 would. not be lost on other
naval powers, Britain's naval retrenchment after 1815 was to be
less severe than had. been the case following 1763.
To be sure, Lord North's words after 1763 that the cost of
_"great Peace Establishments will, if we d.c not take care, prove
our ruin",' were echoed. in the years following 1815. Wellington's
fear that distressed. national finances rather than disarmament
would weaken Britain was shared by Melville, the First Lord., who
believed that Britain's true strength lay in her ability to
finance war, and. that therefore the first object during peace
"ought to be the husbanding of our pecuniary means." To this end.
he declared. himself "quite ready to out down without compunction
1. Bartleet, Sea Power, p. 1.
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every expense that can safely be spared." 1
 Bysin Martin, the
Controller, was also resigned to "the measures which in justice
to the public interest we have been obliged to adopt."2
Firmly as Martin and Melville believed in the need, for
economy, they nevertheless protested. vehemently and usually without
success, when the Government insiated on yet further outs in what
the Admiralty considered. to be dangerously low naval estimates.3
Yet despite the fact that government spending fell from nearly
seventy millions in 1817, toless than fifty millions in 1823,
and, notwithst4nding fierce Parliamentary debate of the Naval
1. Ibid. p. 16. Bartlett's section on "Economy and. the Post-
War Navy", pp. 13-21, is particularly useful for an understanding
of this period.. In this connection see also G.S. Graham, The
Politics of Naval Supremacy: Studies in British Maritime Ascendancy
(The Wiles Lectures given at Queen's University, Belfast, 1964.
eambrid.ge , 1965)), pp. 105-11.
2. Add. MSS. 41394, Martin to Sir George Grey, 24 Feb.
1817.
3. Add. 1(55. 41395, Martin memo. 16 Jan. and 5 July, 1821,
Melville to Martin, 6 eb. 1822, and Martin to Melville, 29
July 1822.
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Estimates, annual naval spending between those same yeaa was
consistently in the vicinity of six millions, and the dockyard
vote in 1821 remained almost as high as it had been in 1813 when
six or seven times as many large ships were in commission. 1
 The
reason for this last figure was the need. to replace nmny decaying
ships of wartime construction, a need. recognized. not only by the
Admiralty, but also by the 1817 Select Parliamentary Committee on
Finance in the opening paragraph of its sixth report.
Esteeming the Naval Superiority of this Country as
the principle on which its external power, internal safety,
and general prosperity, in the highest degree depend., Tour
Committee are of Opinion, that the sense which they enter .-
tam of the necessity of economy, cannot, with a due
regard to the interest of the State, be allowed. to interfere
with the support of such a Maritime force as may be deemed.
necessary in time of peace, nor with the .dequate prepar-
ations for its augmentation in the event of war. And. as
Naval Expenditure in tine of peace is principally connected.
with the purchase and preparation of materials for future
exigency, there is no part of the Public Service in which an
ill-judged temporary economy might be ultimately productive
of such a considerable expense.2
1. Bartlett, pp. 17-21.
2. P.P. (1817), iv. 181; (1818), iii. 169. Bartlett, p. 21.
8].
Thus despite unrelenting pressure to exercise every possible
economy, the Admiralty were not alone in striving to avoid the
mistakes made after 1763, and. the navy was by no means star'Ped
of funds.
It was to be a different matter with the Ortnnoe Department,
the department responsible for providing and. financing naval
weapons. 1 For if the navy had difficulty in passing its estimates
in 1816, the Army Estimates, containing those of Ordnance, were
nearly thrown out. "The history of Parliament", wrote Castlereagh,
"does not furnish an instance of so protracted. and determined
an opposition to the Army Estimates." 2 Nor did the Parliamentary
Finance Committee's sympathetic understanding for the navy's
problems extend to those of the Ordnance Department.
Upon investigating the armouries of that department, the
Committee were amazed, as were the Czar of Russia and a
distinguished. French economist, Charles Dupin, to discover a
wealth of materiel completely unexpected in a nation purportedly
1. On the Admiralty-Ordnance relationship see below
Chapter Five.
2. Bartlett, p. 14.
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exhausted by twenty-five years of war. 1 Further inquiry
revealed the Ord.nance Departments custom of greatly
inflating estimates in order to lay by desirable reserves of
equipment. Although Ordnance could claim in 1817, as had
the navy, that much of its equipment was not of the latest
pattern or best quality, and therefore required replacing,
the Committee directed that existing equipment be used, and
warned that the continuation of inflated estimates would
warrant "marking something more than mere disapprobationw.2
The Ordnance Department mended its ways. The production
of all naval a=iunitions and. stores, discontinued in 1815, was
limited after that date largely to the preparation of experi-
mental materiel in small amounts. In 1816 a visitor to
Woolwioh found only the Carriage Department working, and. the
cost of naval armaments, believed in 1818 to be incapable of
reduction below ten shillings per man per lunar month, was in
1. Dupin, Mi1itar Force, ii. 170-71.
2. Ibid. i. 238-40.
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fact halved by 1822.1
Reduced Ordnanc. spending after 1815 thus played a con-
eid.erable part in delaying the production of sights and. tubes,
although the navy had officially adopted both by 1819. In a
similar fashion, the need. for economy between 1815 and 1820
was to delay the implementation of other, more anbitious plans
put forth during those years for improving naval gunnery, in
particular plans for a gunnery training school. For the
adoption of sights and tubes, significant as it was, counted for
little unless accompanied by intensive instruction and training
in handling guns as well as sights.
The Royal Navy had. never made use of training ships or
depots in instructing naval gunners. They did not as late as
1816 even possess a standard. manual of exercise for working
heavy guns, the crew of each ship being "more or less instructed
1. W.0.44/936, Ordnance memo. 13 Nov. 1814. Adm.1/4023,
Ordnance to Admiralty, 26 Feb., 30 April and 23 May 1817.
Dupin, Military Force, 1. 265. md.. 4943: 98-21, 22 and 24
Jan. 1818; 4948: 98-21, 2 Feb. 1819; 4964s 98-21, 20 Feb.,
27 Nov. 1822.
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according to the ability and. inclination of their officers."1
With no gunnery school, no gunnery system, and. all training
varying in quality and. quantity from ship to ship, it was not
surprising that British gunnery was often unimpressive.
In fact the standard of British gunnery was low, It was
low among the ships that had fought the Americans and. it was low
throughout the fleet. Shannon's exceptional gunnery was
m	 a rarity ' the fleet as a whole	 to that part
of it on the North American Station. This fact was pointed out
to Melville by "A Post Captain" (Sir Charles Napier) in case the
First Lord should believe, as some did, that as the cream of
the Royal Navy was occupied. in Europe, inferior British gunnery
in America was not a matter for grave concern.
Sir Charles conceded. that the Mediterranean Fleet "to look
at was the finest I ever saw." But its sailing was lubberly,
L. Sir S.J. Pechell, Observations upon the Defective
Equipment of Ship Guns (Corfu, 1825), pp. 12-13. See also
Bowles, Pamphlets, pp. 48-49, and C. Lloyd, "The Origins of
H.M.S. Excellent", LM. ui. 193-97.
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"and. as for firing with precision, they knew nothing about it."1
There was, as C.N. Parkinson has contended., considerable evidence
to indicate that British gunnery was poor throughout the fleet,
and. had. been since before Trafalgar, rather than having declined.
during the uneventful years between Trafalgar and. the War of
1812.2 What the Americans in fact had. done, was to add. the
new dimension of long-range to naval warfare that was to have
far-reaching effects on the science and. technology of naval
gunnery.
The American victories thus not only inspired, the Admiralty
to improve accuracy through the use of sights and. tubes, they
spurred an intense interest in gunnery training. Six months
following the disasterous first encounters, Ordnance was stud.ying
"the American mode of loading guns." 3 In his report on the
1. Napier, The Navy, p. 3. See also Ibid. pp. 6, 9. Napier,
(1780-1860 ) was the hero of Cape St. Vincent in 1833. A brilliant
eccentric, he showed. early interest in steamers and. strove to
improve the Royal Navy. Re commanded. in the Channel in 1846, and.
in the Baltic in 1854, amid. the controversy usually attending his
activities.
2. Parkinson, Exmouth, pp. 412-15.
3. Adin.1/4021 , Ordnance to Admiralty, 7 June 1813.
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subject, William Cuppage of the Royal Carriage Department noted.
that the Americans, while training their gunners aboard ship in
the English fashion, had "added previous instruction on shore
in their several Forts, a practise moat'rthy of imitation."1
The Admiralty, for their part, were most anxious to double the
weekly quotas of exercise powder issued to ships. Owing to
problems of stowage, Ordnance considered such an increase "not
applicable to actual service."2
It was not until 1816 that the Admiralty took firm steps to
-introduce gunnery training into the Royal Navy. By Order in
Council of November that year, the Royal Marine Artillery were
instructed to train naval gunners. 3 Established, in 1804 to
replace men of the Royal Artillery serving on mortar vessels,
the Marine Artillery in January 1816 was given a peace establish-
ment of four companies and the additional ta8k of drilling all
Royal Marines In gunnery.4
1. Ibid. 22 June 1814, enclosing Cuppage to Ordnance, 21 June
1814.
2. Add.. MSS. 41367, R. Wellbank to R.K. Crew, 10 Aug. 1815.
3. Adm . 1/5228 , Order in Council, 25 Nov. 1816.
4. &dm.2/1214, Admiralty to Major General Sir Richard
Williams, 23 Dec. 1815.
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The Order in Council of November 1816 inoreased. these four
companies to eight, at a time when all other units were under-
going severe peace-time reductions, and increased their duties
to include serving on ships other than mortar vessels, All rates
received a number of Marines representing one-sixth to one-eighth
of the ship's complement. The Marines were to assist in training
sea gunners, "experience having proved the great advantages to
be derived to the Service from this practice, which has been of
1late tried to a small extent.N
The Order in Council became effective in January 1817,
despite protests from the Commandant of the Marine Artillery,
Sir Richard Williams, that he was losing his artillery to the
navy. 2 Under Admiralty orders, Marine Artillery field pieces
were replaced with naval guns and carriages at Portsmouth,
1. Adm.1/5228, Order in Council, 25 Nov. 1816. .Ldm.2/l220,
Admiralty to Commanders of Royal Marines, 21 Jan. 1819, with
printed enclosure.
2. Adm.2/1216, Admiralty to Sir Henry Bell, 9 and 16
Dec. 1816.
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Plymouth and Chatham.' In the first instance these three
companies were to train the regular marines ashore and. on board
ship, and the commanders of Marine Divisions were ordered not
to employ the Marine Artillery in any way "that may impede or
delay the intended, instruction."2
Thus the means of training sea gunners had. been determined.
Although it seems clear that the marine Artillery were to
provide only the nucleus of skilled. gunners for the navy, the
exact method by which they transmitted gunnery skills to naval
personnel is not apparent. Whether in fact they trained the
sailors directly, or served only their own guns was quite
possibly left to the discretion of the individual ship's
captain. In either case, the existence of two separate groups
responsible for naval gunnery increased the need. for one uniform
1. Adm.2/l2l7, Admiralty to Sir henry Bell, 21 March 1817;
to Ordnance, 9 and 21 May 1817; to Commanders of Royal Marine
Divisions, 9 May 1817. See also Ad.m.2/l218, foe. 299, 315, 327,
392-93, 525; 1219, foe. 305, 467; Adin.1/4024, Ordnance to
Admiralty, 1 June 1818.
2. Adin.2/1217, Admiralty to Commanders of Royal Marine
Divisions, 9 May 1817.
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system of operating naval guns.
The Admiralty viewed. with alarm "the diversity of the modes
of Discipline and. Exercise ... which has hitherto prevailed.
with considerable injury" to the Royal Navy. With the intention
of establishing "an uniform Practice of Exercise throughout the
Navy ...", sixteen flag officers and captains were convened, at
the Admiralty on 16 June, 1817.1 By the end. of the month, the
chairman, retired Admiral Sir William Young, submitted the
proposed system to the Admiralty. The system recommended the
numbering of every step in loading, aiming and firing guns, and.
assigned. specific duties to each member of the crews. In this
respect it was no different from the many similar but unofficial
systems that prevailed in the navy. The significant fact was
that it claimed to embody the best features of all known systems,
and. if approved. by the Admiralty, it would become standard
throughout the fleet.2
1. Ind.4938s 59-4, 11 June 1817.
2. Adm.1/587, Admiral Sir William Young to Admiralty,
27 June 1817. This system was in fact the one adopted by
the Royal Marine Artillery in 1807.
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This approval was given in August 1817, even before
favourable reports on the system arrived from the captains of
Florida and. Queen Charlotte. 1 In no uncertain terms the Admiralty
expressed. the importance they placed on such a system:
And. whereas we consider the uniformity, celerity and.
precision of the Great Guns to be vitally important to
the Honour of His Majesty's Arms and. to the Safety of
the Country, we do most strictly and. earnestly command
and enjoin all Officers to pay, according to their
several Ranks, the greatest attention to this subject,
and. to spare no exertion in training the Seamen and.
Royal Marine. to an uniform, quick and. precise practise
of the Great Guns agreeably to the said. Instructions.
Only by using this system, "and no other", could. the crew of one
ship be capable of co-operating immediately with that of another,
or with the Royal Marines and. Royal Marine Artillery. In this
way, a higher standard. of gunnery could. be  attained., and. a
large reservoir of skilled. gunners created.2
1. Ind. .4938s 59-4, 26 Aug., 6, 7 and. 21 Oct., 29 Nov. and.
8 Dec. 1817.
2. Ad.m.2/1220, Admiralty to Sir Henry Bell, Commandant in
London of the Royal Marines, 7 Nov. 1818, enclosing printed
copy of Instructions for the Exercise of the Great Guns (London,
1818), preface.
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The Admiralty's desire to improve naval gunnery encouraged
naval and artillery officers to submit almost a dozen similar
gunnery systems within a two year period. 1 The original system
was retained, however, and in 1818 one thousand. abstracts of the
original twenty-four-page manual were distributed to all Royal
Marine Commandants and. Naval Station Commanders for further
dissemination. 2 Like the Admiralty's system, the other schemes
suimitted for study were concerned with the mechanical procedure
of loading and discharging the guns. A more ambitious plan for
a "Corps of Naval Gunnery" was, in 1817, suggested by a retired.
artillery officer teaching at Sandhuret. This officer was
Colonel Sir Eoward Douglas. So pervasive was this man's
influence on the evolution of naval gunnery during the first half
of the nineteenth century, that his career deserves close etu&y.
Douglas was the son of Admiral Sir Charles Douglas,
Rodney's fleet captain at the Battle of the Saints. Sir Charles
had been the first to use flintlocka on heavy artillery, and.
1. Ind.4938s 59-4, 7, 21 July, 15, 21 and 23 Oct., and. 27 Dec.
1817; 4942: 59-4, 12 Aug. 1818; 4947* 59-4, 9 March 1819.
2. md.. 4942 : 59-4, 22 Nov. 1818. Adm.2/1220, Admiralty to
Sir Henry Bell, 11 Feb. 1819.
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had. suggested. in vain the adoption of gunaighta and. vent tubes
to improve the navy's gunnery.1 He died. in 1789 on his way to
command. the North American Station. The following year, at the
age of fourteen, his eon Howard entered. the Military Academy at
Woolwioh, graduating 1 January 1794 as a second lieutenant in
the Royal Artillery.2
His fir8t stationing was at North Tynmouth, but in 1796
he was transferred to Canada. Shipwrecked at Great Jarvie,
Labrador, he survived. to serve at Quebec and. Iingston. 3 On the
death of his half brother, Douglas became Third Baronet of Carr,
and. ii 1799, while still on compassionate leave in Edinburgh,
married Anne Dundas. It is probable his wife 1 s influential
1. On Sir Charles Douglas's many proposals for improving
naval artillery, see Douglas, 3rd.. ed., p. 458; Robertson, pp. 150-54,
Majend.ie, Smooth-bore Ordnance, pp. 129, 191-92 ; W.O.44/498,
Admiralty to Ordnance, 9 April 1816. It is quite probable that
Douglas compiled, the manuscripte entitled "A Treatise on Artillery",
dated 1780(?), and initialed. C.D., contained. in 1.0.55/1823.
2. 5.1. Fullom, The Life of General Sir Howard Douglas
(London, 1863) is an enthusiastic but not always accurate
biography of Douglas.
3. 1.0.55/1064, Deputy Adjutant of Artillery to Lord
Dorchester, 4 Jan. and 15 April 1796.
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kimfr'
connections prevented. e having to return to Canada, as "he
would rather be employed. anywhere than go back to that country."1
His next five years were spent with Royal Artillery battalions
at Plymouth, Woolwich and. Canterbury.
From November 1803, until April 1804, Douglas served. with
the experimental rooket and. mortar battalion of the famous
William Congreve. His first inventions, a flintlock for sea
mortars and a device for ascertaining when the mortar's base was
horizontal, were produced. during this posting.2
.Through his "talents as a mathematician and knowledge in
the scientific parts of his profession", Douglas in the summer of
1804 was appointed Superintendent of the Senior Department of the
new Royal Military Acadamy (Sand.hurst). 3 His immediate superior,
1. 1.0.55/1067, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Trotter to the
Deputy Adjutant General of Artillery, 2 April 1799.
2. 1.0.55/1148, Deputy Adjutant General of Artillery to Sir
William Congreve, 8 Nov. 1803 and. 20 April 18 04: 1.0.55/1079,
Captain Alexander Munro to D.A.G., 6, 9 and. 18 May 1804, and.
DA.G. to Munro, 25 May 1804.
3. 1.0.40/10, Sir Harry Calvert to Earl Cavan, 11 March
1805; 1.0.133/13, Sir Robert Brownrigg to General Sir John Moore,
7 Dec. 1808.
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the French Royalist General, Jarry, was senile and, spoke
little English, so that th. burden of running the department was
assumed by Douglas. In two years Douglas replaced Jarry,
becoming acting commandant of the Senior Department with the
rank of Lieutenant Colonel.1
Much bitterness was caused by Sir Howard's original appoint-
ment and. subseq,uent promotion. Both General Jarry and. the
Lieutenant Governor of the Academy, Colonel John G. LeMarchant,
resented Douglas. Following Jarry's wretirement N , LeMarchant
'foi.md, himself 0surroun&ed. by strangers, and. experiencing
difficult relations with both superiors and subordinates.2
L.W.O.31/220 , William Harcourt to Commander-in-Chief, 2S Dec.
1806. Major A.A. Godwin Austen, The Staff and. the Staff College
(London, 1927), pp. 37-39.
2. Some indications of this bitterness are to be found. in
LeMarchant's letter books at Sand.hurst. See in particular
R.M.A.S. 3, LeMarchant to Sir Harry Calvert, 22 March 1804, to
General Stuart, 26 June 1806, to the Earl of Harrington, 16 Aug.
1806, and to General Clinton, 8 April 1807. See also Minutes of
the Supreme Board of the Royal Military Academy, W.O.99/5/2,
23 Nov. 1804; W.O.99/6/3, 2 Aug. 1806.
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In this unhappy situation, Douglas volunteered for active
duty, a request highly applauded by LeMarchant and. warmly
welcomed at the Horse Guards, where both the Commander-in-Chief
and. the Quarter Master General of the Army were anxious to
improve the stand.ard.s of the Senior Department by exposing its
young commandant to actual service. 1 Recommended. to Sir John
Moore as "an artillery officer (who) is allowed, to excel moBt
of his standing", Douglas was sent to observe the functioning
of the higher departments of Moore's army. His object was
2
"soley to acquire knowledge."
Douglas arrived. in the Peninsula too late to observe a great
deal, as Moore's retreat had. begun before the 	 departure
from England. But in the summer of 1809, Douglas was sent out
once again to gain experience, this time at the siege of
Wa].cheren. This campaign, too, was a defeat for British arms,
1. R.M.A.S. 3, LeMarohant memo. 18 Nov. 1808. W.O.133/13,
Sir Robert Brownrigg to Douglas, 11 July, 1808. Godwin Austen,
Staff College, p. 50.
2, v.0.1/639, Commander-in-Chief to General Moore, 15 Dec.
1808; W.0. l33/l3, Sir Robert Brownrigg to General Moore, 7 Dec.
1808, to Lieutenant Colonel George Murray, 10 Dec. 1808.
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but it provided, the acting Commandant of the future Staff
College with a longer opportunity to observe staff officers in
action.1
Douglas learned, a great deal at Waicheren. In the first
place, earlier criticisms that his department was not providing
officers with sufficient training in the making and. interpreting
of maps were borne out. On his return to Yngland., Sir Howard.
immediately drew up a more practical surveying course, devoted
more time to field. work and. instruments experience at the expense
of fortification classes, and suggested a new scale of four
inches to the mile in military maps. In all these proposals
Douglas was opposed. by LeMarchant. But the governor of the
college and. the supreme board. overruled LeMarohant, and. Douglas's
suggestions were put into practice. Around. the same time he
patented the Douglas reflecting ciroul. for the improvement of
surveying instruments
1. W.O.1/641, Commander-in-Chief to Brownrigg, 7 July, 1809.
2. R.M.A.S. 7, LeMarohant to Douglas, 2 Aug. 1810, 14 Feb.,
20 and 31 March, 7, 11 and. 13 April 1811; to Harcourt, 18 and.
20 Feb. 1811. W.O.99/6/4, Minutes of the Collegiate Board of
B.M.A.S., 17 May 1811.
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and equipment in Spain, 1 a fact that did not itacate Wellington.
Moreover, Wellington's desire to jettieon Douglas in May of 1812
was complemented by the even stronger desire of the Royal
Military Academy to have him return. In December 1811, the Supreme
Board of the Academy demanded Douglase return. When the Secretary
of State refused, the Board protested that the condition of the
Senior Department did. "absolutely depend on Sir Howard Douglas's
immediate return."2 In May 1812, Douglas was very reluctantly
"replaced after performing his duties-b the perfect satisfaction
of His Majestys Government."' Although the reason given was the
"repeated and. earnest" requests of the college for his return,
Douglas did. not return to England until November. He spent the
summer in various parts of Spain with the guerillas, and aboard
the North Coast Squadron of Sir Home Popham.4
1. w.o. 1/267, Douglas to Colonel K.E. Bunbury, 17 Jan. 1813.
2. 1.0.99/6/4, Minutes of the Supreme Board of R.M.A.S.,
19 Dec. 181]. and 30 Jan. 1812.
3.1.0.6/43, Bunbury to Douglas, 15 May 1812.
4. 1.0.1/263, Sir Home Popham to Lord Kisith, 21 June 1812;
Douglas to Popham, 2 Aug. 1812, and to Lord Liverpool, 19 July
and 22 Aug. 1812; R. Bourke to Lord Bathhuret, 22 Oct. 1812.
N.R.5. Keith, iii. 259-313.
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On his return Douglas discovered that the Senior Department
had. been moved to Farnham. He assumed responsibility for setting
up the future Staff College in its new location, and was promoted
from "acting" commandant, as he had been styled since 1806, to
commandant. He was also made Inspector General of Education for
all military schools.1
 But in November 1816, Douglas's department
was subjected to severe peace-time reductions. With little
money available and. few students to instruct, Douglas was free
to turn his attention in other directions.2
That he turned to naval gunnery was perhaps surprising in
light of his background. as an artillery officer and army
instructor. Yet when one recalls Douglas's admiration for his
sailor father, his experience with naval mortars, his presence
at Waloheren and off the north coast of Spain, there is little
doubt but that he had had many opportunities to observe the
standard of British naval gunnery. His acknowledged brilliance
1. W.0.99/7/5, Minutes of the Supreme Board of RJ.A.S.,
12 Jan., 1 Feb and 14 April 1813. See Godwin Austen, pp. 53-58.
2. W.0.99/7/6 , Minutes of the Supreme Board. of LM.A.S.,
4 Nov. 1816. Godwin Austen, pp. 59-60.
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as an artillerist made him a competent judge of what he had
observed.1
But it is doubtful if Douglas would have tackled the
subject of naval gunnery had not the "late unfortunate affairs"2
on the Great Lakes in 1814 forced his attention back to these
recent observations. In October of that year he expressed his
concern of British setbacks to Lord Liverpool. 3 In 1816 be
submitted twin flintlocks for trials, and in 1817 commenced the
argument for a reduction in windage. During the same year he
submitted to the Admiralty an exhaustive treatise on all
aspects of naval gunnery.
Douglas showed his first interest in improving naval
gunnery in 1816, when he suggested an improved flintlock for
naval guns. As single-flint locks were liable to failure,
Douglas hoped to improve the reliability of ignition by providing
two flints in place of the customary single flint. Should the
1. Douglas, 1st ed., pri, pp. 1-3 . N.R.S. Keith, iii. 259 and.
note.
2. Add. MSS. 38260, Douglas to Liverpool, 24 Oct. 1814.
-	 3. Ibid.
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first flint fail, a winged nut need only be turned 180 degrees
to automatically centre the second flint in the correct striking
position. The Admiralty ordered this lock gradually introduced
into service, but owing to several factors, one of them being
the need. for economy, it was never actually adopted.1
In addition to improving ignition, Douglas further suggested
that gun accuracy could be greatly improved through a reduction
in windage. Windage was the term applied to the difference
between the diameter of the gun's bore, and the lesser diameter
of the shot meant to fit it. This gap was necessary to permit
easy access of the shot when loading the gun. But allowance
had also to be made for expansion of the shot by the white heat
of the discharge, for its enlargement through rust, for the
fouling of the gun during heavy fire, and for the thickness of
tin straps generally used to attach the shot to a wooden bottom.
Finally, considerable allowance had. always been made for
l.Adm.1/4023, Ordnance to Admiralty, 10 Nov. 1816, enclosing
Douglas to Ordnance, 8 Nov. 1816. See also Douglas, 1st ed.,
pp. 207-10, and Majendie, Smooth-bore Ordnano, pp. 191-92.
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imperfectly cast shot or bore.1
In June 1817, Douglas was primarily concerned, with the
last feature. The improvements in casting during the past
twenty years, he informed. Wellington, had, rendered nnnecesaary
such a large windage as British guns possessed. Douglas claimed.
that one-quarter to one-third. of the gunpowder's force escaped.
around the projectile; this not only served to reduce range, but
accuracy was impaired. by the	 tenenoy to traverse the
large bore in "a sort of zig-zag motion." Thus if the shot last
deflected from the left of the bore, it veered right of the
target
Douglas was convinced that if this large windage was not
reduced, the adoption of gunsights and vent tubes would not
appreciably improve the accuracy of British gunnery. The gun
itself was inaccurate. Moreover, he pointed out, it was Less
accurate in this respect than were the guns of France or America.
The windage of a French 24-pdr. was .133 inches, that of the
1. Douglas, 1st ed., pp. 69-95. Majendie, pp. 110-15.
2. Adm.1/4024, Ordnance to Admiralty, 21 Jan. 1819, enclos-
jug Douglas to Ordnance, 18 June 1817. Douglas 1st ed., p. 70.
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same American gun slightly larger. Most British 244pd.rs., On
the other hand, had. a windage of .277 inches, more than double
that of French counterparts. Douglas recommended, that windage
in all heavy artillery be reduced. to .14 or .13 inches.1
Such a red.uction had. been advocated. in the 1770's by
Dr. Charles Hutton at the Ordnance Department, but never carried.
out. 2 Despite the success of the carronad.e after 1779, a
success that owed. much to its having a wind.age half that of the
same calibre gun, 3 little had been done about Hutton's suggestions
until 1811. In that year, Sir Thomas Blomefield, the Inspetor
of Artillery, experimented with enlarged. shot to determine the
1. The urindage of British Artillery was established. at 1/20
the diameter of the shot. 24-pdr. shot having a diameter of
5.547 inches thus had. a windage of 1/20 x 5.547 or .277 inches.
A 32-pdr. had a windage of .300 inches. See Douglas, 1st ed..,
p.69.
2. Robertson, Naval Armament, pp. 128-29. Paixhans,
Nouvelle Force, p. 12, note. Simmons, Effect of Heavy Ordnance,
pp. 5-6, 42-46.
3. 24-pd.r. guns and carronades had windages respectively
of .277 and .140 inches, 32-pdr's. had. .300 and .150 inches.
jouglas, 1st ed., p. 69.
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benefits of reducing windage, but did not consider the
resulting improvement in range and. accuracy sufficient to justify
the increase risk of gun bursts that he predicted. would.
accompany a reduction in urind.age.1
Douglas's suggestions in June of 1817 renewed official
interest. In June 1818, enlarged. shot was fired from 6-, 9- and.
12-pd.r. guns at Woolwich. Even with reduced powder charges to
prevent gun bursts, the heavier shot's range and accuracy were
superior to those of rgu1ation shot fired from the same guns.
The committee recommended. that guns of small calibre have a
standard. windage of .1 inch, and further recommended. that 24-pdrs.
undergo similar trials.2
A month later these trials had. been completed.. It was
discovered. that, as with the lighter guns, reducing the 24-pd.r.'s
1. A&m.]/4024, Ordnance to Admiralty, 21 Jan. 1819,
enclosing report of the President of the Select Committee,
General Anthony Parrington, to Ordnance, 18 July 1817.
2. Ibid.. 21 Jan. 1819, enclosing Yarrington Report ta
Ordnance, 12 June 1818.
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windage not only improved range and. accuracy, but actually
reduced wear in the bore, thereby prolonging the gun's liZ.. A
windage of .15 inches was recommended for all heavy artillery.1
These alterations were adopted by the Royal Artillery. But
the Admiralty, after first accepting the recommendations, held
back when a committee of naval officers under Lord. Keith advised
against reducing windage in naval guns. The committee believed
nothing should be done until the effects of corrosion on sea
shot were more closely studied. The Woolwich Select Committee
of artillery officers who had actually conducted the trials,
concurred in this opinion, and. further pointed out that as
enlarged shot would. not fit the smaller bores of carronades,
two sizes of sea shot would have to be supplied for guns and
carronadee of the same nominal calibre.2
Douglas retorted that rust could easily be avoided by
lacquering naval shot, while the second problem, that posed by
1. Ibid. 21 Jan. 1819 enclosing Farrington Report of 13
July 1818. See also Douglas, 1st ed., pp. 79-86.
2. Adm.1/4024, Ordnance to Admiralty, 21 Jan. 1819,
enclosing Farrington to Ordnance, 18 Jan. 1819. Ind..4947i59-4,
21 Jan., 16 and. 23 Peb, 4 May 1819.
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oarronades, could. be so].ve& by reaming out these weapons an
average of only .07 inches. 1 Both these steps were ultimately
taken.. But in 1819 the Admiralty were "decidedly of the opinion
that not any alteration should. be made." 2 The problem of excess
wind.age remained unsolved. until 1839, a fact that did much to
counteract the efforts made in other directions to improve the
accuracy of naval gunnery.
Sir Howard had. thus failed to have either his new flintlock
or his proposed reduction of windage accepted. He was to have
little better success with the many suggestions made in the
exhaustive treatise on all aspects of naval gunnery that he sub-
mitted to the Admiralty in l8l7. The treatise began by comparing
1. Douglas, let ed., pp. 86-91 ; 3rd. ed., pp. 114-27.
2. Ind .4947 s 59-4, 4 May 1819. Paixhana suggested that French
windage, which was about half that of English artillery, could be
safely reduced. Nouvelle Force, pp. 190-92 , 19 8 , note; Exiriences
Faites ar La Marine Francaise sur tine Arme Nouvelle, (Paris, 1825),
pp. 80-84.
3. Adin. 1/4525, Douglas to Admiralty, 15 and. 23 Oct. 1817 and
enclosures. A1thougI ti• manuscripts ar. not identical with the
material later published., future references an, drawn from the
published, form.
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Britain's cu,(ess in Europe with her failure in America; Douglas
concluded, wryly that British gunnery superiority had "consisted.
more in relative than in absolute excellence." 1 He further
concluded. that this state of affairs reflected. the fact that,
deplorable as British gunnery- was, European gunnery was even
worse; the close-range rapid-fire tactics that had. triumphed. in
Europe "through being feebly opposed" had. proven inadequate
against American long-range skill. 2 Douglas believed the Royal
Navy could. also attain such skill if, to the superior quality of
its seamanship and ordnance "the knowledge of warlike science
and. practice be added.." 3 To acquire this knowledge and.
practice would. require the provision of a manual of exercise and.
a gunnery training school.
It will be recalled. that in 1817 the Admiralty had adopted
such a manual, and. had. also re-organized the Royal Marine
Artillery into a training unit for naval gunners. 4 Douglas had.
1. Douglas, let sd., pp. 3.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. pp. 7-8
4. See above.
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also included a manual in his treatise, but was indifferent as
to whether the Admiralty adopted his system or one of the many
others submitted to them. "The mere arrangement of a manual,"
he explained, would provide "very trifling progress" in gunnery.
it was a necessary first step, but if it was to be an effective
one, a permanent school of gunnery would be required. 1 It was
on this point that Douglas was most critical of Admiralty policy.
Be realized that it had been "no uncommon thing" for captains
fitting out ship to employ the Royal Marine Artillery to train
their sea gunners. 2 This had been bad enough, Douglas believed,
but to use the marines to the extent envisaged in the 1816
Order in Council, would "repress and extinguish an ambition now
very general among naval officers, to make themselves masters of
this important part of their duty."3 If the Royal Artillery
1. Douglas, let ed., p. 143 . The manual is included
Ibid. pp. 145-93.
2. Ibid. p. 25. See pp. 11-30 for Douglas's discussion on
the use of the Marine Artillery.
3. Ibid. p. 15. Other observers, notably Bowles, p. 48,
and Napier, Navy, pp. 1, 3-4, 12-16, remarked on the need and
general desire for a gunnery training school at this time.
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and. the Royal Marine Artillery had. their training depots, it
would be sensible for the Navy to take advantage of this new
enthusiasm in its officers to provide at least one such depot.
Douglas anticipated that even one small depot could. provide
a nucleus of master gunners who would join the fleet and pass
on their skills to other sailors. Not only would. this serve
to support ethe uniform, systematic excellence of the whole
machine, however remote some of its parts may be,N but a purely
naval establishment would give rise to an sprit d.c corpe that
would encourage emulation and. a pride in gunnery.1
Sir Roward envisaged a depot consisting of a shore range
for preliminary training, a hulk for introducing the difficulties
of gunnery at sea, and. finally, a sea-going vessel to give the
full experience of operating ship and gun at the same time. At
this depot gunners wcnild also study the theory and mechanics of
all projectiles and ord.nanoe in service, and carry out experiments
with new inventions.2
1. Douglas, 1st d., p. 24.
- 2. Ibid. pp. 15-24.
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Trifling as Douglas's scheme might sound, he was in fact
suggesting an organization that had. had. very litti. precedent.
Although the Spanish had set up a fleet gunnery school as early
as 1576, it was of small influence, short duration, and. was
probably made up of army personnel. 1 Not for another two
centuries was ary attempt made by any power to systematically
train naval gunners. This occurred. in 1767 when the Duo d.e
Choiseul, French Minister of Marine and. Colonies, provided for
organizing ten thousand naval artilleriets to drill once a week
at the various ports. These were not, however, sailors, and.
after 1783 even this training ceased. 2 During the War of 1812
the Americana had trained first on shore and then at sea, where,
with their large complements, a good portion of the crew was free
for gunnery practice at a given time. Yet the Americans did not
have a school of sea gunners.3
1. N.R.S. Monson, iii. 323-24.
2. Mahan, p. 333. Douglas, let ed., p. 2, points out that
British ships had. taken their greatest punishment from the French
at this period..
- 3. Ada.1/4021 , Ordnance to Admiralty, 22 June 1814, enclosing
William Cuppage to Ordnance, 21 June 1814. Clowes, vi. 53. See
also Dahigren, Shell-Guns, prefatory note, p. 13.
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In 1815 the French had. been even more anxious than the
British to follow the American example of good. gunnery. By
Rglement of that year, a manual of exercise was promulgated.,
and. plans made for once more training sea artillerists at the
various ports. 1 Indeed it was the French manual that Douglas
had. included. in his treatise. The Admiralty's activity of 1817
was similar to that of Prance. A manual had been adopted. but
the training of naval gunners was not to be given by the navy,
but by the Marine Artillery.
Douglas, on the other hand., was recommending something quite
new and. quite different. He wished. t see an elite group of men
within the Royal Navy responsible for gunnery training. Only a
group with special status and. pay, and. possessing the " S'eprit d.e
corps" found in graduates of the same institution, could provide
the impetus necessary to raise the standard. of gunnery.
Sir P.Y.B. Broke, revered. captain of the Shannon, was a
1. Douglas, 1st ed., pp. 2, 145, 188, note. By 1820, upwards
of 5000 gunner. of the Fr.noh artillery and. marine artillery were
available for service aboard French ships. P.C.P. Dupin,
Organisation de la Marine et des Colonies (Paris, 1634), i. 181-85.
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"moat &nTl-ous well wisher" of Douglas's plan. Even one Bmall
depot would, he agreed with Sir Howard., "create an exoellence
that will excite emulation."1
 Another gunnery expert and.
veteran of the War of 1812, Captain S.J. Peohell, also applauded.
Douglass work. Having transmitted. a copy of Douglase manu-
script to Broke in the hope that he would use his prestige to
press for official action on its suggestions, Pechell mourned. the
fact that Broke, "did he reside in London", could have exeroiBed.
immense influence • 2
Broke made little effort to exercise this influence. He
did., however, lament the fact that "after the useful lessons
which the late war afforded us", the Admiralty had rejected
Doug1aas scheme for a corps of naval gunners. "It will be too
late to teach our hands to war," he wrote Douglas, "when the
enemy is pillaging our trade and Lloyd's in an uproar to have
ships rigged. and. sent instantly to sea." He advised Douglas to
1. Douglas, 3rd.. ed., pp. 12-13, notes, personal letters of
Broke to Douglas, 5 July and. 23 Sept. 1818.
2. Ibid. Pechell to Douglas, undated.
113
publish.1
The Admiralty had. turned. down ug' a plan for a
training ship on the plea of "political circumstances and.
financial conaiderations.N They did, however, "highly approve
of the work", retained a copy for their own reference, and.
granted. Douglas permission to publish. The first edition of
Naval Gunnery, appeared. in 1820.2
Douglas's book represented. yet another advancement in
gunnery resulting from the War of 1812, an advancement that was
to contribute much to the "knowledge of warlike science" its
author advocated. and which was so lacking in the navy. Indeed.,
not since the seventeenth century had a similar treatise been
published. in England. 3 With the exception of Adye's small,
general handbook, Bombardier and. Pocket Gunner, Britain possessed
1. Ibid. Broke to Douglas, 23 Sept. 1818 and. 3 Jan. 1819.
2. Ind.4947s 59-4, 24 Feb. 1819. Douglas, 3rd. ed., p. 20.
3. John Seller, The Sea Gunner (London, 1691).
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no textbooks in the field. of naval gunnery. 1
 And. although not
officially adopted. as a textbook until much later, Naval Gunnery
did. much to fill this need.. It exercised. a tremendous influence
on the thinking of those interested. in its subject. Translated.
into French, Dutch and Spanish, and. widely read in the United
States, the many suggestions made in Douglas's book were
ultimately adopted. by all havies.
Naval Gunnery was the first serious study into the problems
of naval armaments in the new, scientific era initiated. by the
Americans. As such it was symptomatic of the Royal Navy's
transformation from a completely unsophisticated approach to
gunnery in 1812, to something approximating a scientific and
precise approach by 1820. This transformation had brought about
the adoption of guneights and. vent tubes, gunnery manuals and.
gunnery training, in an attempt to attain the accuracy
1. The paucity of British texts was noted. by Dupin,
ii. ii. 30. Only the infantry and the cavalry were issued. with
standard. manuals. Glover, Peninsular Preparations, pp. 90-91.
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&emonatrated by the Liaerioans in the War of 1812. The British
had also adopted super frigates, and. had. replaced. many of the
18-pdrs. in the navy with Congreve's 24-pdr. medium ship gun.
The eighteen twenties were to witness the continuation of this
tendency towards heavier ships and armaments, together with an
attempt to standardize both.
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Chapter Three
TEE EIGHTEEN TWENTIES: STLNDARDIZING THE SAILING NAT!
By using gunsights, vent tubes and systematic gunnery, the
Americans had served as an example to Britain. Yet in one
respect, that of size of ship, the Americans were not
innovators as they had. been with gunnery. In building frigates
larger than comparable European vessels, they had merely
amphasized. a trend. towards heavier ships and. armaments alread7
observable in Europe. This trend had. witnessed. the supplanting
of the l2-pd.r. gun by the 18-pdr., with subsequent enlarging
and strengthening of warships. The American 24-pdr. guns and
super frigates instigated further desire for even heavier ships
and armaments after 1815. The British move to 24-pd.r. Congreve
guns was rendered. ineffective by France's adoption of 3O-pd.r.
uniform calibre, and the American move to the 42-pdr. forcing
Britain once more to introduce heavier artillery in the form of
32-pdr. uniform calibre, thus bringing the wooden sailing ship
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The 74, the smallest ship in the line of battle in 1793,
was replaced ih that year by the Prench with the 82, thereby
increasing broadside weight of metal by nearly five hundred.
pounds. The Royal Navy also considered the 74 too small for the
line, but found it too useful for other purposes to abandon
entirely. This class served well enough on blockade duty, and
was otherwise valuable in shallow waters such as the Baltic.
Several of one type of 74, the scornfully and durably nicknamed
"forty thieves", were cut down to uc heavy frigates, amounting
24-pdre ., as the Barham, Anson, Magnanime and Indefatigable.
Others of the same class stayed on until the 1830's, devouring
valuable dockyard space, and. attracting the scorn of naval critics.2
There were other increases in the size of ships and armaments
1. Dupin, Voyages, ii. ii. 156-57. Paixhans, Nouvelle
Force, p. 55. See also Add. lBS. 41399, Martin to Sir James
Graham, 22 Jan. 1831.
2. Bartlett, Sea Power, p. 36. Bowles, Pamphlets, pp. 6,
42-43, 67-69. Napier, The Navy, pp. 64-66. Sir J.H. Brigge,
Naval Administration, 1827-92 (London, 1897), 10-24. Add.. 155.
41399, Martin to Graham, 22 Jan. 1831.
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during the Napoleonic Wars. The British 36- and. 38-gun frigates
had. been given increased. broadside weight by the addition of
24-pdr. carronad.ea on their quarter decke and. forecastlea. Even
so, such 321s as Thames, Isis, Boston and Venus, with main
battery armaments of l2-pdr. guns, were embarrassed. by French
counterparts mounting 18-pdrs. Steps were subsequently taken to
make the 18-pdr. the smallest main battery armament on British
frigates)
As a result of this step, similar increases in standard.
armament were introduced. into ships of the line. As multi-
decked. ships could. not fight their lower deck guns in rough seas,
the general practice was to arm the upper decks with the same
calibre gun prevailing among frigates. 2 By 1811, all upper decks
were to carry at least 18-pdr. guns. Those ships that could. not
support the heavy nine- or eight-foot patterns were to receive a
very light six-foot gun. 3 Nevertheless, the trend. was toward
1. Adm.7/677, Establishments of Ordnance, Admiralty Orders of
14 Dec. 1779, 25 Nov. 1782 and. 4 June 1799. Bowles, Pamphlets,
pp. 27-33.
2. Dupin, Voyages, ii. ii. 150.
3. Adin .1/4020 , Ordnance to Admiralty, 13 Feb. 1811.
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heavier armament weight, leading to larger ships of the line.
This "increased. dimensions of men of war," Sir Robert
Seppings, Master Shipwright at Chathain Dock Yard, informed the
Admiralty, "calls for increased strength." 1
 In the interests of
added strength, Seppings had. advocated in 1807 that traditional
beakhead bows be replaced in large ships by a round bow. The
Defence and Vindictive had been conStructed on this principle,
and had. proved. Seppings contention that round bows would provide
increased. strength and. stability, while giving greater protection
to the crew and. providing room for chase guns. In 1811, the year
18-pdr. guns were introduced on all upper decks, the Admiralty
officially adopted. the round bow.2
In that same year, Seppings submitted further proposals to
strengthen ships against their increased. burden of size and.
armament. Re wished to give them stronger frames. Traditionally,
a ship's frame consisted of horizontal and vertical beams meeting
at right angles. The space enclosed. by these beams was, therefore,
-	 1. Adm.7/709, undated. manuscript of Sir Robert Sepping?, fo.2.
2. Ibid. foe. 54-55, Dupin, Voyages, ii. ii. 162-63.
Robertson, Naval Armament. pp. 53-54.
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of rectangular shape. Hence the frame was essentially weak, as
weight and stress tended. to distort the unit cell from a rectangular
to a rhomboid shape. From the picture of a Swiss bridge, Seppings
derived the idea of adding a diagonal brace to each unit cell.
This "trussed frame" transformed. the cell from a weak rectangle
into two immovable triangles.1
Not only was this new structure inherently stronger, the
"triangular mode" of construction insured. that stress would follow
the grain of the timber, rather than cut across it, and. would
be distributed throughout the whole structure, not borne only
at the point of strain, as was the case in the old. style. The
new construction was thus estimated to treble the strength of a
ship, and increase her stiffness six times. As a result,
1. The references for this and. the four subsequent paragraphs
ares Sir Robert Seppings, On a New Principle of Constructing His
Majesty 's Shipe of War (London, 1814), A letter Addressed to the
Right Honourable Viscount Melville on the Circular Sterns of Ships
(London, 1822), Seppings manuscript in Ldm.7/709, fos. 1-68; also
Dupin, Voyages, ii. ii. 162-63, and. De ].a Structure des Vaisseaux
Anglais Coneidr(e dana see Derniers Perfectionnements (London,
1817). Albion, Pp. 393-94. Bartlett, pp. 34-36. Robertson,
pp. 50-56.
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"arching", the tendency of bows and sterns to droop as they were
relatively lees supported by the water than amidships, was
reduced. So, too, was "hogging", the similar tendency across
the breadth of the ship owing to the weight of her guns.
In February 1811, the Tremendous, a 74 built on Seppings'
principle, was launched and proved successful. The larger ships
Ramil]js and Albion were similarly rebuilt at Chatham, and. nine
new vessels laid down. Not only were these vessels dentonBtrably
stronger than their predecessors, they represented a saving in
valuable timber. Old or inferior timber could be used for the
trussing, thereby saving nine thousand feet of first grade
timber, or the equivalent of nearly two hundred oak trees in each
ship of the line.
Having strengthened the bows and. frames of ships, Seppinga
prescribed a similar treatment for stems. He had encountered
little "bigotry of old practice" in introducing his round bows
and trussed frames. But when he attempted to extend these same
principles to sterns, structurally and defensively the weakest
tart of the old ships but quarters of high-ranking officers,
his suggestions caused a furore.
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The Surveyor drew up a massive list of British ships that
had. leaked. dangerously owing to loosened. square sterns, or had
sustained. heavy damage from enemies hanging on the quarter, the
point of impunity. 1 Under such circumstances, British captains
had been known to blast out their own sterns with cannon fire in
order to bring guns to bear on their tormentors. 2 Seppings pointed.
out that the advent of maneuverable steam gunboats would. increase
the risk resulting from the lack of a protective arc of fire at
this vulnerable point. The Americana had. already tried. such a
gunboat against one of their own frigates with great effect.
With rounded. sterns, however, a first-rate could. direct ten,
a frigate four guns, on any point astern.3
However cogently Seppings argued that square sterna were
structurally and. defensively weak, his round sterns were
questioned. "with a keenness and. severity of a very uncommon
1. Seppings, Letter to Melville, pp. 9-14.
2. Barnaby, Naval Development, pp. 22-24.
3. Seppings, Letter to Melville. pp. 10, 15-16.
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kind.	 Much of this criticism was directed toward the
inconvenience of the water closet, and. the email size of the
captains cabin. Seppings conceded the truth of these charges,
and also admitted that round sterns were comparatively gly, but
he hoped that the merits of strength and protective arc of fire
would prevail over the desire for sterna to resemble "shops in
2the Boulevards of Paris."
Nevertheless, many officers were not pleased with the one
iron balcony gracing the Admiral's cabin on the Prince Regent
building at Chatham in 1816. Their opposition was overceme by
those serious students of naval architecture who app1auded
Seppings' utilitarian purpose. 3 By 1828, when improvements had
been made in Seppings' basic suggestion, notably in the
addition of a counter, a former critic pronounced the round
1. George arvey, Observations on Sir Robert Seppinga' Plan
for the Circular Sterns of Ships of War (London, 1822), p. 19.
2. Seppings, Letter to Melville, pp. 3, 35, note. See also
Ibid. pp. 4, 17, 20, note.
3. Dupin, Voyages, ii. ii. 162-63. Harvey, Observations,
pp. 19, 25. Paixhane, Nouvelle Force, pp. 6-7. 3. Marshall,
Ships' Guns, pp. 28, 74.
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stern universally accepted, 1 although as late as 1831, the Duke
of Clarence was still reviling "that confounded round. stern in
2
ships."
In addition to bows, sterns and. trussed frames, Seppinge
provided. stouter ships by a general strengthening of all members
of the structure. Increased strength was also derived from the
use of iron for many braces and. clamps. By all these means,
large ships capable of carrying increasingly heavy armaments were
provided.3
Concerning armaments, one other alteration in ship
construction deserves mention. This was the advent of the walled
side. Up until the Napoleonic Ware, gunwales generally curved.
in toward the centre of the upper deck. This "tumble-home", as
it was known, was considered. necessary for the stability of the
ship, but it made for a narrow deck. With the introduction of
1. Napier, The avy, p. 89; for Napjer's earlier criticisms
see ibid. pp. 61-63. Robertson, pp. 53-54.
2. Add.. MSS.41368, Martin memo. 5 Sept. 1831.
3. Robertson, p. j3. Sir Charles Stirling, A Letter with
additional Observations on Professional Topics (Chertsey, 1827),
pp. 72-78, 86-88.
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more powerful artillery requiring increased room for recoil,
wider decks became necessary. Thus, in the ships laid. down
toward the end of the war, tumble-home was reduced. There was
little decrease in high, three-decked ships, but there was
considerable reduction in two-decked. vessels, while frigate walls
were practically straight.1
By 1812, therefore, Britain had. already taken considerable
pains to prepare her ships for the heavier armaments necessary
to equal French l8-pdrs. American success with their super
frigates and. 24-pdr. guns promised yet further increases in
number and calibre of guns accompanied by similar increases in
the dimensions of warships.
Britain's answer to the American 54-gun frigate had been
Leander and Newcastle, each mounting 60 guns, together with the
allocation of Congreve 24-pdrs., to the upper decks of ships of
1. Dupin, Voyages, ii. ii. 160-61. Ad.m.7/7l2 , "Armaments of
United States Ships", foe. 39-4 1. Albion, pp. 393-94, attributes
the advent of the walled. aid.. to the disappearance of oak
hed.gerows used. for knees in the old. construction.
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the line. France soon followed with her own super frigates
built on the British model, and, as discussed below, the
adoption of the 3O-pd.r. After 1815 there developed a similar
tendency for other classes of ship popular during the Napoleonic
Wars to be euperoeded by the class above them. Once again it
was the Americans who provided the impetus.1
During the War of 1812 they had. laid down three ships of
the line, the Washington, Franklin and !ndependence. Nominally
74's, these ships in fact mounted upwards of 90 guns. Although
none of the three saw aotion, and indeed two were completely
unseaworthy, these vessels had considerable influence on
European navies.2
To match these American ships, the French in 1819 were
planning to replace the 82-gun ship that had supplanted the 74
1. On the First French super frigates, see Dupin, Voyages,
ii. ii. 95, 156-57; Paixhans, Nouvelle Force, p. 15; Bowles,
pamphlets, p. 65. On the increased dimensions of warships in
general at this time, see Bartlett, Sea Power, pp. 30-31.
2. Chapelle, M.M. xviii. 300. Add. MSS. 41400 , fos. 25,
40, undated secret memo. of Byam Martin.
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in 1793, with 94's; Britain followed, with a new class of second-
rate, the 92-gun ship mounting long 24-pd.rs. on its upper deck.1
No attempt was made by either power to match the unsuccessful
American first-rate, Pennsylvania, of four decks and. 132 guns.
But Britain and. France laid down few first-rates mounting less
than the 120 guns of Caled.onian and Commerce de Marseille.2
The French were particularly vigorous in building the
larger classes of the various rates. Of eight frigates building
in 1820, six were 24-pdr. vessels on the lines of H.M.S. Leander,
and. a similar proportion of French ships of the line were first-
rates. 3 The British, on the other hand., while not whl1y ignoring
the trend to build. the largest classes, continued. to devote much
1. Paixhans, Nouvel].e Force, p. 55. Bowles, Pamphlets,
pp. 8, 30-35.
2. Bartlett, pp. 32-33. Bowles, pp. 33-34. Robertson, p. 50.
According to Napier, The Navy, pp. 188-89, one first-rate of
116 guns and three of 104 were built for the Royal Navy between
1815 and 1850.
3. Bowlea, pp. 65-69 . Dupin, Voyages, ii. ii. 95, 156-57,
160-61, and A Tour Through the Naval and Military Establishments
of Great Britain 1816-1820 (London, 1822), p. 61. Paixhans,
,Rouvelle Force, P . 15.
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of their construction to smaller vessels. Thus more than half
the twenty-six ships of the line launched between 1815 and, 1825
were third-rates, and. only six frigates of the twenty-eight built
during the same years were fourth-rate super frigates.1
Britain's shipbuilding policy during these years ensured that
many of her vessels were inferior in size to their foreign
counterparts during the first half of the nineteenth century.
The explanation for such a policy has been admirably summarized. by
C.J. Bartletti
Britain, more so than any other naval power, was
unable to think exclusively of constructing a Navy able
to meet her needs in any one set of circumstances, in any
one region, or against any one power. Britain had to
provide fleets to meet the diverse needs of the english
Channel, the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Indian
Ocean and even the Pacific. A local superiority was not
enough. Ships were needed. almost everywhere, and to make
that possible - in peace when resources were not freely
granted. by Parliament; in war when Britain could never
have too many ships at sea - small frigates, third-rate
sail of the line, and ten-gun brigs were a great
temptation to the Admiralty. Cheaper to build. and. maintain,
1. Bartlett, p. 33. Bowles, pp. 30-35.
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easier to man, and. responsive to so many of the needs
of the far-flung empire and. trade, the existence of
such ships is not to be explained solely by the dogged
conservatism, the serene indifference to foreign
precepts, the obstinant complacency of senile admirals
as contemporary critics delighted. to declare. What may
appear indefensible at a tactical level may wear rather
a different guise when viewed strategically.1
Thus British postwar ships, while greatly strengthened by
Seppings' innovations, were nevertheless restricted in the
armaments they could. mount by virtue of their small size. And.
while the shortcomings of having built so amall were not revealed
to the Admiralty until 1826, as discussed. below, the policy of
building small ships had been settled. upon immediately after the
war. Once having decided to build. the smaller rates of ship,
another factor arose, related to those cited. by Bartlett, to
further encourage the proliferation of small ships. This was
the desire to economize by limiting the varieties of ship and.
eq,uipment through standardization.
By the same Order in Council of November 1816 that had.
1. Bartlett, p. 34.
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instructed the Royal Marine Artillery to train naval gunners to
a standard gunnery system, the Admiralty declared their intention
to organize the Royal Navy "into one regular syatem." 1 Their
purpose was to reduce not only the great variety of gunnery
disciplines; they also wished to reduce the number of manning
systems as well as the great variety of masting and rigging
schemes that, in the words of one observer, "formed a source of
perpetual expense and. perplexity in our dookyards." 2 This could
best be accomplished by standardizing ships themselves "as far
as may be practicable."3
Since the days of Charles I, British arshipe had been
grouped into six rates, with a seventh added under Charles II to
include the many types of smaller craft. By 1816 there existed
within these seven ratings forty-seven subclasses, all differing
in masting, armament and. rigging. This profusion of classes
arose in part from the addition of foreign prizes to the Royal
1. Adm. 1/5228 , Order in Council, 25 Nov. 1016.
2. Bowles, p. 6.
3. Adin. 1/5228 , Order in Council, 25 Nov. 1816.
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Navy; but there was alsO a proliferation of classes within the
navy itself, owing to the fact that old. ships continued. to
serve with new vessels of nominally the same rate and class,
but containing various modifications and innovations introduced.
with little system under the pressure of war.'
In 1816 the Admiralty planned to reduce these forty-seven
subloasses to a more manageable twenty, comprising three classes
of first-rates, two of each rate from second to sixth, and six
classes of seventh-rate. Each of the twenty subclasses was to
have different rigging and. armament, but within each class as
much standardization as possible was to take place, thereby
reducing masting and rigging schemes from foity-seven to twenty,
and decreasing manning schemes from twenty-nine to thirteen or
fourteen. It was realized. that the great number of old ships
comprising the navy, together with advances in armaments and.
architecture, would render perfect uniformity in this point
impossible. Only at the expense of progress could complete
1. Ibid..
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standardization be achieved.; with the quickening pace in
armaments development already perceptible in 1816, the Admiralty
were not prepared to make this sacrifice.1
It was largely in masts, yards and. rigging that the Admiralty
believed. uniformity desirable. They indicated. no similar plans for
stand.ardizing armaments, apart from encouraging the standard gunnery
system discussed. in Chapter Two, and. apart from ensuring that in
future the real and nominal force of a vessel's armaments were
identical. 2 But while the British plan to reform the navy did
1. Ibid. See also Dupin, Voyages, ii. ii. 142-44.
2. Captures made during the War of 1812 revealed that both
British and. American frigates carried more guns than their rating
indicated. Thus the American 441s in fact mounted. 52 or 54 guns,
and. many British 38's, including Guerri're, mounted. 50 guns. The
1816 Order in Council noted that "the majority of those (frigates)
rated at 36 guns carry 44, arid, some of those rated. at 32 carry 46
and. 48, being more than others that are rated at 38 and. 6." The
reason given for this was the fact that in many cases carronades,
which were not included. in the rating of ships' armaments, had. been
issued to frigates, and then replaced with guns. Stressing the
accidental origins of this apparent deception, the Order in Council
admitted. that it lay Britain open to charges of misrepresentation,
and. was thus "wholly unworthy of the character of the Royal Navy."
- For some of these charges of misrepresentation, see Dupin,
Voyag, ii. ii. 90-93, 143, note.
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not specify any systemization of armaments, a French observer
concluded that a standard. calibre of gun would be the logical
accompaniment to the standardization of ships and. rigging.
This observer was the French economist and. statistician,
Charles Dupin, 1 who arrived. in England in 1816 to study the
war machine that had. defeated. France. Born at Varzy in 1784,
Dupin entered. L'Eoole Polyteohnique in 1801, and upon
graduation was first employed as a marine engineer in setting up
the naval arsenal at Anvers. After Trafa].gar he spent four
years establishing technical schools in the lonian Isles, and.
on his return to Paris published a paper on the strengths of
various woods in ship construction. In 1816, the year Britain
commended. the standardization of the Royal Navy, Dupin was
granted. permission to visit England. The result of his studies
was the massive Voyages d.ans La Grande-Bretagne, published in
Paris between 1820 and 1824, and still the most exhaustive
study of British naval and. military establishments in the early
1. Nouve].le Biographie Gnra1.
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the matter. He predicted. that the United. States would. soon
raise its most common calibre from the 24-pdr. to the 32-pdr. gun.
Indeed., secret memoranda of Byam Martin, Controller of the Navy,
indicated that by 1617 the Americans were well on the way to
this new armament, with the Franklin mounting eighty-six 32-pd.rs.,
and the Independence fifty-aix 32-pdrs. and. thirty long 24-pdrs.
Dupin believed the only way to avoid this apparently endless
armaments spiral was for France to move directly to her largest
practical calibre, the 36-pdr. He further suggested that every
gun in the fleet be of this calibre.1
Such proposals for a standard. or uniform calibre were age-
old. Yet very little had been done in any navy toward attaining
this desirable goal. Up until the sixteenth century, European
land. and sea artillery had. been totally unclassed, and had.
consisted of whatever had come to hand. About the year 1544,
1. Ibid.. pp. 144-53. Paixhans, Nouvelle Force, pp. 71-74.
For British awareness of American activity with 32-p&r. armaments,
see Add. MSS. 41400, foe. 25, 40, secret Martin memo. of 1817.
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Charles V of Spain decreed that all Spanish artillery consist of
seven calibree. In 1550 France restricted, her number of
different ca.libres to six, goon followed. by England's retention
of seven large calibree with a host of lesser oalibres. 1 Never-
theless, it was many years before any system of gun distribution
was forthcoming. In 1815 Britain had. more than twenty models
of naval gun in seven different calibres.2
France also had seven calibres, but only fourteen different
models. Dupin felt these were too many. He therefore advocated
that the variety of calibres be replaced with one uniform calibre,
the 36-pd.r., and. that the fourteen models be reduced in number
to four. The ideal would have been to adopt one standard heavy
gun for all naval purposes, but this was obviously impossible.
1. Robertson, Naval Armament, pp. 72
-90 , 173-74. These were
the 42-, 32-, 24-, 18-, 12-, 9- and 6-pdrs.
2. See Appendix A, Table I; W.O.44/498, Royal Arsenal
Return of Sea Guns, 29 March 1813. It would perhaps be more
accurate to say that there were only 6 calibres as at this time
the 42-pd.r. was used only in the form of carronadea. Interest
in 42-pd.r. canon nevertheless continued.
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To allow for the great variation in size arid strength of ships,
while retaining the maximum effect of calibre, demanded that
there be several different weights of gun. Hence the four
models advocated by Dupin)
Henri-Joseph Paixhans, another Frenchman working independently
of Dupin, had. reached the same conclusions. An artillerist,
and subsequently a proponent of the shell gun, Paixh-ns agreed
that four models of different weights would permit practically
every deck in the French Navy to carry 36-pdr. guns. In this
way Prance would attain a uniform calibre of maximum effect, and
at the same time greatly increase the broadside weight of metal
2in existing ships.
Like Dupin, Paixhans had studied. closely the increased.
weight of metal in British and. American armaments immediately
1. Dupin, Voyages, ii. ii. 144-53.
2. Paixhans, Nouvelle Force, pp. 55, 71-74. Paixhans
estimated that the weight of metal of a French first-rate
would be increased. from 3159 pounds to 4600 pounds. Ibid.
p. 74.
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after the war. He noted., too, the effort to mount the largest
possible guns in the greatest possible numbers, with the
consequent strengthening and. snlarging of ships. Indeed. it was
the great size and. unwieldiness of these vessels that inspired.
him with the idea of providing small, maneuverable ships mounting
a few destructive shell guns. Thus, unlike Dupin who advocated.
maximum uniform calibre for its own merit, Paixhans merely
referred. to it as the logical conclusion to an already obsolete
armaments system.1
Paixhans also applauded. the controversial Congreve 24-pdr.
that so influenced. the design of his own shell guns. Like
Dupin, he interpreted. Britain's introduction of this gun as an
indication that the 24-pdr. was to become the Royal Navy's
uniform calibre, and. in this respect criticized. its adoption on
two counts. In the first place it was not the maximum calibre,
which for the English was the 32- or possibly even the 42-pdr.
1. Ibid.. pp. 4-15, 74. On Paixhans' shell system, see
below Chapter Pour.
140
Secondly, as Congreve's gun was slightly smaller in the bore
than regulation 24-pdrs. complete uniformity within the calibre
was not attained.1
In fact, both Paixhans and Dupin erred in thinking that
Britain in 1816 was planning to adopt "l'acoroissement
progressif d.e puissance et d.e simplification" of 24-pdr. uniform
calibre. 2 Certainly the adoption of the Congreve 24-pd.r. increased
the broadside weight of metal of those ships receiving them,
but there was to be none of the simplification associated with
a standard or uniform calibre. The Royal Navy retained its
complex, multi-calibred. armaments. Thus, as shown in the
partial table of ships' armaments on the following page, the
two decked vessel that in 1811 mounted lower deck 32-pd.rs. and
upper deck iS-pdrs., replaced the latter after 1816 with Congreve
24-.pdra. This increased weight of metal by about two hundred
pounds, half the increase that uniform 32-pd.rs. would have
1. Paixhana, Nouvelle Force, p. 71, note. See also Dupin,
Voyages, ii. ii. 148.
-	 2. Paixhans, Nouvelle Force, p. 15.
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bestowed., but retained, the disadvantage of mounting two calibree.
Further study of the same table reveals that in other rates, three
and even four calibree were mounted in the same ship.
Superstructure
Rate	 Guns	 A Batt.	 B Batt.	 C Batt.	 Guns	 C'nades
1	 120	 32-32's	 34-24's	 34-18's	 8-12's	 12-32's
1	 110	 30-32's	 32-24's	 32-18's	 6-12's	 10 or
or	 12-32's
30-12's
1	 104	 28-32's	 30-24's	 30-12's	 6-12's	 12-32's
or 18's
2	 86	 30-32's	 32-24's C	 8-12's	 14-32's
2-68's
3	 78	 28-32's	 30-24's C	 6_12?s* 12-32's
2-68's
	
74	 28-32's	 28-24's C	 6_121s* 12-32's
4	 60	 30-24's	 2-24's	 28-42's
5	 46	 28-18's	 2- 9's	 16-32's
6	 24	 16-32's	 2- 6's	 6-16's
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This variety of calibres and. gun models greatly oomph-
cated. the arming of the Royal Navy. Each calibre, and. indeed in
some cases, each model of that calibre, required its own size
of shot and. charge, not to mention specially trained. crews and
specialized equipment for working the gun. The arming of even
one ship posed serious problems in supply, stowage and combat
efficiency. For example, the Caledonian of 120 guns, if armed.
as envisaged in the table referred to, mounted. thirty-two
32-pd.r. guns, thirty-four 24-pd.rs., thirty-four 18-pd.re., eight
12-pdre., and. twelve 32-pd.r. carronadee.
To confuse matters further, there were thirteen different
models of these four calibres in service. As a first-rate, it
is probable that Caledonian mounted. the heaviest model of each
calibre, thus making jt necessary to supply only four classes of
gun and one class of carronade. Even at that, she had. to carry
probably five sizes of shot, and, as each weapon was provided
with three sizes of powder charge, fifteen classes of cartridges
with as maiy wred.uoee w as a particular situation or a particular
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gun might demand..1
Thus even in its simplest form, the arming of a large ship
mounting several different ca].ibres was a complicated, business.
Fighting such a ship was no less complicated. A an American
observer wrote in 1857*
All this variety of supply was to be distinguished and
selected in the magazines and. shot lockers - circulated.
with perfect exactness in the confusion and. obscurity of
the lower passages, to a particular hatchway, then up to
the decks where was placed the gun for which each charge
or shot was designed.: and this was to be accomplished.,
not with the composure, deliberation, and attention that
the nature of the operation itself demanded, but amid.
all the excitement and. hot haste of battle.2
The efficiency to be derived. from replacing multi-calibred.
armaments with uniform calibre, as advocated by Dupin end Paixhans,
was obvious. Not only would. the one class of shot and. three
classes of charge reduce the possibility of confusion and.
accident in battle; the whole business of manufacture, supply
1. Robertson, Naval Armament, pp. 173-74.
2. J.A. Dahigren, Shells and Shell Guns (Philadelphia,
1857), pp. 270-71.
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and. stowage would be greatly eimp].ified.
In 1824, France adopted the principle of uniform calibre.
The 36-pd.r. was not, however, the calibre settled. upon. As
both Paixhans and Dupin had feared., the advantages in range and.
power of the 36-pdr. over the 30-pd.r. were found to be more than
offset by its tremendous weight and. expense, with the result
that the 3O-pd.r. was adopted.. The adoption of the smaller
calibre nevertheless conferred the advantages of uniform
calibre on French ships, and. greatly increased their broadside
weight of metal. Moreover, as the O-pd.r. was a 33-pd.r. by
British measurement, France would. continue to enjoy a small
broadside superiority should. the Royal Navy adopt the 32-pd.r. as
its uniform calibre. 1 The French proposals of 1824 made it likely
that Britain would consider such a move. This likelihood. was
increased. when, in 1825, France voted. additional seamen and
1. F.C.P. Dupin, Organisation de la Marine et des Colonies
(Paris, 1834), i. 279-82. See also Dupin, Voyages, ii. ii.
153, and Paixhans, Nouvelle Force, pp. 13-14, for fears that the
36-pdr. would be too heavy.
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1
and. marine artillerists, and. when Britain feared that war, not
only with France, but against a Franco-Ainerican alliance, was
imminent.
British use of the Royal Navy to prevent European inter-
ference in the rebellion of Spains Latin American colonies,
had. strained. Anglo-French relations. In addition, America was
seeking increased. trade with the liberated. colonies, largely
at Britain's expense. Attacks on all commercial vessels in the
Caribbean by Spanish privateers operating from Cuba brought
matters to a head.. British commercial losses had been
sufficient to provoke criticism in the Commons, and the d.espatch
of naval reinforcements to the area in 1822 and. 1823. French
and, American commerce was losing as well, and. the attention of
the three powers turned. to the pirate headquarters on Cuba.2
Considered. by Mahan as the most strategic island in the
1. Dupin, de la Marine, ii. 172-76.
2. Bartlett, Sea Power, pp. 68-73.
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world, after Ireland., the power controlling Cuba controlled. the
Caribbean. Prevailing winds necessitated moat commerce with
Central and. South America sailing north of the island. and. within
easy range of warships anchored. there. Neither France, Britain
or America wished. Cuba to belong to either of the other two
powers, but each was tempted. to move against the pirates there.
Britain feared. the Americana and. French would. form an alliance
to prevent her capturing Cuba. "Sooner or later," wrote Canning,
"we shall probably have to contend. with the combined. maritime
power of France and the United. States."1
In 1825, Britain's naval artillery was less powerful than
that of either country. For with America's having begun as
early as 1817 to replace her 24-pd.rs. with 32-pd.rs., Prance's
decision to move directly from the l8-pdr. common calibre to the
3Q-pdr. uniform calibre, would. thus place the Royal Navy at a
disadvantage if called. upon to oppose those powers with its
1. Ibid.. p. 50.
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24-pdr . common calibre. When it i. recalled that even this
weight of metal depended to a considerable extent on the light
and. erratic Congreve gun, it is not surprising that Britain once
more reacted. to foreign influence by again adopting more
powerful armaments. The 18-pdr. bad been adopted to match the
French, the 24-pd.r. to match the Americans; the 32-pd.r. was
adopted to match both the French and. Americans.
Until 1813 the Royal Navy had. possessed only one model of
this calibre. Nine-feet six-inches in length and weighing 55 owt.,
only the lower decks of ships of the line could. comfortably
support it. In July 1813, the Inspector of Artillery, Sir Thomas
Blomefield, suggested that an eight-foot model of 47 cwt. be
provided for use against the American 24-pdrs?
Apart from six experimental guns cast in the same year,
this model appears to have aroused. little official interest
until 1825. Alarmed at the increase of 32-pdrs. in the American
armoury, the Admiralty in August and September of that year
1. Adm.1/4021 , Ordnance to Admiralty, 21 July 1813 and.
minute.
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ordered six ships building at Bermuda and. Jamaica, and the
three-decked vessels Canada and. Wolfe building on Lake Ontario,
supplied. with the Blomefield. 32-pdrs.1
The fact that in 1825-26, French 3O-pdrs., adopted in 1824,
still existed. largely on paper left Britain free to deploy her
limited numbers of suitable heavy artillery against the Americans,
with their heavy armaments in service. 2
 Still small in numbers,
the United States Navy had inreaaed. dramatically in power since
1814, boasting not only the experimental steam frigate Fulton,
but also containing several superb sailing ships. This small
navy alone could. have been contained. easily by the massive
superiority of the Royal Navy, as b d. been the case in 1814; but
in alliance with France, the Americana could. prove again to be
1. Ad.m.1/4025, Ordnance to Admiralty, 9 Sept. 1825 and
17 April 1826 and minute. It will be recalled from Chapter One
that 32-pdrs. domin ted American Lake armaments in 1813-14.
2. Having adopted. uniform calibre in 1824, the French were
very slow in producin the necessary new guns, a matter for
complaint from Dupin (de la anne, i. 279-82), and probably
the explanation for the fact that Robertson ( Taval Arament,




In 1826 the American Minister in London found British
hostility to his country almost as strong as it had. been in
1812, In the same year the Admiralty began a serious
reappraisal of American naval activity and. construction.1
Special reports from British naval officers and. agents were
unsettling. Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane observed. the North
Carolina at Toulon and. declared. her the "finest ship of her class
I ever saw." 2 Of her sister ship the Ohio, an anonymous
observer reported "a more splendid ship I never saw." 3 Other
such State Class ships as Vermont and New Tork also attracted
attention. Nominally 74-gun ships, this class in fact carried
between 102 and. 106 guns, the equivalent of the smallest class
of British first-rate. But whereas most British first-rates
1. Bartlett, Sea Power, p. 70, note 3.
2. Adm.7/712 , Admiral Sir Alexander Coobrane to Melville,
24 Dec. 1826. This volume of correspondence deals exclusively
with American ships and armaments between 1826 and. 1852, but
is comprised largely of reports from officers end agents
during the 1820's.
3. Ibid.. foe. 39-41.
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mounted. 32-pdrs. on the lower deck, and. 24- . , 18- ox even 12-pdrs.
on the other two decks, State Class ships mounted. 42-pdr. lower
deck guns, and. 32-pd.rs. elsewhere. The second. class of American
ship of the line, containing such "74's" as Franklin and.
Independence, mounted. upwards of 90 guns, mostly long 32-pdra.1
Information had. already reached the Cabinet to the effect
that the largest British first-rates barely equaled. the powerfu].
broadsides of the American State-Class ship. Byam Martin, the
Controller, was called. upon by various members, including
Lord. Liverpool, to comment on the allegations. Although he sought
to reassure the Covernment, Martin's private papers revealed.
that British first-rates were in fact lees powerful than the
American State-Class ships. The U.S.S. Ohio, mounting 102 guns,
had a broadside weight of 1,794 pounds. Britainb largest first-
rate, mounting 120 guns, tbrew only 1,568 pounds, while her
smallest but most numerous ship of the line, the third-rate,
1. Ibid. to. 93. Add.. MZS. 41400 , foe. 25, 40, Martin memo.,
secret, 1817.
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averaged only 926 pounds.1
Martin gave no figures comparing broadside strength of frigates,
but if other reports on American frigates were accurate, their
superiority over British counterparts must have been of the same
m salve proportions as obtained in the battleship class. For
the thirteen frigates built or building in 1826, and rated as
44' s , in fact mounted at least 60 guns. The Liberator (later
Eud.son) was pierced for 62 guns, and the Brandywine for 60.
These fri ates, like the American ships of the line, had
circular sterns and wl1ed sides to permit carrying heavy
32-pdrs. The Bra d.ywine, strained and. leaking from the weight
of these guns h d reverted to long 24-pd.rs. Nevertheless, It was
planned to remount the 32-pdrs. in time of war. In the meantime
the AmrIcans were casting li&,hter experimental models of this
1. d.d. MS. 41396, Martin me o. 25 July 1826, and
Melville to Martin, 21 and. 22 July 1826; 41397, M rtin
to and from Clarence, 4-6 laroh 1828; 41403, artIn memo.
un'ated. fos. 53-56, 66. See B rtlett, ea Po er, p. 33.
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calibre
As a result of these revelations, Britain in 1826 under-
took to bring her naval armaments into line with those of Prance
and America. The problem immediately arose as to which system
to adopt, French uniform calibre, or the American multi-calibre
arrangement with 42-pdrs. on lower decks. The ordering of
32-pd.rs. to America in 1825 indicated that the Admiralty were
contemplating the former; the tremendous power and. range of
American 42-pd.rs, on the other hand., gave rise to speculation as
to whether the banked system should. not be retained, but given
power equal to the Americans. The solution to the problem lay
in the armament weight the lower decks of British ships could.
bear. In August of 1826, the Admiralty ordered that four guns
be cast and prepared for experiment, two 32-pdrs. of 60 and
1. Adm .7/712 , fOe. 10-15, 23-24. It is probable that these
American frigates, like those of France, were inspired. by the
British super frigates Leander and Newcastle built during the war
to surpass the American super frigates. The Americans did. not
adopt uniform calibre until 1845, Dahlgren, Shell Guns, pp. 23-25.
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64 owt., and two 42-pdrs. of 80 and 85 cwt.1
Not since the late eighteenth century had. the Royal Navy
used. the 42-pd.r. to any extent. According to Sir Roward. Douglas,
a very few first-rates had. mounted these massive guns on their
lower decks before and. during the Napoleonic Wars, although a
Royal Arsenal return of all sea guns in service in 1813 listed.
only carronades of this calibre. 2 As it was largely the desire
to match the American State-Class ship that inspired. Admiralty
activity in 1826, it was not surprising that interest in the
42-pdr. was rekindled. in that year.
In August 1827 the four heavy guns ordered a year earlier
commenced trials. The two 42-pd.rs. were pronounced too heavy
1. Ind .4993 t 59-4, 30, 31 Aug. 1826. See also Adm.1/4025,
Ordnance to Admiralty, 23 April 1827 and minute; 4027, Ordnance
to Admiralty, 11 Aug. 1828.
2. Douglas, Naval Gunnery, 3rd. ed., p. 222. Paixhans,
Nouvelle Force, p. 58. W.O.44/49 8 , Royal Arsenal Return of
Sea Guns, 29 March 1813. 32-pd.rs. began to replace 42-pdrs.
on the lower decks of ships of the line in 1790 . Adin.7/677,
Admiralty Board. to the Master General of the Ordnance,
22 May 1790.
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or British ships of the line. In the light of Portuguese
experience with 48-pdrs., and. that of Prance with 36-pd.rs., this
was har&].y surprising. Nevertheless, Sir Alexander Dickson, the
recently appointed Deputy Adjutant Genera:L of Artillery, advised
that if the 42-pd.r. could be reduced in weight to 65 cwt., it
would."possess great power and fully answer the object desired in
again introducing 42-pdrs. into Naval Service."1
The Aduiralty concluded that the 42-pd.r. was not feasible,
and. that the 32-pdrs. of 64 cwt. tested with the 42-p&rs. become
Britain's heaviest artillery. This decision in effect meant that
Britain would follow the French model of uniform calibre of
maximum practical effect. To this end experiments were carried
out in 1826 and 1827 on two lighter 32-pdr. pieces proposed. by
Sir Alexander Dickson. Ria seven-foot six-Inch model proved to
be too light, and was rejected, but his five-foot six-inch gun
1. Adm.1/4026, Dickson to Admiralty, 20 Aug. 1827.
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1
of 25 cwt. was adopted.
Thus, by 1827, Britain had. rejected. the 42-pdr., and. had
decided. to adopt the four models of uniform calibre advocated.
by Paixhans and. Dupin, and. adopted. by Prance in 1824. hese
four models were the existing regulation 32-pdr. of 56 owt., the
47 owt. model proposed. by Blomefield. in 1813 and. sent to North
America in 1825, and. the 64 cwt. and. 25 owt. guns adopted in
1827. But with only sixty-six guns of 47 cut. available for
service in 1827, and. even fewer of the 64 and. 25 cwt. pieces in
existense, it was to be many years before uniform calibre could.
be put into practice.2
One factor that served to delay the attainment of uniform
calibre was the time required to produce sufficient 32-pd.rs. to
rearm the Royal Navy. The exact number necessary is not clear,
1. Ad.m.1/4025, Ordnance to Admiralty, 9 Sept. 1825 arid
enclosures, 5 June 1826 and. minute, 22 Nov. 1826; 4026, Croker
memo. 22 Feb. 1827, Add. MSS. 41396, Martin to Ielvil].e,
31 Oct. 1826.
2. Adm.1/4025, Ordnance to Admiralty, 23 April 1827 and
minute. For proposed. new scheme of armaments see Adm.1/4026,
Navy Office to Admiralty, 10 Oct. 1827.
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but if returns of 1838 listing 27,924 pieces of all descriptions
in the navy are any indication, it is safe to estimate that at
least three-quarters of this number would be required. 1 Again,
it is not clear what was the production capacity of the Ordnance
Department with itB various private contractors. Nevertheless
some indication of the time required to supply the vast
quantities of ordnance involved in a total re-armament can be
derived from France's experience with the same problem.
France had adopted uniform calibre in 1824; yet as late a
1832 only 1,241 of the 3,000 oarronad.es, and. 1,493 of the 4,256
guns required had been produced. 2 Thus when the Duke of
Wellington expressed concern in 1828 that France was attaining
uniform calibre much more rapidly than was Britain, Sir George
1. Adm.1/4034, Ordnance to Admiralty, 14 Nov. and 21 Dec.
1838 and enclosures. These enclosures refer only to Naval Guns
on board commissioned ships and those in store at Woolwioh,
Chatham, Portsmouth and Devonport. In 1828 it was estimated that
1377 of the 47 cwt. models alone would be required for about
fifty ships. Ldm.1/4027, Ordnance to Admiralty, 1]. Aug. 1828.
2. Dupin, de ].a Marine, i. 279-82.
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Cockburn, First Sea Lord, could. assure him that of the more
than 4,000 guns required by the French Navy, only 380 were
promised for 1828.1 And. while it is impossible to aBcertain
what portion of Prance's production capacity these figures
represented, it is clear that the time required to provide the
necessary guns delayed. the advent of uniform calibre.
A second factor also helped to delay the attainment of
uniform calibre. This was the need. to alter many of the ships
in the Royal Navy so that they could. support the increased.
weights of the new armaments. It was at this point that Britain
found cause to regret having built her ships so small after 1815.
It will be recalled that more than half the twenty-six ships of
line built between 1815 and. 1825 had. been second- and. third-rates,
and. that only six of the twenty-eight frigates built during the
same period were super frigates. The Admiralty thus discovered
in 1826 that their eight super frigates built or building,
compared. with America's fourteen and. France's twenty-nine, and
1. W.N.D. iv. 361-69, 685-86. Bartlett, Sea Power, p. 38.
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that not one British ship of the line could support the armament
weight of the American State-Class ship.1
During the summer of 1826, therefore, when the Admiralty
had. determined. to cast heavy 52- and. 42-pdr. guns for lower decks,
steps were taken to provide ships stout enough to support the
immense weights involved.. Ten first-rates were ordered to be
built or reconstructed, and ten fourth-rate super frigates
provided. by building or by cutting down 74-gun ships. 2 During the
autumm of 1826, and. with the same purpose of preparing the navy
for heavier armaments, another fourteen ships of the line were
selected. for doubling. 3 "Doubling" referred to the expedient of
1. See above.
2. Add.. 1135. 4 1396 , Melville to Martin, 21 and. 22 1Tuly 1826;
Martin memo. 25 July 1826. Bartlett, p. 53.
3. Add.. 1135. 41596, Martin to Sir George Cookburn 19 Oct. 1826,
to Melville, 31 Oct. 1826 and. delivered. to Cockburn 1 Nov. 1826, to
dockyard. commissioners, 7 and. 10 Nov. 1826, to Admiralty, 4 Dec.
1826. The ships ordered for doubling weres Asia, Ganges, Monarch,
Goliath, Thunderer, Neptune, Nelson, Saint George, Caled.onian,
Trafalgar, London, queen Charlotte, !oyal George, Waterloo.
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lapping over the existing external walls of a ship with
additional planking; so far as these fourteen ships were concerned.,
this was to consist of "an increase of one foot
	
t breadt to
extend. upwards from the seat of water ... end then to break
gradually into the form of the ship, so that the upper deck will
have only its present breadth0"1
 This increased. breadth was to
provide the water displacement and. stability necessary to permit
mounting 32-pd.r. guns.
Other alterations were necessary if these ships of the line
were to bear such heavy armanents. Deck beams and planking had.
to be heavier; with tte exception of the teak decked Asia and.
Ganges, the deck planking of the other twelve ships was increased.
from tiree inches in thickness to four inches. The great size
of the new 32-pd.re. also necessitated alterations in gunporte.
So high did these guns stand on their carriages, that mcBt ports
were too low to permit rinrntng out, let alone elevating the
weapon to fire at extreme range or at elevated coastal batteries.
1. Add. MSS. 41396, Martin to A. Seppings, 1 Sept. 1826.
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For three years the dookyard.e struggled with the problenia of
altering ports and decks to adequate dimensions; so great was
the work involved in grooming ships of the line for heavier
armaments, that the 32-pd.r. became distinctly unpopular in the
dookyard.e
These alterations occurred at an awkward moment in the
history of British naval architecture. It had become clear in
1826 that Britain had built her ships too mmall in comparison
with those of other nations, and. that the necessity for doubling
resulted from the "invincible unwillingness" of the Admiralty to
permit designers to give sufficient breadth and stability to their
ships. 2 Trials held in 1827 and 1828 between ships of various
designers, were closely followed by the public who were outraged
at the poor showing of those designed by the Admiralty. The Navy
1. Adm.1/4026, Ord.nance to Admiralty, 19 March 1827; 4027,
25 April and. 4 July 1828; 4028, 13 May 1829 and enclosure. 1.0.
44/499, Admiralty to Ordnance, 17 Feb. 1829. Add. MSS. 41396,
Martin to lelville, 21 Aug., 31 Oct. and. 7 Dec. 1826.
2. Bowles, Pamphlets, p. 40.
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Board, the Admiralty and. the Surveyor of the Navy, Sir Robert
Seppings, 'were alike subjected to fierce criticism. In 1829,
the School for the Improvement of Naval Architecture, opened in
1811, closed its doors)
In this sane year, and. amid. continuing heated controversy,
the first-rate Caled.onian was brought forward. She had just
completed the alterations ordered in 1826, and. was in the process
of receiving her armaments. To the horror of Byam Martin, the
Controller,	 32-pd.rs. weighed sixteen tons more than
had been anticipated, leaving her midship ports a mere two inches
above the water. Martin begged Cockburn not to "start the ship
upon trial under so manifest a disadvantage." Such a course, he
warned the First Sea Lord, would "subject us to public remark
2
which is not pleasant."
1. Bartlett, Sea Power, pp. 34-38. Bones, Pamphlets, pp.20-27,
33-46. Brigge, Naval Administration, pp. 8-10. Naier, The Navy,
pp. 56, 64-66. Stirling, Professional Topics, pp. 72-78, 86-88.
A brief history of the School of Naval Architecture is to be
found in P.p.(1833), xxiv. 315-30.
2. Add.. MSS. 41398, Martin to Cockburn, 6 Lug. 1829.
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Martin also feared that another class of ship would not
wear its new armament well. This was th. Barham class frigate
provided by razeeing, or cutting down, 74-gun ships. Despite
M.artin'a protests, the Admiralty persevered in its policy of
providing super frigates by this method., and of mounting long
32-pdre. on the maind.eck and. eight-foot 32-pdrs. on the weather
deck and. forecastle. Not until 1831 were fifth-rate frigates
1
similarly armed.
Martin's intense dislike of increased armament weight in
ships designed for lighter weights, revealed in 1815 when the
Congreve 24-pdr. was adopted for upper decks, and revealed again
in 1829 when 32-pdrs. were beginning to appear, mysteriously
disappeared in 1830. In that year he recommended that 32-pdrs.
be used everywhere in ships of the line, and. that frigates unable
to carry these guns be doubled, cut down to corvette., or turned.
1. Adm.1/4025, Ordnance to Admiralty, 5 June 1826 and minute;
3473, Admiralty to Navy Board, 10 Jan. 1831. See also Ind..4993f
59-4, 13 Dec. 1826; 5001: 59-4, 2 July, 22 and. 29 Aug., 17 and.
29 Sept. 1827.
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into troop ships. Melville approved. most of these recommendations,
but before they- could. be put into effect, Sir James Graham
replaced. him as First Lord. of the Adiniralty)
Graham was in agreement with Melville and. Martin on the
desirability of uniform calibre. By Admiralty Order of 10 January
1831, all first-rates were to mount an exclueiv1y 32-pd.r.
armament. The four models approved in 1827 were to be used..
And although Graham disapproved of "doubling" or "filling out",
he agreed that 84-gun ships should be "enlarged. generally or have
an increase of breadth sufficient to attain the object required."2
Again, as Martin and others had. suggested., the inferior
third-rate ships of the line and. fifth-rate frigates that
Britain had concentrated on building since 1815, came in for
close scrutiny. No further third-rates were to be laid down,
and. those building were to be completed. as speedily as possible.
All work on fifth-rate frigates was suspended. to determine
1. Add. MSS. 41368, Martin'a State of the Navy proposals
of 1830 , foe. 264-66.
2. Add. MSS. 41368 , Admiralty Order of 10 Jan. 1831. See
also Adm.1/3473, Admiralty to Navy Board., 10 Jan. 1831.
164
those that could. be strengthened. to mount 32-pdrs., and. those
better suited for corvettes or troop ships.1
Britain's navy in 1830 was thus taking on a considerably
different shape from the one the Admiralty had planned in 1816.
The Order in Council of November of that year had. anticipated
a standardization in classes of ahips and, the continuation of
multi-oalibred. armaments. What in fact came about was a
atand.ard.ization of armaments by the adoption of the 32-pdr.
uniform calibre, that in turn rendered. the existing classes of
ship too small. To support the increased weight of the new
armaments, existing ships had to be strengthened and enlarged,
and proposed ships given greater dimensions. In this way the
wooden sailing ship of the line achieved its greatest magnitude
in size, in power, and in efficiency.
But the orders of 1830 were never completely carried. out,
both in regard. to the introduction of uniform calibre, and in
the provision of a new generation of ship of the line. Thus
1. Ibid.
165
while in 1833 Sir Augustus Frazer of The Royal Laboratory noted
a shortage of 32-pd.r. cartridges, owing to "the almost total
exclusion in our armaments of any other calibre for large
vessels", 1 the Ordnance Department in 1835 still adverted. to
the fact that,
although the ships of His Majesty's Navy are classed,
it is not found that any two ships of any one class
(except that of ten guns) are armed with ordnance of the
same nature, which occasions a considerable variation
as to the powder and ammunition allowed
In fact uniform calibre was attained slowly and imperfectly.
By 1840 there were still a great number of 18-. and. 24-:pd.rs. in
the fleet; and although the 32-pd.r. was then by far the most
common calibre in service, there were not four models of this
calibre, as had. been planned. in 1827, but nearly fourteen. This
abundance of models stemmed from the fact that, as discuBsed in
Chapter Five, the Admiralty resorted to the expedient of boring
up lesser calibre. to 32-pdrs. This step had. the advantages of
1 • Supply 5/31, Sir Augustus Frazer to Captain Henry Ihincan,
25 Nov. 1853.
2. Adin.1/403l , Ordnance to Admiralty, 2 March, 1835.
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providing the vast numbers of necessary guns more quickly, as
well as attaining 32-pdr. broadsides with existing artillery,
thereby saving money through not having to provide new weapons
or enlarged ships. But the overriding consideration behind the
Admiralty's decision to compromise on uniform calibre and
enlarged warships, was the fact that new weapons introduced by
the French, and adopted by the Admiralty in small quantities in
1830, threatened the sailing ship of the line and. its solid shot
artillery with extinction. This new weapon was the shell gun.
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Chapter Four
TRE EIRTEEN TWENTIES: NOUVELLE FORCE MLRITIME
The adoption of uniform calibre to increase the power and.
effioienoy of solid. shot armaments coincided. with the introduction
of shells into naval service. Paixhane in Prance had observed
the increasingly heavy guns in the navies of the world, and. the
increasingly heavy ships necessary to carry them. Re believed.
that one shell exploding at the waterline of such a ship would.
sink it. He further believed that if France mounted shell guns
in her sailing fleet and in war steamers, she could bring about
a revolution in naval architecture that would. force Britain to
abandon the large sailing navy that was the mainstay of her
power to compete on equal terms with French steamers. In 1821
Paixhans published his Nouvelle Force Maritime. By 1829 shell
guns mounted on war steamers had. demonstrated their value for
warlike purposes, and the Melville administration was preparing
V
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to introduce both into the Royal Navy. During the eighteen
twenties the problems and. dangers that had. plagued. horizontal
shell-fire for two centuries were largely overcome.
Shells were first used. as projectiles in the mortar. With
its high trajectory and. notorious inaccuracy, this weapon was
beet suited. for the bombardment of large towns and. forts under
siege, and was used for this purpose in land. warfare by the
middle of the sixteenth century,1
Owing to the risks of fire on shipboard., however, shells
were not used. by sea services until a considerably later date,
and. theft only in small, specially designed. craft called bomb
or mortar vessels. Five such vessels took part in the French
bombardments of Algiers in 1680 and. 1688, and. in 1689 a French
"Ord.onnance" crested. two companies of bombard.iers to operate the
1. 3.P. Baxter, The Introduction of the Itouclad Warship
(Cambridge, Mass., 1933), pp. 18-19. Garbett, Naval Gunnery
p. 2 33 . Rime, Origin of Artillery, pp. 194-97 . Majendie,
Smooth-bore Ordnance, p. 21. Paixhans, Nouve].le Force,
pp. 86-88.
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mortars of this new flotilla. In the same year, EngliSh mortar
vessels set on fire and wholly disabled a French ship at Bantry
Bay. Five years later, in 1694, the English end French each lost
a vessel to mortar shell fire at Havre, while an English
aquadron of bomb vessels levelled 1400 houses at Dieppe. Sir
John Leaks repeatedly demonstrated the effectiveness of such
shell fire in reducing castles and. towns along Spains east
coast during the first years of the eighteenth century.1
As mortar vessels were slow, clumsy sailors unable to keep
up with ships of the line, Lieutenant Colonel Browne, Master
Gunner of England, proposed shooting grenades and fire-shot from
cannon so that all ships might have shell-firing capability.
A council of officers studying Browne's proposal on board
H.M.S. Triumiph in July of 1701, concluded that forty or fifty
of each projectile be issued to great ships in time of war,
"provided they can be well secured from taking fire and. doing
1. Baxter, p. 18. Dupin, Voyages, ii. ii. 80-81.
Paixhane, Nouvelle Force, pp. 87-90. NJ.S. Leake, ii. 103,
131, 257.
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mischief in our own ships." 1 This same cautionary spirit that
had. moved William Monson to admonish Elizabethan seamen to
prepare such contrivances on shore, "or otherwise into sea far
from the ship", 2 apparently still gripped the Admiralty; for
there is no evidence that the Triumph resolution was officially
adopted..
Browne's plan was significant in that it not only proposed
introducing shells on shipboard, but also because it was one of
the earliest attempts to impart the superior accuracy and
penetration of high velocity gunfire to these projectiles.
Fired. from mortars or howitzers (a light mortar designed to serve
as a field. piece) at low velocities, shells described a parabolic
trajectory that resulted. in poor accuracy and no penetration.
Nevertheless, several seventeenth century artillerists had
attempted to attain both precision and penetration with shells
by firing them from howitzers laid almost horizontally. As early
as 1602, Renaud-Ville, an engineer in the French service, proved.
1. Baxter, p. 19. N.R.S. Rooke, p. 113.
2. N.R.S. Monson, iv. 44, note.
171
unsuccessful in such atte pto at the siege of Ostend.. In 1689,
however, the Master Gunner of England, Rioha.rd. Leake, mounted
two of hia "cushie pieces" aboard the mortar vessel Firedrake,
and. by the end. of the century, howitzers designed to fire shells
nearly horizontally were available for use on these vessels.1
Not until the middle of the eighteenth century, almost
fifty years after the Triumph resolution, were attempts made to
fire shells horizontally from high velocity guns as opposed to
howitzers. In 1749, tests held by M. Leduo at Strasbourg, and.
M. d.e Valiere at Berg-op-Zoom, were unsuccessful, as were secret
French tests from a naval 24-pdr. in 1760.2 In June of the same
year, the English demonstrated. a comparable lack of achievement
at Acton Common. Shells were fired from 12- and 24-pdr. naval
guns, "but as the shells were found frequently to burst in the
guns, it was thought too hazzardous to introduce them on board.
ships of war." Similar disappointments rewarded Royal Artillery
1. .7.1. Dahlgren, Shells and Shell Guns, pp. 4-5. Baxter,
pp. 18-19. Robertson, pp. 160-61. N.R.S. Leake, 1. 10-12,
22-23.
-	
2. Paixhane, Nouvelle Force, p. 91.
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trials in Canada during 1776.1
These failures stemmed from two great defects in shell
construction. In the first place, the poor iron casting
techniques of the day could not be relied upon to provide shells
strong enough to withstand a	 blast, yet fragile enough
to be shattered by their bursting charges. The second defect
in shells, and. one persisting until well into the nineteenth
century, ooncerned the fuze that ignited the bursting charge.
As the fuze projected from the shell, not only was couraoy
impaired, but the shell had to be placed in the gun with its
fuze facing either the breech or the muzzle. In the first
instance, the blast frequently drove the fuze into the shell,
bursting it prematurely; if facing the muzz.e, the fuze often
failed. to ignite, consequently the shell could. not explode. If,
despite all these hazards, the projectile left the gun intact
and. with its fuze activated., there remained. the possibility that
1. Robertson, Naval Armament, p. 163, note. W.O.55/1823,
"A Treatise on Artillery", 1780(?), to. 6.
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the fuze would not burn for the proper interval of time, causing
the shell to explode before it reached. the target, or to be
shattered. by the target before it could. explode. Technology was
not yet sufficiently advanced. to provide for all the delioate
calculations required. if shells were to be fired from guns
successfully.1
In 1779, however, at the siege of Gibraltar, Captain Mercier
of the 35th Regiment did successfully fire 5.5-inch mortar
shells from long 24-pdr. guns into the Spanish ranks. This
first recorded. firing of shells from cannon under fire impressed.
the English not at all. They showed. a like indifference to
reports of successful French testing in 1778, 1780 and. 1784,
and. made no immediate effort to adopt the deadly spherical
case shot demonstrated by Lieutenant Henry Shrapnell a few
1. On the difficulties presented. by fuzea, see Douglas,
3rd. ed., pp. 314-22; Rime, Origin of Artlllery, pp. 212-15;
Majendie, Smooth-bore Ordnance, pp. 232-40; Paixhans,
Nouvelle Force, pp. 137, note, 193-95, 212-13, 245-54;
John Sooffern, Projectile Weapons of War (3rd ed., London,
1858 ), pp. 144-50. See below.
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years later.1
This surprising attitude was undoubtedly in part owing to
the fact that in 1779, the year that Captain Mercier demonstrated
his resourcefulness at Gibraltar, the first "smashers and lesser
carronadea for solid., ship, shell and. carcass shot" were used.
against French ships. 2 Five years earlier, General Robert
Melville had proposed. a short 8-inch gun weighing only 31 cwt.,
but capable of firing 68-pdr. shot. Described as a gun on the
outside and. a mortar on the inside, NSmaahersN and carronad.es
offered. many advantages. A carronade was about half the weight
of a gun of the same calibre, used. much smaller powder charges,
and. required only a few men to operate it. These agreeable
properties were shared. by al]. Niesser carronad.es W , and the 32-
1. Baxter, p. 19. Clowes, v. 277, note. Robertson, p.163,
note. 1.3. MoGuffie, The Siege of Gibraltar (London 1965),
pp. 77-78 . MoGuffie states that of 200,600 rounds fired
between 1779 and. 1783, 129, 000 were shells, but that they
were a makeshift and. "suitable only for the special conditions
of Gibraltar."
2. Robertson, p, 127. For greater detail on the carronade,
,.see Ibid. Chapter Five, and above Chapter One.
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and. 24-pd.re . became highly favoured. for the defense of merchant-
men, and. for the quarter decks and. forecastlee of warships.
The controversy aroused. in naval circles over the
carronade's introduction has been discussed in Chapter One.
Strangely enough, the new weapon's shell-firing capability
played. no part in this controversy, and. the carronade was
judged solely on its performance with regulation solid. shot.
Thus while General Melville recommended. issuing carcass and.
common shells for carronades during the American revolution, and.
several authors agree that this policy was followed. to a
considerable extent throughout the long French wars, there is
little evidence that common shells were issued. to the Royal
Navy in any great numb era •
Indeed, according to an incomplete Royal Laboratory report
of 1811, no common shells were officially issued. to any
British ships save bomb vessels between the years 1783 and. 1811,
and. carcass shells were the only "combustibles" considered.
1. Baxter, p. 20, Dahlgren, Shell Guns, pp. 10-13. Dupin,
Voyages, ii. ii. 80-81, 121-22. Palxhans, Nouvelle Force,
p. 97. John Scoffern, Projectile Weapons, p. 56, and New
Resources of Warfare (London, 1859), pp. 6-8
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sufficiently safe to be carried in large ships. 1 As late as
1820, both Ordnance and Ad.miralty expressed. concern that the
carronade had been assessed only in terms of firimg solid shot,
whereas its performance with hollow shot and shell had. not been
tested. 2 One of the original purposes of the oarronad.e had. been
lost eight of, probably owing to undiminished fear of the
dangers of combustibles aboard ship.3
The outbreak of the French wars in 1792 gave a great
impetus to ordnance experiments. Especially in Prance, where
the carronade was not adopted until near the turn of the
century, did artillerists concern themselves with horizontal
shell fire. Prom 1791 to 1799, Lieutenant General count
Andr(oasy experimented so successfully with ricochet shell fire
from naval guns, that he recommended to Bonaparte that it
1. W.O.44/498, Royal Laboratory Report of Sir William
Congreve, 26 Oct. 1811. Carcass and shrapnel were occasionally
fired from carronadee in action. Clowes, v. 69, 123, 214, 222,
261, 264, 175-77, 384, 516.
2. Ada.1/4024, Ordnance to Admiralty, 7 May 1820, enclosure
and minute.
3. Robertson, p. 139. Dahlgren, Shell Guns, pp. 8-13.
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replace hot shot in sea service.1
Subsequent testing of ricochet fire at Cherbourg in 1794,
and at Toulon in 1795, on the other hand, convinced a special
committee that shells on shipboard. remained a grave danger to
friend as well as foe, Their recommendation to postpone further
experiments until peace permitted exhaustive testing was not,
however, adopted. For in April 1797, shells fired from 24-pdr.
guns burst upon a hulk at Cherbourg with such devastating effect,
that observers believed no ship of the line could surive
fifteen minutes with similar damage to her waterline. The
committee consequently reversed its 1795 decision, and in January
of 1798 recommended the introduction of shells into sea service.2
The French Navy sustained more damage from its shells
than did the enemy. At the Battle of Aboukir Bay, the
destruction of their flagship L'Orient was hastened when her own
incendiaries caught fire and exploded. A similar disaster
1. Baxter, P. 20.
2. Ibid. pp. 20-21. Paixhans, Nouvelle Force, pp. 95-100,
124-26.
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terminated an engagement off Gavre, and. reports of recurring
accidents with shells aboard. French ships, spread panic through
that fleet and. encouraged. other powers to continue restricting
their issue of shells to bomb vessels.1
It is probable the French withdrew shells from large ships
shortly before Trafalgar. They nevertheless studied other uses
for shells, and. continued. the attempt to solve the problems
connected. with horizontal shell-fire. Thus Bonaparte ordered.
on June 17, 1803, that each pinnace in the Boulogne flotilla
mount an "obusier", and. the following year had long howitzers
cast for the protection of Toulon and other French ports. Ten
years of continuous experimenting with shells fired. from guns,
although rewarded in 1811 by bursting only 29 out of 169 shells
1. Baxter, p. 21. Garbett, pp. 16-17. Jurien de la
Gravlire, Guerres Maritimes sous la Ré'publiue et 1'Empire
(Paris, 1883), ii. 94-96. According to Douglas, 3rd ed., p. 322,
four or five ships of the line and. six frigates or lesser vessels
were put out of action through the explosion of their own
incendiaries.
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effectively on target, convinced French artillerists that they
were on the right track, and in that year Bonaparte approved
plans to forge an experimental 8-inch shell gun at Douai. Owing
to the course of the war, this gun was never tested.1
Britain's experience with shells during these war years,
while not extensive, paralleled that of France. Extreme caution
alone prevented the Royal Navy from duplicating the d.iaasterous
French move to introduce shells. Thus the same mistaken hope of
having solved the problems of horizontal shell fire, the same
hope that had led France in 1798 to introduce shells into service,
had. encouraged Admiralty experiments as early as 1796. Rather
than marvel at the destructive properties of a few successful
shells, however, the Admiralty concluded that this ammunition
was still tco dangerous to serve in large ships, and continued to
provide it only for the mortars and. howitzers aboard mortar
vessels. Tested aboard one such vessel, the Vesuvius, at Stoke
1. Baxter, pp. 21-22. Qarbett, pp. 16-17. Paixhans,
Nouvelle Force, pp. 98-106, 140-44. Robertson, p. 165.
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Bay in May of 1797, shells were stored. in the Tower of London
for issue to these ships, and. for unspecified. "particular
services."1
The Admiralty's refusal to permit shells aboard ship not-
withstanding, the 1802 edition of Adye's semi-official
Bombardier and Pocket Gunner listed the shell diameters required
for each calibre of sea service gun. As few of these projectiles
were in fact produced, Adye suggested that any shell could. be
fired. from a gun of smaller calibre, providing the gun elevated
sufficiently to balance the shell on its muzzle. Such advice,
coupled. with the solemn instruction to reject those shells having
surface cavities and abrasions greater than three-quarters of an
inch in depth, indicated that a high order of accuracy was not
expected.2
Indeed, Royal Artillery experiments in 1803 once more
l.Add. 1(88. 37878, ILK. Crew to W. Windhani, 28 Dec.
1799 . Douglas, 1st ed., pp. 297-99. Paixhans, ITouvelle
Force, p. 97.
2. R.W. Adye, Bombardier and Pocket Gunner (2nd. ed.,
London, 1802), pp. 251-22.
181
affirmed the unreliability of shells and. spherical case shot
(shrapnel). "The flight of the shell has no velocity," the
Deputy Adjutant General of Artillery cautioned an artillery
captain, "and. burst them as we.will, the shot does not
penetrate the target at five or six hund.red. yards; when the
enemy comes nearer, let me advise you to limber up, and leave
1the rest to the cavalry."
By 1803, therefore, the Admiralty's fear that shells were
neither safe or reliable had. been confirmed, and between that
year and 1811, little attentions given to horizontal shell-
fire. In 1811, the year France had. climaxed. ten years of
continuous testing by ordering experimental 8-inch shell guns,
the Admiralty did consider a "fireball" claimed. to have been
invented. by a Mr. Pane. This fireball, consisting of solid
shot coated. with combustible materials, was in fact an old. type
of ammunition, as Sir William Congreve pointed. out. In any
1. W.0.55/1l48, 3. Macleod., Deputy Adjutant General of
Artillery, to Captain Bloomfield, 22 Oøt. 1803.
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case, the Admira1t rejected. it on the ground.s that, if
adopted, it would. "endanger the British Fleet more than the
French."1
In July 1811, and. again in January 1813, Lieutenant John
Harvey Stevens of the Royal Marine Artillery recommended a more
widespread use of shells in the Royal Navy. While in charge of
ordnance aboard the bomb vessel Fearless in 1810, Stevens had
substituted 68-pd.r. carronad.es for the regular 8-inch mortars,
and had achieved startling results. Trials held. at Sutton
Heath confirmed. the fact that 68-pd.r. carronadee used. as mortars
held a range superiority of 1500 yards over brass £-inch
mortars, although inferior by almost three-quartere of a mile to
1. Adm.]./4020, Ordnance to Admiralty, 28 Aug. 1811 and en-
closures, Admiral Moorson to Admiralty, 19 Oct. 1811 and enclosures.
See W.O.44/498 , packet entitled. "Inventions 1811 - Mr. Pane's
Fireballs". Sir William Congreve took advantage of the opportunity
to express the Royal Laboratory's opinion on incendiaries for
sea service in general, and concluded "that round carcasses are
the only combustibles which should be used on Ships of War which
are not fitted for firing Red Hot Shot." Adm.1/4 020 , Ordnance
to Admiralty, 28 Oct. 1811, enclosing Congreve to Ordnance,
26 Oct. 1811.
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the more common 10.5- and. 13-inch sea mortars. Stevens'
suggestion that the carronade would. serve well either as a mortar
or a howitzer on gunboats and. other small vessels was not,
however, adopted..1
In 1814, another John Stevens, an. American working with his
two eons in Boboken, New Jersey, developed. an elongated. shell.
Designed. for service with Major George 	 "Columbiad",
a chambered. piece capable of firing both solid shot and shells,
the American Chief of Ordnance believed. elongated, shells the
answer to many of the objections against the use of shells on
shipboard. 2 The effect of this 9-inch percussion shell against
a target representing the side of a ship led the Stevenees to
predict a revolution in naval architecture. Although the
1. Adm.1/4020, Ordnance to Admiralty, 12 July 1811, enclosing
committee report of 3 July 1811. Baxter, p. 22, note. For a
brief summary of Stevens's early services, see Ad.m.1/3557,
Sir Richard Williams to Admiralty, 27 Aug. 1827, enclosing
Stevens to Williams of the same date, and Williams to Admiralty,
15 Sept. 1827, enclosure.
2. Baxter, p. 23.
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Americana ordered Boinford. shells for both Army and Navy,
the coming of peace in 1815 ended official interest in the
new armament, and. the Stevensea' proposals for iron-plated
gun-boats, floating batteries and. war steamers mounting shell
1
guns, went unheeded.
The Stevenses' view that shell fire would. revolutionize
naval architecture was shared by a bri1lia.t French
artillerist, Colonel Henri-Joseph Paixhans. Born at Metz
in 1783, Paixhans graduated from L'Eoole Polyteohnlque
into Bonaparte's Artillery. In 1809 he comnienced working
on horizontal shell fire, and ten years later submitted, to
the Minister of Marine and. Colonies his design for the new
French Navy. In 1821, and. again in 1822, Paixhans
published his ideas in a volume appropriated. entitled.
1. Ibid. pp. 8-9, 22-23. Dupin, Voyages, ii. ii. 134-35.
Paixhans, Nouvelle Force, p. 137, note.
185
Nouve].le Force Maritime.1
Expressly disolaiming the title of inventor, Paixhans
cited, past examples of the destructive powers of shell fire,2
and argued. the need. for such capabilities in existing ships. A
ship of the line, he asserted, was practically invulner&ble to
solid shot of the highest calibre. At Trafalgar, despite an
1. Nouvelle Biographie G(nral (Paris, 1856). The full title
is* Nouvelle force maritime, et application de cette force i
guelqjues parties dii service de	 de terre; ou Essai stir
l'tat actual des moy-ens de la force maritime; Stir tine espce
nouvelle d'artlllerie de mer, gui dtnuirait promptment lea
vaisseaux d.e haut-bord; Sur la construction des navires 	 oi1e
et vapeur, de grandeur modre, gui, arins de cette artilLierie,
donxieraient tine marine moms couteuse et plus puissante gue celles
eiistantes; Ft stir la force gue le systme de bouohes-.-feu
propos offrirait terre, pour lea batteries de sige, de 1acea,
de ctes et de oaiupagne. (Paris, 1822. 4to. xv, 458 pp., with 7
plates.) Pages 1-74 are a revision of his Nouvelle Force Maritime,
ou expos(&ee moyens anflu1er la force des marinactue1lead.e
haut-bord, et de d.oriner ^ des navires trs-petits, assez de
puissance pour dtruire lee plus grands vaisseaux de guerre.
(Paris, 1821). Citations in the present work are from the edition
of 1822. Much of my information in the following paragraphs on
the earliest uses of sheila is based. on Paixhans, as is that in
Baxter. Neither source is satisfactory for British experiments
in the 1820's.
2. Paixhans, Nouvelle Force, pp. vii, 86-110.
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immense expenditure of shot, not one ship had. been sunk in action,
and. at Algiers in 1816, the British ship Impregnable had
sustained. more than fifty direct hits, near or below the water-
line, without in any way endangering her. Had. Ipregnab1e been
hit by shells rather than shot, as had. been the hulks fired
4
upon at Cherbourg in 1797, and. at Waicheren in 1811, Paixhana
believed, she would. have been sent to the bottom.1
The first nation to introduce shell guns into sea service
would therefore, in his opinion, hold. other fleets at a
tremendous disadvantage. Improved. metallurgy and. Paixhans' own
experiments with shells, convinced. him that Prance was in a
position to assume this advantage by introducing his proposed.
new guns into her existing fleet. By this move, 500 British
ships and 150 French ships would become obsolete, and. 'she
opportunity arise for France to commence a steam navy on an equal
footing with Britain. For it was upon a fleet of small war
steamers mounting shell guns that Paixhana based. his prediction
of a naval supremacy that would render Prance " tout t coupe,
1. Ibid.. p. 77.
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matresee de mere."1
Paixhans believed. the vantages of such a fleet tc Prance
would. be twofold., one temporary and. one permaflent. 2 The steamer,
small, fast and nimble, would present a difficult target to
ships of the line, while itself capable of bringing shell guns
to bear upon the cumbersome and. vulnerable advereary,inepend.ent
of the wind. ngland.s vast fleet, soon coming to fear "le plus
petit	 would be scrapped in order to meet the French on
their terms. This would be a temporary advantage; for Paixhans
realized that Britain would ultimately build. larger fleets of
war steamers than France.
But the very nature of steam warfare, Paixhans asserted.,
guaranteed France certain permament advantages from the
impending naval revolution. With small ships costing lees to
build. and. maintain, France's timber supplies would be sufficient
for the purpose, and. thus end. her dependence on foreign countries
1. Ibid. p. 127. For Pajxhans' references to steam, see
vxiv, 285-348.
2. The information for this and the next two paragraphs is
to be found in Ibid. pp. 346-48. See also Baxter, p. 25.
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for materials. Of greater significance to France, however,
was the fact that the new fleet would. require fewer seamen, and
that the quality of seamanship need. not be high.
Paixhans realized. that England's naval strength lay to a
considerable degree in her large seafaring population skilled.
in the working of sailing vessels. France despite her larger
population, had. comparatively fewaen trained. to the sea. Steam
warfare would convert this liability into an advantage; for with
the emphasis on the more soldierly qualities that Paixhana
associated. with the working of steamers, a nation's seapower
would become proportional to its total population, rather than
to that part of it that was seafaring. Twenty thousand British
sailors would no longer dictate the law to the world.
Paixhans' whole system, however, centered upon the
introduction of his as yet non-existent shell gun. On 28 May
1821, a committee of high ranking naval and. artillery officers,
having studied.	 proposals, recommended that two of his
8-inch guns be prepared. for trials. At Brest in January 1824,
twelve shells from these guns burst upon the old eighty-gun
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ship Le Pacificateure with terrible effect.1
The committee supervising these tests reported unanimously
that the problems of shell-fire had been solved., that the
interior of large ships was open to great destruction, as
Paixhana had. predicted, and that one explosion a't the waterline
could. sink them. Moreover, by a majority of 13 to 3, they
recommended that Paixhans' gun be introduced, into ships of the
line, "mais en petit q,uantit et en prenant des precautions qui
A	 2doivent etre l'objet d.'une recherche et d.'un examen special."
In May 1824, Paixhane appeared before an enlar ed naval
committee, chaired by the Minister of Marine and. Colonies, to
answer searching questions concerning the accuracy, dependability
and safety of shells. He was able to produce acceptable
factual evidence as to the first two qualities; but to convince
senior naval officers who remembered the fate of L'Orient in
1799 of the safety of shells aboard ship, required all the
1. Paixhans, Exiptriences Paites par la anne Française sun
une Anne Nouvelle (Paris, 1825), oo. 37, 41-44.
2. Ibid. pp. 45-46. Baxter, p. 25.
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persuasiveness Paixhans' sense of mission could. bring to bear.
Attributing the explosions on L'Alcide and. L'Orient to the
fact that shells had. been stacked. on deck beside the guns,
Paixhans advised. mounting only four guns at the extremities of
the lower decks, and supplying them from special shell rooms
situated. below the waterline. The committee recommended that a
ship be prepared. in this manner, and following repeated. testing
of shell fire at Brest in September and. October of 1824,
further recommended. that shell guns receive sea trials.1
Apart from Paixhane' general references to improved
metallurgy and bis(*3 work with shells, there is no information
available to indicate in what manner shells had. been improved
from the dangerous and unreliable projectiles they had proved to
be in the last years of the eighteenth century. Indeed., as shall
soon be revealed., the French once more proved overly optimistic
in believing the problems of shell fire had. been solved.. Never-
theless, the decision to embark on sea trials in 1824 was the
1. Paixhans, Experienc, pp. 57, 78-92.
19].
first step in introducing ehe].ls into naval service. As such
it did. not go unnoticed by the British, who had. not been slow
to adopt uniform calibre after the French had. done so, also in
1824.
In fact Britain had. begun to show interest in shell fire soon
&fter the war. For if the French had been unsuccessful with
shells at sea during the war, this ammunition had. become
increasingly popular for coastal defense, Thus in 1813, at the
siege of Danzig, the Nymph of the Danube had been destroyed. by
land-based shell fire, and. according to Paixhans, a similar fate
reportedly befell a British ship at the hand.s of an American
Co].umbiad.) With these portents in mind, Sir Eoward. Douglas
advised. in 1817 that British seagunnera be familiarized with shell
practice from guns with common 8hella as well as with spherical.
case. 2 Although his advice was not taken, secret Ordnance
experiments in late 1819 or early 1820 with elongated spherical
1. Paixhans, Nouvelle Force, 109-110.
2. Douglas, let ed., p. 22.
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case shot had a arent].y "succeeded perfectly."1
In April of 1820, Colonel William Miii. r, an artillery
officer at th Ordnance Department who specialized in naval
armaments, 2 designed and. bad. cast a 68-pdr. carronade,
"applicable chiefly to naval purposes." 3 On 17 April, a
committee of naval and artillery officers under Sir Thomas Hardy
inspected. Millar's 36 cwt. weapon, recommended that it undergo
sea trials, and. further suggested that a 50 cwt. experimental
gun be cast. By May of the same year, the original carronade
was mounted on H.M.S. Rochfort at Sheerness, and a year later,
the year that Paixhans published his first edition of Nouvelle
Force Maritime, the heavier gun had undergone seven months of
1. Ibid. p. 304.
2. Dupin, Military Force, ii. 319. Apart from a very brief
article in D.N.B., little is known about Millar, und.oubted.].y one
of the foremost artillerists of the period. 'villar was appointed
2/Lt. in the Royal Artillery in 1781 and served 18 years in the
West Indies. In 1804 he was appointed as an assistant to Colonel
Page at the Royal Carriage Department. In 1827 he b came
Inspector, in 1833 Director of Artillery. He committed suicide
in March 1838.
3. Ad.ra.1/40 24, Ordnance to Admiralty, 12 April 1820.
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continuous testing at Woolwich, and. was assigned. to H.M.S.
Northumberland. • 1
The original carronade was of 36 cwt., with a distribution
of metal probably similar to Congreve's 24-p&r. medium ship gun
of 1813, to give strength around the Corner chamber in its
breech. In comparative trials with the regulation 68-pdr.
carronade,	 weapon excelled. It was worked. much more
rapidly by a crew of six men (as against eight or ten for the
regulation carronad.e) and. was much more destructive within its
range than were 24- or 32-pdr. guns. But if the Admiralty had
nurtured any hopes that the new ordnance would. solve the maximum
calibre problems discussed in the preceding chapter, they were
quiokly disillusioned.; at five degrees elevation, Millar's gun
ranged some 400 yards less than the long 32-pdr.2
Considerable mystery surrounds these first two Millar guns.
1. Adm.1/4024, Ordnance to Admiralty, 15 May 1820, 18 April
1821 and minutes.
2. Adm.1/590, Admiral Sir B. Hallowell,to Admiralty 17 April
1820, enclosing Millar memo. 15 April. W.O.44/498, Rear Admiral Sir
John Gore to Admiralty, 22 June 1821, enclosing Sir Thomas Hardy
to Gore, 16 June, and. reports of 12 and 21 June.
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Surviving descriptions of the 'weapons and. their testing are
vague, and it is not clear that they were in fact tested. with
shells, or that the Admiralty considered. them primarily as shell
guns. Only in their inventor's mind. was there little doubt as
to their true purpose. Millar oonsistently referred to the
50 cit. model as an 8-inch gun, in contrast to those officers
who considered to to be no more than an improved carronade, and
in 1829 revealed that "I have had it always in mind that this
projectile o1low shot he had designed for this gtu) might also
be used. with good effect as a shell."1
It appears probable that neither the Millar gun or carronade
receiving sea trials in 1821 was tested with shells. For in May
of that year General Alexander Farrington, President of the
Select Committee, adverted to the fact that carronades had never
been adequately tested. with hollow shot and shell, although they
had been designed. to fire these projectiles, and had been in
1. Ad.m.1/4028, Ordnance to Admiralty, 30 larch l$29,
enclosing Millar report of 21 March.
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service for more than forty years. Farrington believed, that
the advent of Millar's guns presented the opportunity to
experiment with shell fire from both 68-pdr. guns and. carronadee,
and advised. the Admiralty that three types of projectile,
68-pdr. solid shot, hollow shot weighing 52 pounds, and 8-inch
sheila of 47 pounds, be tried in these weapons. He further
recommended that shells "be found at every station to which
ships of war may proceed to refit after an action."1
The unpreparedness of the ports to receive shells in
1845, indicated that the advice to store this ammunition in
1821 was not followed. 2 There is also little evidence to
indicate that the shell trials desired by Ordnance were in tact
carried out. Nevertheless there was consi erable activity with
68-pdr. guns and. carronad.es between 1821 and 1824, and. when in
the latter year France followed up the trials at Brest with
sea trials for shell, the Admiralty ordered the 50 cwt. Millar
1. Adm. 1/4024, Ordnance to Admiralty, 7 May 1821, enclosure
and. minute.
2. W.O.44/502, Reports from Civil Officers at the various
ports, 28 and. 29 Nov., and 1, 3, 4 and 13 Dec. 1845.
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gun mounted on quarter decks and forecastlea)
France was not the only power capable of revolutionizing
naval warfare through the introduction of shells. In 1825 and
1826, declining Anglo-&merican relations over Latin America
attracted British attention to the American Navy. Small in
numbers but with powerful artillery, the steam frigate Fulton,
and an undetermined number of Columbiad shell guns, the
Americans could be formidable, especially in alliance with France.
As already described, the British had taken immediate action
to increase the broadside weight of metal of their frigates and.
ships of the line. They also tested an elongated shell similar
to that introduced by the Stevenees in 1814.
This acylindro_oonloal percussion sheflw was designed and
first tested by the Commandant of Leith Fort, Colonel George
1. Ind.
.495 2s 59-4, 12 and 17 April, 1820; 4958, 12 April
1821; 4964, 20 Aug., 4, 10, 12, 18 and. 23 Sept., 3 Oct. 1822;
4970 , 13, 17 and. 25 Sept. 1823. Douglas, 3rd. ed., P. 217.
It is unlikely that maxy ships carried these guns as there were,
by 1829, only 34 cast, although they had been "for some years
adopted" by the navy. Adin.1/4028, Ordnance to Admiralty, 1 Jan,
1829, enclosing Millar report of 29 Dec. 1828.
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Miller.1 Encouraged. by Miller's results, Ordnance conducted.
official trials at Woolwich in April of 1826. During the first
test held on 8 April, 21 Miller shells were fired from a 9-pdr.
field piece at the sloop Pheasant. The ranges were 320 and 450
yards. Prom these shells, only eight hits were secured., and. of
these three failed. to explode on impact; the remaining shells
either burst prematurely or grazed. short of the target without
bursting.2
To discover the reason for such a low percentage of effective
hits, nineteen shells were prepared without burstiicharges and.
fired through a screen at a butt. When the eight shells that had
lodged in the butt were recovered., only two of them were found.
to have entered cone-foremost as intended, while the remainder
had impacted side- or end-foremost, thereby failing to activate
the percussion fuze in the nose. Two similar tests on 15 and.
1. Adm.1/4025, Ordnance to Admiralty, 18 Feb. 1826,
enclosing Colonel George Miller to Ordnance, of the same date,
and. minute.
2. Adm.1/4032, Ordnance to Admiralty, 16 March 1836,
enclosing Select Committee Report of 17 April 1826.
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17 April 1826 produced similar results. The Select Committee
conducting the trials therefore c noluded that cylindrical
projectiles "can never be attended with any satisfactory
precision of direction, and the sentiments of the committee
remain unchanged as to the extreme d.anger of introducing
percussion powder into the Service."1
Colonel Miller protested that his shell should not be
abandoned on the basis of this report. He believed his
projectile capable of great improvement and deserving of trials
from heavy naval guns, rather than 9-pdr. field pieces. Moreover,
he complained, the committee had omitted any mention of the
damage sustained by Pheasant, which had in fact been set on fire.
"Let the Navy of England mark well the march of events in France
and. America," snapped Miller, "as at no distant time they may get
a lesson upon the subject In more eloquent language than I
1. Ibid. Dupin and Paixhans inFrance also believed that
elongated shells were inferior to spherical. Dupin, Voyaee,
ii. ii. 134-35; Paixhans, Nouvelle Force, p. 137, note.
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can use."
remonstrance was unnecessary. For it was
undoubtedly owing to awareness of the trend.s in France and.
.&merica that his shell had. been officially tested in the first
place. It was this same vigilance that had. persuaded. the
Admiralty to order Millar shell guns in 1824, and to take the
tremendous pains described in Chapter Three to prepare the Royal
Navy for the adoption of uniform calibre. Further reports of
French plane for shells and. steam, together with published.
accounts of the successes of both in various parts of the world,
lead. the Admiralty to take the first reluctant steps toward
introducing shell guns and steamers into the navy. And. a1tiough
it is beyond. the scope of this work to study olo8ely the advent
of steam, some attention to this important aspect of Paixhan's
I
"nouvelle force" is essential.
Apart from having encouraged. the Third Earl of Stanhope's
design of the steamer Kent in 1792, the Admiralty showed slight
1. W.O.44/50b , Colonel George Miller to Ordnance, 13 May,
1826.
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interest in steam as a motive power for naval vessels until
after 1815. Between these years British progress in this field.
was confined to such examples of private enterprise as William
Symington's Charlotte Dundas, which by 1803 was towing barges
on the Forth-Clyde canal, and. the Clyde built Thames which
steamed. from Greenook to London in 1815.
In that year, the American steam frigate Fu].ton underwent
successful trials. .Ls large as a ship of the line, capable of
doing six knots, and mounting 32-pdrs. prepared for firing shot
heated in her boilers, the Fulton's success apparently made
little lasting impression on Admiralty thinking. For while
Melville, the First Lord, immediately ordered the steam sloop
Congo built, that ship eventually sailed to the river of the same
name under canvas, while its engines pumped. water at Plymouth.
In 1816 Melville was firmly against studying the possibilities
of steam, apart from its application to tugboats for towing
warships out of harbour against contrary winds or tides.2
1. Bartlett, Sea Power, pp. 196-97.
2. Ibid. pp. 197-98. Sir John Barrow, An Auto-B1oraphica1
Memoir of Sir John Barrow (London, 1847), pp. 388-89.
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To this end. the packet Regent was hired in 1817 for
conversion to a steam tug, but alterations were never
carried out, probably owing to reasons of economy. In any
event, another packet, the Eclipse, failed two years later in
attempting to tow a 74 front Woolwich to Chatham against
strong tides. Despite this setback, the Admiralty continued
to experiment cautiously and. on a limited scale with steam.1
In 1821, they purchased the Monkey of 212 tons and eigity
horsepower, and. the following year built the Comet at
Deptford.. At least fourteen such vessels, mostly serving
as packets and. tugboats, but also used to provide information
on the possibilities of steam for warships, were built for
the Royal Navy between 1821 and 1831, and more than thirty
steamers built between these years eventually came into naval
1. Bartlett, pp. 199-200. Barrow, pp. 390-91.
G.S. Graham, "The Transition from Paddle-wheel to Screw
Propeller", M.M. xliv. 37. See also B. Brodie, Sea Power in
the Machine Age (Princeton, 1941), pp. 18-25.
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service
Although the Admiralty in the eighteen twenties used steam
for non-combative purposes, steamers gave the first practical
demonstrations of their value for warlike purposes during those
years. U.S.S. Seagull had. participated. in the extermination of
piracy in the West Indies in the first years of the decade, and.
in the First Burmese War of 1824-25, the East India Company
steamer Diana proved invaluable time and again in towing transports
and gun platforms against the powerful currents of the Irrawad.dy.2
1. For a list of the services of naval steamers until 1831,
see Bartlett, p. 200. p .P.(1831-32), xxxiv. 265-66. See also
Adin .95/86 , Steam Register of 1848, foe. 106-7, 111-13, 118, 120,
125-30 , 139-47, 150-51, 159-60 , 169. Only two of the steamers
listed. in Bartlett and. P.P. were armed. These were Messenger,
built in 1824, and. Columbia, built in 1829. Both were Mediterranean
packets mounting two guns, and. Douglas (3rd ed., p. 217 and note)
indicates that the earlier steamer carried. a shell gun.
2. Bartlett, pp. 199-200. Lieutenant John Marshall,
The Naval 0perations in Ava, durin the Burmese War (London
1830), pp. 2-4, 25-27, 33, 37-38, 57, 67-70 , 73, 79-80, 110-11.
Brodie, P. 21.
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More widely known were the services of the Karteria during
the Greek struggle for independence. The London Committee for
the Greek Cause had. been persuaded. by Lord. Cochrane, newly
returned. from his triumphs in Latin America, to built six
steamers armed with bow and stern long-guns. Even the smal].eat
of these vessels were to be "capable of carrying the heavy guns
CMillar 68-pdrs.J for firing eight-inch shells."1
Of these ships, only three were completed and. only the
Karteria saw much action. Und.er:powere&, and. subject to recurrent
breakdown, she nevertheless used. her eight 68-pdrs. to fire some
18,000 shells without accident, and with considerable effect.
She inspired. fear in her enemies ashore and afloat, causing
1. Add.. MSS. 36462, Frank Abney Hastings to J.C. Hobhouse,
M.P., 9 May 1826. For other comments by Hastings on these vessels
and. their armaments, see Add.. MSS. 36461 , foe. 2 78 , 391-92 , 407-08;
36462, foe. 115, 126, 253, 305, 33].; 36464, fo. 16; 36544, foe. 166,
187, 191 . The British Government kept a close surveillance on the
construction and. preparation of the steamers. Add. MSS. 41396,
Martin to Sir iohn Barrow, 3 July 1826; 36461, fo. 278.
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conventional enemy warships to tow their gunpowder behind, them
in the maimer of mortar vessels to avoid, being blown up by her
shells, or by shot heated. in her boilers. The Greeks had. a
similar respect for a former Margate packet mounting three guns
in the Egyptian service.'
Although it was probable that these hopelessly inefficient
vessels were regarded. by some observers with greater awe than
they in fact merited, it is nevertheless true that their exploits
attracted. considerable attention in Britain. Throughout 1827 and.
1828 there arose in England. a spate of public speculation
concerning the impending naval revolution with its "prosects
the most d.isastAous and most humiliating" for England..2
Thus in 1827, Vice Admiral Charles Stirling's belief that
I. Bartlett, pp. 200-01. Sir John Barrow, Memoir of the
Life and Services of William Barrow (London, 1850 ),
 p. 12.
F.A. Hastings, Memoir on the Use of Shells, Hot Shot, and.
Carcass Shells, for Ship Artillery (London, 1827). Naval and
Military Magazines 1828, iv. cxli-cxlii.
2. Naval and Military Magazih, 1828, iv. 243.
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steam would. revolutionize the Royal Navy1 was accompanied. by
Rear Admiral Sir John Ross's inability to reflect on that force,
"without some feeling of doubt, whether the destiny of Great
Britain may not at length be involved. in this very invention,
whether its fate will not even be sealed...." 2 In the following
year, two testimonials to the effectiveness of shell fire were
published., one posthumously by Captain Frank Abney Hastings of
the Karteria, the other by Sir Sam Benthazu on his experiences
with the projectiles in the Sea of Azov in. the late eighteenth
1. Sir Charles Stirling, A Letter on Professional Toipics, etc.
(Chertsey, 1827), pp. 53-54. Stirling was at Quiberon in 1795 and
Cape Finisterre in 1805, and was naval commander at the reduction
of Monte Video in 1807. In 1811 he became C.-in-C. Jamaica, and.
then second in command to Warren on the North American Station when
the two stations were amalgamated. Returned to England. in 1813,
died. 1833. O'Byrue's Nay . Biog. Dict.
2. Sir John Roes, Treatise on Navigation by Steam; and an
Essay towards a System of Naval Tactics peculiar to Steam Navigation
eto.(London, 1828), introduction, p. xv. Naval and ilitary
Magazine, 1828, iv. 244. Ross (1777-1856) is most famous as an
Arctic explorer. In 1818, 1829 and 1849 he searched for the !orth-
west passage without success. In the second voyage (1829-33)
be surveyed Boothis Peninsular and discovered the magnetic pole.
D.N.B.
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century. 1 Although Bentham's em 11 vessels were propelled, by
sail and. oar, he was convinced. that the advent of steam would.
increase the efficacy of small boats and. shell guns, and. that
Britain should. set about adopting these new forces before their
"superior efficiency should. have been proved. to us by the
success of some enemy."2 The opinion of various writers and.
reviewers was that recent events had. proved. Paixhans "no idle,
shallow visionary", 3 and that Britain should boldly assume the
lead. in developing satisfactory shell guns and. steamers.
The Admiralty showed. no immediate signs of sharing this
sense of urgency. Indeed the only anxiety concerning the flaVys
adequaey at this time, appeared. to be directed. toward. enlarging
ships of the line to bear the wei ht of uniform 32-pd.r. armaments.
1. Sir S. Bentham, ava1 Essays (London, 1828), pp. 52-57,
70-89.
2. Ibid.. p. 89.
3. Foreign guarterly Review, June 1828, p. 5 64. For other
opinions see Ibid. pp. 566-91; Naval and Military Magezine, 1827,
ii. 588, 686-87, and. 1828, iv. xxv-xlv, oxli-cxlii; Napier,
The Nawy, pp. 42-43, 47-55, 63-64.
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Thus, Sir William Congreve's proposed "steam vessel battery"
mounting five hundred tons of armour to make it imp rvious to
shot or shell, and. suggested. to Clarence in 1828, apparently
received. no serious official study. Byam Martin, the Controller,
doubted that such a vessel could. be made seaworthy, or a
sufficiently powerful engine devised.1
The Admiralty were perhaps encouraged. to believe that there
was no great urgency in prov-id.ing shell guns and. steam vessels
as a result of experiments conducted. by the Royal Marine
Artillery. Early in 1827, the same Lieutenant John Earvey
Stevens, R.M.A., who had. suggested. arming gunboats with shells
during the war, had conducted a series of experiments at the
Royal Marine Laboratory. Stevens believed the French trials at
Brest in 1824 had. merely demonstrated. the obvious. They had
proved., "if any proof were wanting", that 8-inch shells could.
2be destructive; they had. not proved. the projectiles reliable.
1. Add.. MSS. 41397, Martin memo. 14 April 1828.
2. Adm. 1/3357, Lieutenant Colonel Sir Richard Williams,
R.M.A., to Admiralty, 2 March 1827, enclosing report of
J.H. Stevens.
208
In fact, during the second series of French experiments in the
autumn of 1824, over half the shells fired had. malfunctioned.,
largely owing to faulty fuzes) Paixhans himself confessed.
the fuze to be the major weakness in shell fire, 2 and it was to
this "great defect" that Stevens turned in challenging "some of
the assertions contained in the publication entitled Nouvelle
Force Maritime."3
Two types of common fuze, a regulation issue and. one of
Stevens' own design, underwent a series of six teats. Neither
model was satisfactory. Both would burn properly when submerged.,
but were extinguished. if they struck the water with the
slightest impact. When fired over water from 8- and. 10-inch
howitzers, only one shell burst after the first graze, and none
survived. the second. Stevens concluded. that until adequate fuzea
could be provided., or until naval gunnery became sufficiently
accurate to avoid. ricochet, existing fuzea would. "greatly
lessen the destructive effects that would. otherwise result from
1. Paixhans, Exriences, pp. 53-56.
2. Paixhans, Nouvelle Force, pp. 193-95.
3. Adm.1/3357, Williams to Admiralty, 2 March 1827 and.
enclosure.
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the introduction of M. pajhns system." For this reason
Stevens advised the Admiralty that little benefit would be
realized from the introduction of shells at that time, and. the
Admiralty agreed to await the result of other tests)
It was not until April 1829 that a satisfactory fuze was
forthcoming. 2 This delay undoubtedly contributed to the
impression that the Melville Administration was less than
anxious to undertake the necessary steps to revolutionize the
navy. For Melville and his First Sea Lord, Sir George Cockbuzn,
had won themselves an unenviable reputation for "retrograde
proclivities" 3 by those contemporaries, who, like Paixhans,
saw something of the part to be played in future wars by steam,
shells and armour plate. In truth, both these men, in conjunction
with Thomas Byam Martin, the Controller of the Mavy, had been
less than encouraging toward those suggesting such innovations.
Sir William Congreve's proposed ironclad steam battery had been
l.IBid.. minute.
2. See below.
3. Brigga, Naval Administration, p. 8.
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scorned, by Martin. The more modest proposals of Sir John Ross
for armed. steamers for coastal defense, or of the Colonial Office
for a mail steamer, both received the same reply,
Their Lordships feel it their bounden duty to discourage
to the utmost of their ability the employment of steam
vessels, as they consider that the intzod.uction of steam
is calculated. to strike a fatal blow at the naval
supremacy of the Empire.1
Colonel George Miller, whose cylindrical shells had been so
brusquely rejected at Woolwioh in 1826, reported a similar
attitude. The Admiralty had. verbally confided to him that they
objected to his projectile, not so much on the grounds of
inefficiency,
•..but they conceived that, if brought into use, it
would. bring about a change in Naval Warfare, which might
be injurious to our Naval Superiority, and. that therefore
they would not be the first to introduce it...2
It is obvious, then, that Melville and. Cockburn did. not
object to steamers merely because of their dirtiness or limited.
1. Ibid. P
. 9, Bartlett, p. 202.
2. W.O.44/500, Colonel George Miller to Ordnance, 1 March
1836.
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aesthetic appeal; nor was their reluctance to press ahead with
shell guns necessarily owing to a violent prejudice against
progress, as thwarted innovators charged. So long as Brjtajn's
naval supremacy could be maintained with the weapons at hand, it
was in her interests to preserve those weapons; to herself
undertake the great effort and. expense of rendering her source
of power obsolete would. be
 absurd.. As one observer succinctly
put its "Many of the defects which were known to exist, so long
as they were common to all navies, operated to the advantage of
Great Britain."1
No one recognized this fact more clearly than Paixhans, who
was enjoying only slight success in convincing his compatriots
that to challenge British naval supremacy France would need to
assume the lead. in solving the problems of steam and. shell
technology. Britain would never take the lead. in this field., he
pointed, out, for as the nation with most to lose from a revolution
1. TJ. Simmons, Keavy Ordnance, p. 2. In this respect see,
too, Napier, The avy, pp. 203-07.
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in armaments, Britain would be the last country to initiate this
revolution "ce qui en definitif ne aera dfavorable qua
1 &ngleterre.h11
Britain	 e had far too much to lose by initiating the
adoption of shell and steam. Her existing fleet was capable of
defending British interests in all parts of the world, in any
capacity, and under all weather conditions. Steamers in 1828
could not. 2 Indeed., as Professor araham has pointed out, the
development of the war steamer was to take "long years of
exacting experiment and wasteful expendittue" that could not be
attributed "to any appreciable extent as the consequenoe of
Ld.miralty or shipbuilders conserv-ativism and abhorrence of
invention.
let another reason why Britain felt little need to push
1. Paixhane, Nouvel].e Force, pp. 236-37; Force et
Faiblesse Militaires de la France (Paris, 1830 ), pp. 401-03.
2. Bartlett, p. 205.
3. G.S. Graham, "The Ascendency of the Sailing Ship 1850-
55", Economic History Review, ix. 1. 75. See Bartlett, pp.
202-05.
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forward with the adoption of shell guiis was the fact that
she already possessed a proven delivery system for shells.
This was the war rocket. The war rocket had undergone a
brief but chequered history of combat and, experiment, before
attaining the reliability necessary for service against
naval and. coastal shell gins. Supposedly understood but
scorned by European powers since 1325, the rocket was first
seriously considered as a military weapon by the British
after it had been used. against them in India in the 1790's.
It was William Congreve who first produced a tolerably
accurate rocket by using his own improved powders,
positioning the stick at the center of the base, and. by
locating the exhaust vents on the periphery of the base.
Nevertheless, the earlier versions used at Boulogne in 1806,
and. at Copenhagen and. Flushing in 1807 and 1809, were often
disappointing. Following brilliant success at Leipzig in
1813, they failed miserably at uatre Bras when they turned
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on the British lines.1
Apart from their use as an anti-personnel and siege weapon
for the military, Congreve anticipated that his rockets would
replace the bomb or mortar vessels of the navy. The
bombardments of Boulogne, Copenhagen and. Flushing offered the
Admiralty some encouragement in this respect, and rockets were
issued to ships on the North American station for use along the
American coast in 1814.2
At Algiers in 1816, rockets were used with such good.
results, that a special ship's boat was designed and approved.
for their use. Fther trials were carried. out in 1819. On
land. it was found that the rocket hd been improved to the point
1. On the Congreve Rocket, see Sir William Congreve, A Treatise
of the Conreve Pocket System (Lond.on,l827); Clowes, vi. 190-91, 201;
Dupin, Yilitary Force, ii. 189-200; Glover, Peninsular Preparations,
pp. 68-73; Rime, ArtIllery, pp. 144-48; Scoffern, Projectile earons,
pp. 59-60; Paixhans, Nouvelle Force, pp. 31-36.
2. Adin.1/4021, Ordnance to Ad.niiralty, 3 Jan. 1814 and 4 Feb.
1814. El ht thousand. rockets were set aside for the navy, three
thousand of which were sent to America; of these latter, one
thousand. were 12- and 32-pclr. shell rockets.
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where it was more aceurate at medium range than was field.
artillery, and. comparable success was experienced. firing them
from the bo te of H.M.S. E7perion. The Congreve rocket 'was also
considered. by some to be the weapon most capable of dealing with
1the American steam frigate F.ilton, should the occasion arise.
By 1828, therefore, the rocket had proven itself a aseful
and effective weapon. Considering the primitive state of
contemporary shell gunnery, there can be 11 tie doubt that the
rocket was superior to any shell guns it might have to face.
Moreover, the secret of its c nstruotion had. been so well kept
that no other nation was in a position to match a British move
to introduce rockets, thereby rendering ships of the line
obsolete, not by shell guns as Paixhans had predicted, but by
he11 rockets.2
1. Adm.2/].2l6, Admiralty to Sir Richard Williams, R.M.A.,
3 and. 6 July, 1816. Ind.4938s 59-4, 25 Aug., 9 Sept. 1817;
4947, 3 Aug. 1819. Dupin, Military Force, ii. 199. Bartlett,
pp. 197-98. Parkinson, Exmouth, pp. 447, 462-64.
2. Glover, Peninsular Preparations, pp. 71-73. See also
dm.1/4024, Wellin ton to Melville, private, 15 Feb. 1821.
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The rocket could. deliver solid. shot, carcass or shells from
small boats against ships or coastal batteries, while the mother
ehip stood. beyond range of enemy shell Lire. This "ammunition
without ordnance ... the soul of artillery without the body",1
as Congreve described his invention, was cheaply and. quickly
produced, required no costly and cumbersome launching apparatus,
and. was relatively safe and dependable. None of these qualities
applied to existing shell guns, and. thus the rocket was an
excellent temporary expedient while the slow and. expensive process
of designing, casting and testing long-range shell guns was
carried out.2
In November 1828, when Stevens and. others had. not yet
succeeded in producing a satisfactory Luze, and when public
1. W. Congreve, A Concise Account of the Origin, and. Progress
of the Rocket System, etc. (London, 18 07), p. 7.
2. 3.K. Stevens, Some Description of the ethods Used in
Pointing Guns at Sea (London, 1834), p. 34. Scoffern,
Projectile Weapons, p. 69. Naval and Military Magazine, 1828,
iv. 145. both Stevens and Scoffern point out that rocketry
required practically perfect weather conditions.
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controversy over Paixhane' new force was at its height, the
Admiralty ordered rockets for the navy. Every ship of the line
and every frigate in commission or ready to be brought forward.,
was to receive five dozen 24-pd.r. shell rockets; lesser vessels
were to be issued. with three dozen 12-pdrs. The Royal Navy was
thus assured. of shell firing capability in the event France
should introduce shell guns and war steamers on a large scale.1
In late 1828 it appeared that France was about to do just
that. Reports indicated. that she already possessed three more
steamers than did Britain, and that her building program would
substantially increase this margin in the near future, as well
as increase her number of shell guns. 2 Under this threat the
Admiralty moved with uncustomary boldness. On the first day
of 1829, Cockburn, whom the Duke of Clarence thought no more fit
1. Adin.1/4029, Ordnance to Admiralty, 15 April and 26 May
1831. These inform Admiralty that the rockets ordered on 29
Nov. 1828 and. 7 May 1830 were completed. See also LO.54/938,
Sir Augustus Frazer to Sir James Xempt, 26 May 1831.
2. Bartlett, p. 206.
218
to serve as First Sea Lord. "than azy old. grandntother",' anxiously
requested. Ordnance to immediately provide 10-inch Millar guns
for trials with hollow shot and. shells. Viscount Beresford,
Master aeneral of the 0rdnsnce, promised. to immediately set
about preparing for trials and. confessed., "I think you are quite
right to try them."2
Trials were carried. out in early February on two of the
six 10-inch guns ordered. by the Admiralty. One of the guns was
designed. to fire 68-pdr. shells, the other shells of 75 pounds.
The larger gun was recommended. on the grounds that its shell
bad. superior penetration, and. three more of this nature were
ordered. prepared. for further experiment. At the same trials,
shells weighing 112 pounds were successfully fired from 12-inch
guns of 90 cwt., and. a second such gun was ordered. for trials
1. Add. MSS. 41368, Martin Memo. 5 Sept. 1831.




During the following month, efforts were made to solve the
problems of horizontal shell fire that stemmed from faulty fuzes.
It will be recalled that in 1827, Lieutenant John Harvey Stevens,
having failed to provide satisfactory fuzes, had. advised that
until this problem was solved., the shell system would. never
have the effect predicted. by Paixhans. Sir William Congreve
at the Royal Laboratory had taken up Stevens' challenge, but had.
failed in his effort to convert a fuze he had developed at en
earlier date for use with mortar shells.2
Not until March of 1829, two years after Stevens' report,
did Colonel William Millar, the inventor of England's shell guns,
submit a fuze for trial. Of the gunmetal construction advocated
by Paixhans, and. screwing flush into the fuze hole, Millar
1. Adm.1/4028, Ordnance to Admiralty, 15 Jan. and minute,
6 Feb. 1829 and. enclosures, 10 June 1829 and. minute, The 10-inch
guns were 7 feet 6 inches and 8 feet 4 inches, and. weighed
57 and 621 owt. The 12-inch guns never saw service.
2. Paixhans, Force et Faibless , p. 412.
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believed he had. overcome many of the defects of regulation fuea.
The latter, generally of beechwood. construction, were adequate
for the low velocities of mortar fire, but posed several
problems when used. in high velocity gunfire. In the latter
instance, these projecting fuzes greatly reduced accuracy, and
were frequently blown out of the shells by the concussion, or were
snuffed out when striking the water or the target.1
Millar's fuze promised much greater strength and accuracy.
Tested at Woolwich in April 1829, the Select Committee found
it to answer their needs. Of three shells fired at a bulkhead,
range 400 yards, one passed through the target and. exploded in
the air, the second. lodged, but did not explode, while the third
lodged and "exploded with most powerful effect displacing beams
both inside and. out."2
1. A good. summary of the difficulties presented by fuzes at
this time is to be found in Paixhans, Force et Faiblesse, p. 411,
note F. See also above.
2. Adiu.1/4028, Ordnance to Adniralty, 30 March 1829 and
enclosures, See also T.0.44/500, Admiralty to Ordnance, 10 April
1838 and. enclosures.
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Millar had also provided a metal cap to screw over the fuze and
thus protect it from accidental ignition. This device, tested
by exploding a pound of gunpowder on the capped fuze without
igniting it, was thought by Millar and the Committee to remove
the dangers of shells on shipboard.. The Admiralty agreed, and.
ordered. that shell guns and fuzes be provided for sea trials.
In June 1829, the Talavera received. two 10-inch shell guns and.
forty live shells, to become the first British ship of the line
to receive such arinament.
Steps were subsequently taken in 1830 to increase the number
of shell guns in the fleet. Martin recommended that two armed.
steamers of 120 horsepower be laid. down, and. suggested mountiri,g
8-inch guns on certain ships of the line. Melville replied.
that "If found. to answer, all line of battle ships should have
two large guns for shells or hollow shot." And instead of the
1. Adm.1/4028, Ordnance to Admiralty, 18 May 1829 and
minute, 10 June 1829 minute and. enclosure. Majendie, p. 234,
note 6.
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two steamers recommended. by Martin, the First Lord., after first
implying that the question of steam was open to "further discussion
and. consideration", directed. that nine steamers be laid. down,
four of 220 horsepower and. five of 140 horsepower, both classes
to be armed.)
More significant, as to the five ships of the line
recommended. by Martin, Melville ordered. "no more be laid. down
or the materials prepared for the present." Thus, not only was
Melville discontinuing the construction of ships of the line and.
frigates that could. not sustain the weight of uniform 32-pdrs.,
the First Lord. was in fact placing a moratorium on the
construction of all large conventional ships until the policy
best suiting British needs on the threshold. of a new era could.
be decided..
With the accession of the arey ministry in November of 1830,
the responsibility for this decision fell to Melville's successor,
1. Add. MSS. 41368, fos. 264-71, Martin abstract of proposed.
state of the Navy, 1830.
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Sir James Graham. And. although it a pears that Melville argued.
his case on the side of phasing out ships of the line in
discussions with the incoming First Lord, Graham would. have none
of it. Highly critical of Melville's bid. to provide no more
ships of the line, "on the vague ground. of anticipated.
improvement in steam", Graham wrote Martin in June, 1831:
Strong language has been used. in reprobation of building
more large ships, at a time when the application of steam
to maritime purposes is considered. likely to giv, such a
turn to Naval Warfare as to render large ships, as it is
assumed., comparatively insignificant and useless.
While fully aware that war steamers and. their shell guns
would change the character of subsequent wars with France,
Graham believed that so long as other n tions continued. to build.
large ships, Britain was obliged to retain her capacity to fight
on that basis. To lartin's delight, the new First Lord. ordered
five first-rates to be laid down, while retaining the remainder
of Melville's bold. policy.1
1 Add.. MSS. 41399, Graham to artin, 16 June 1831.
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Melville's policy of 1829 confirmed. the fact that only
eight years after the publication of Nouvelle Force Maritime,
the naval revolution predicted by Paixhans had. begun. War
steamers mounting shell guns had become an acknowledged
threat to the large wooden ship of the line. The mechanical
inefficiency of steamers, together with their inability to
fulfill such important requirements of naval warfare as under-
taking ocean voyages and. mounting blockades, convinced Graham
that a sailing navy was still essential. He consequently
departed. from Melville's scheme by insisting that ships of the
line continue to be built in addition to war steamers. Graham
also disagreed with Melville on armaments. For while he
accepted. the scheme of uniform solid shot calibre combined with
6- and. 10-inch shell guns, the new First Lord was reluctant to
adopt the actual gun models selected. by his predecessor. In
fact the search for suitable guns was to occupy the greater
part of the thirties, and during this period the Royal Navy's
armaments were a curious mixture of 24-pdrs. bored up to
32-pdra., and. a few unsatisfactory shell guns. But if Graham
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and Melville differed on many points, on one they were in
complete agreement: without highly trained gunners, the shell
system would be useless and. dangerous.
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Cha ter Five
THE ESTABLISEMENT OP H.M.S. EXCELLENT
Melville's abrupt decision to introduce the shell system was
not taken ithout considering the fears and dangers that had. kept
shells out of British warships until 1829. It was realized that
highly trained crews would be required. if this complex and.
dangerous ammunition were to be used. effectively and. with safety.
And. yet the Battle of Navarino had. indicated, that the average
British gun crew could not competently handle simple solid a ot,
and that the Royal Marine Artillery had failed to adequately train
naval gunners in the use of the sights, tubes and. gunnery manuals
introduced, a decade before. Poor gunnery at 'Tavarino caused
many naval officers and. artillerists to renew their demands of
1817 for a gunnery training depot, and in 1830, following the
introduction of the shell system, Melville established a training
school aboard, H.M.S. Excellent at Portsmouth. This ch pter
discusses the reasons for Excellent's establishment, her
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contribution to the gun ery of the fleet, and her influence on the
Admiralty-Ordnance relationship following Graham's reorganization
of the n val administration.
In 1829 the Melville Administration took the first step in
the changeover from existing sailing ships of the line and. their
solid shot armament to steam warships armed. with shell guns.
Melville's successor, 1 Graham, modified. his predecessor's radical
proposals only by insisting that conventional warships continue
to be built in addition to steam vessels. Another innovation of
Melville's in 1829, and. one resolutely carried. through by Graham,
was the establisbment of the gunnery training ship H.M.S. Excellent
at Portsmouth.
After the War of 1812 many naval and. artillery officers and
artillerists had advocated. some form of training unit for naval
gunners. In particular, Sir Howard Douglas, in his first edition
of Naval r'unnery, had. been at great pains to oint out the benefits
1. See above, Chapter Four.
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to be derived from a naval gunnery ship; and. although 1n 1817 the
Admiralty had. chosen to make do with the Royal Marine Artillery
for training purposes, by 1829 events and. technioal developments
had. brought home the wisdom, indeed. the necessity, of a regular
gunnery training depot for the navy.1
There were three main reasons for the establiabment of
Excellenti (1) an effective shell system necessitated. increased.
accuracy in gunnery; (2) the improved. accuracy of naval guns
resu1ing from advances in sights and. tubes demanded more
sophisticated gunnery teohniues; end. (3) the failure of the
Royal Marine 1.rtillery to adequately train a eutfioent aumber
of naval gunners, as revealed. in the Battle of 1avarino in 1827,
resulted. in a renewed and. vigorous oamaign by influential
individuals to establish a gunnery training depot.
The introduction of the shell was perhaps the most important
of these reasons. Tn the first place shell. were more complex
1. Sob óovehapter ?iro,c for steps tekei io !tpro?e
gunnery after 1815.
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and. dangerous projectiles than solid shot, and gunners had. to be
specially trained to handle them carefu].ly, not only in filling
them and moving them from shell room to gundeck, but also in
unoapping the fuze and loading the rea4 shell into the gun. In
short, shells called for safety and, safety demanded rigorous
training.
A second reason why shells called for intense training was in
the nature of their construction. Casting a homogeneous shell
"skin" was beyond the metallurgical skill of the period., with the
result that faulty metal and imperfect spbericity caused irregular
flight, an irregularity aggravated by the imbalance created by
the positioning of the fuze. Moreover, as Lieutenant John Harvey
Stevens R.M.A. had discovered in 1827, when shells grazed. the
water either as a result of such imbalance or because of
deliberate ricochet fire, their fuzes were snuffed. out. Stevens
felt this to be the "great defect" of Paixhans' shell, and
concluded in his reports
-... still one advantage it is hoped has resulted. from
this investigation, viz. That ricochets with shells on
230
the water will be justly distrusted., and that the
• necessity of a careful and accurate management of the
arm in question will be evident, to ensure the shell's
striking the object without grazing, as often as it can
be so attained.1
Not only were shells less accurate than solid shot, they were
inferior in range. This was caused in part by the fact that early
shells could withstand only moderate detonating charges if they
were not to burst in the gun. But a more important limiting
factor was the low specific gravity of shells: as they were
considerably lighter for their size than shot, their initial
velocity was much more quickly retarded by air resistance and. by
gravity. Thus, in the early thirties, the optimal effective
range of an 8-inch shell weighing 48 pounds was at the most 800
yards, while that of the 6-inch 32-pdr. solid shot then in service
was of the order of 1300 yards. 2 This immediately suggested that
1. Ldiu. 1/3357, Lt. Cal. Sir Richard Williams, Commandant R.M.A.,
to Admiralty, 2 March 1827, enclosing Stevens to Williams of the
same date.
2. It is interesting to note in this respect that in tests held
at Southsea in 1838, 10 out of 11 32-pdr. shot struck the target,
compared. with 3 out of 11 8-inch shells. The range was only 400
yards. Ad.m.1/4034, Ordnance to Admiralty, 29 Oct. 1838, enclosures.
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the best defense against shell guns was to knock them out with
heavy solid shot fired from beyond. 800 yards. In other words,
the introduction of the she].l system not only demanded that gun
crews for shell guns receive adequate training, but that gunners
be able to fire solid shot accurately at long range. Hence the
need for a training depot Buch as Excellent to provide a high
standard of gunnery throughout the fleet.
The adoption of the shell system in 1829 clearly encouraged
the decision officially taken the following year to establish
Excellent. There is nevertheless considerable evidence to suggest
that Melville's administration was considering the desirability
of such a move even before the advent of shells made a training
depot essential. This evidence is to be found. in the increasing
interest taken in gun accuracy and gunnery training following the
Battle of Navarino in October 1827.
In the course of this four hour demonstration British
expenditure of ammunition was immense but the destruction 'wrought
comparatively small. The Asia, Albion and Genoa alone pumped 122
tons of shot in the general direction of the Turkish fleet, much
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of the Genoa's share striking the Albion, and. this despite the
fact that the engagement was fought at anchor in an enclosed
harbour. There were reports by gunnery lieutenants of lower deck
guns having been fired without any breeching to retain their
recoil and. of at least one gun having been loaded with six shot,
"the last having been put in for luck."' Young William Barrow,
who commanded three guns during the engagement, may have been
writing with studied nonchalance when he informed his father, the
Second Secretary to the Admiralty, that "I fired now and. then, and
hit a corvette twice." Nevertheless his wordswould. appear to
accurately describe the haphazard manner in which the British
bombardment was carried out.2
1. A.W. Jerningham, Remarks on the Means of Directing ships'
Broadsides (London, 1851), pp. 34-35. See also A. Macderinott,
"Guns and Gunners of Olden Times", M.M. xliv. 148-50. Simmons,
Heavy Ordnance, 117-18 . Bartlett, Sea Power, p. 39. W.O.44/499,
Captain T.F. Simmons to Ordnance, 17 Jan. 1831.
2. Sir John Barrow, Memoir of Life and Services of William
Barrow (London, 18 50 ),
 p. 24. For a more general view of the
whole action, see C.M. Woodhouse, The Battle of Navarino (London,
19 65), pp. 10-41.
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The abysmal standard of gunnery at avarino testified. to
the failure of British gunners to make effective use of the
recently introduced sights, locks and. tubes, and. revealed. the
complete failure of the Royal Marine Artillery to instruct
seamen in the correct handling of guns. Throughout 1828 step.
were taken to improve both the mechanics and. the art of naval
gunnery. Attention was first paid to gunsights)
First officially adopted. in 1819, it was not until 1828
that sights were "introduced. universally" into the Royal Kavy.
By 1827, however, at least six different types of sight had
found. their way into the service. Early in 1828, a committee
including Admirals Sir Pulteney Malcolm and Sir Thomas Hardy,
tested in the presence of Sir George Cockburn and. the Lord. High
Admiral, every model of gunsight in service or proposed for
service, and. recommended. that a design of William Millar's
1 Adm.1/4026, Ordnance to Admiralty, 3 Dec. 1827; 4027,
4 Feb. 1828. See also Ind. 5009 : 59-4, 11 Feb., 21 and. 28 April,
7 and 16 May, 1828.
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be adopte&)
In fact both Millar and Congreve eights were to be issued
to all guns in cominision, depending upon the preference of
individual captains. In late 1829, the Admiralty again decided
to reduce the variety of eights, this time from two to one; all
manufacture was suspended until 16 ships, selected to test and.
compare the two patterns, could report. In the end
sights were adopted..2
By equipping all naval guns with improved gunsights the
Admiralty had taken an important step towards increasing the
potential accuracy of its artillery. A second effort in this
direction, also made in 1828, was to increase the accuracy of
the projectile by the better preservation of shot. This cast
iron ammunition had usually been left to rust in stowage until
required for use, at which time the rust was beaten off by
1. &din.1/4025, Ordnance to Admiralty, 20 Jan. 1824; 4026,
Miller to Ordnance, 4 Sept. 1827. W.O.44/500 , William Millar to
Ordnance, 16 May 1837.
2. Adm.1/4026, Ordnance to Admiralty, 6 Nov. and 10 May, 1830;
4029, 9 May 1832.
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hammers or in special hoppers which jostled the shot together.
Methods such as these left the surface of the ball pitted and
irregular, causing inaccurate Lii ht. Sir Roward Douglas was
the first to advocate a more careful handling of shot, and in
1828, Ordnance, having te8ted various types of preservative,
ordered that lacquered shot be provided for the Royal Navy.1
In addition to improving sights and shot surfaces, a third
modification in existing materiel was undertaken in 1828. This
was the attempt to increase accuracy by reducing the time lapse
between touch and discharge. Captain Fynmore's q.uill tubes,
adopted after 1815, had slightly reduced the interval of time
which elapsed between firing the tube and. actual ignition of
the charge. This in turn served to reduce the difference in
muzzle position relative to the target at time of aim and time
of ignition, owing to ship or target movement. It had long been
the desire of many artillerists to use a powder so rapid burning
that the inofiient of touch and the moment of discharge would be
1. Douglas, 1 t ed., pp. 84-86. Adm.1/4027, Ordnance to
Admiralty, 25 June 1828, enclosures.
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practically simultaneous. Such powders h d. been in existence
from early times. It h d been impossible, however, to develop
a metal for vents which was caDable qf withstanding this
violent combustion, and even had such metals been available,
the 3,arge quairity of powder necessary for a warship issued with
percussion locks would, in the words of a Select Committee in
1820, "be frau ht with such extreme risque" as to render it
inadmiesa.ble at sea.1
During the 1820's all n vies strove to solve the problems
of developing m tals capable of withstanding the violent
action of percussion or muriatic powder, or alternatively, of
taming the powder to a level where existing metals could with-
stand its action. It was not until 1829 that a surgery
dispenser at Woolwich, a Mr. Marsh, had his hammers and. tubes
adopted for trial with the shell gu.ns aboard U.M.S. Talavera.
1. clrn.1/4024, Ordnance to Admiralty, 12 M y 1820, enclosure.
See also W.0.44/498, packet entitled "Locks on the percussion
principle for great guns of K.M. ships, Jan.-Aug. 1820.". Percussion
or muriatic powder differed from ordinary powder in that it
contained axymuriate rather than nitrate of potash or saltpeter.
237
By 1832 they h d been issued to more than twenty ships of the line
in commission, although Ordnance predicted that such locks
would "be for some time ii ble to occasional failure."1
Thus the ragged performance at Navarino had prompted
Admiralty attention to the correction of various defeats in the
mechanics of gunnery. But improved locks, sights and.
projectiles could. contribute little to improved accuracy so
long as gun crews remained. incompetent. Indeed, refining the
mechanics of gunnery could be justified. only be increasing
the skill of gunners.
The Duke of Clarence, Lord High Admiral during 1827-28,
was an e thusiast for good gunnery. Dismay over the standards
revealed. at Nay rino caused him to investigate the navy's
gunnery situation in gen ral. He was not encouraged by what he
found. Several ships had not exercised their guns once during
1. Adm.1/4030, Ordnance to dmiralty, 11 May 1832. See also
Atha.1/4027, 16 Jan. 1828 and. minute; 4028, 2 June and. 19 Aug. 1829.
A eneral review of percussion tubes is to be found in Dougi s,
3rd ed., pp. 384-96, and a particular description of Marsh's
tube is to be found in Hogg, Royal Arsenal, II. 1834.
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three-year commissions, and. others h d done so with varying
frequency and dedication. Captains who strove for gu.nnery
excellence by exercising frequently and according to the
established manual were rare, for such practice interfered with
the day-to-day working of the shipa, spoiled the paintwork, and
scarred the holyatoned. decks.
Between January and March 1828 Clarence directed his
influence toward improving gunnery. He insisted that each
ship make quarterly returns of gunn ry exercise and. ammunition
expenditure, and. urged that guard-ships should also put to
sea for practice. He attended the trial of gunsighta already
mentioned, invited Sir Philip Broke of Shannon fame to submit
suggestions regarding gunnery practice, appointed a committee
to review the gunnery system adopted in 1817, and. discussed
with Byam Martin, the Controller, the possibility of fitting
out a guard-ship as a gunnery school.1
1. Add.. MSS. 41397, Martin memo. 23 June 1827. See also
Barrow 1 Auto-Biographical Memoir, pp. 338-41, 3 67-70 , 386; Bartlett,
pp. 39-40; Bowlea, p. 48; Brigga, pp. 1-8; Brighton, pp. 350-53.
239
Clarence was not alone in discovering that the Order in
Council of August 1817, establishing a gunnery drill to be given
to naval gunners by the Royal Marine Artillery, had become a
dead letter. In 1824 axid. 1825 the Admiralty had, with no
disoernable result, reminded all captains of their obligation
to exercise their gunorews regularly in accordance with that
Order. 1
 Captain John Peohell answered publicly from Sybil].e at
1. Ind.4977s 59-4, 28 Aug. 1824; 4985, 10 Mar. 1625. The
Marine Artillery's early efforte had been impressive. By 1820
there were naval guzis and carronades mounted at each of the four
divisional headquarters, Woolwich, Chatham, Portsmouth and
Plymouth, and. upwards of 1500 marines and. seamen had been trained
to the naval drill. Three headquarters moves in two years, from
Fort Monckton to Chatham to Portsmouth, had lett the unit in
disarray and. demoralized., contributing to the resentment against
what was held to be an imposition on the part of the navy.
After 1822 it appears that few marines or seamen were instructed.
in the drill. Ad.rn.1/3356, Colonel Sir Richard. Williams to
Admiralty, 17 June, 11 July, 1 and. 6 Sept. 1824, Melville to the
Duke of Norfolk, 23 June 1824; Adin.2/1226, Admiralty to
Ordnance, 19 and. 22 July 1822.
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Corfu that he could see no evidence of a standard. gunnery manual
in the navy, and that most ships' companies were still being
"more or less instructed according to the ability and. inolin-
ation of their officers."1 Pechell, criticizing the Admiralty
for having failed to adopt Sir Howard. Douglas's scheme for a
gunnery school in 1817, advocated setting up a Senior Department
at Portsmouth on the lines of Douglas's at Farnhain, and urged
that the rank of Gunner of the Fleet be revived so that Flag
Officers could. be assisted in their yearly inspections by an
artillery expert.2
The following year, 1826, two senior naval officers,
Admirals Sir Alexander Cochrane and Sir Willoughby Lake, supported
Pechell's estimation of British gunnery standards, and pointed.
to the rigid adherence to gunnery training in France and America.
Captain George Smith, who in 1830 was to become the first
1. Pechell, Defective Ships' Guns (Corfu, 1825), p. 12. In
1820 Douglas had still not seen a copy of the manual of 1817.
Douglas let ed., pp. 143-45.
2. Pechell, pp. 1-8.
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commander of Excellent, also expreesed concern over the state
of naval gunnery and urged the Admiralty to set up a training
ship such as Douglas had suggested.1
Navarino confirmed the fears of Cochrane and Pecheil, Lake
and. Smith, and in 1828 the Admiralty, under Clarence, undertook
the steps already described to improve gunnery. In 1829 Sir
Howard. Douglas brought forth a timely second edition of Naval
Gunnery. Although he could not make alterations to the text
1. Adm.7/712, Rear Admiral Lake to Admiralty, 20 Nov. 1826,
and. Cockburn to Melville, 24 Dec. 1826, enclosure; Adm.1f3155,
Smith to Admiralty, 6 Feb. 1826. Coohrane, uncle to the more
famous 10th Earl of Dundonald, was at the time of his report
living in Paris, having last regularly served as Port A&niiral at
Plymouth (1821-24). He had also spent much of his earlier career
in the West Indies, and in 1814 commanded on the North American
station. Lake served with him at the same time, and returned to
North America as Commander-in-Chief, Halifax. It was during this
posting that Lake made his report on American enthusiasm, at a
time, it will be recalled, when the Ad.xniralty was concerned over
the large ships and heavybradsidee of the American Navy.
O'Byrne'e Nay. Biog. Dict. D.N.B.
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from the remoteness of New Brunswick, where he was now
Lieutenant Governor, Douglas pointed. out in his preface that the
French were using a translation of his first editiom in their
naval colleges and were studying it much more seriously than
were the British. He urged. the Admiralty to pay more attention
to the new edition than they had. to the first. 1 	-
Douglas's arguments were reinforced. by Command.er George
Smith's second. plea for a gunnery ship, submitted. to the Adiairalty
in October 1829. Smith pointed. out that the adoption of sights,
percussion locks and. the shell system was all very well, but
that their usefulness was limited. "for the want of some ably—
instructed. person to explain them." He urged, as Sir Howard.
Douglas had in 1817 and again in 1829, that a ship be established.
to train seamen gunners in all aspects of gunnery. 2 Another
supporter of Douglas's scheme, Captain William Bowles, brought
1. Douglas, Naval Gunnery (London, 1829), xiv. See also F.E.L.
Charpentier, Traid D'Artillerie Navale (Paris, 1826), passim.
2. Adm.1/2557, Smith to Admiralty, 7 Oct. l29, enclosure
entitled. "Prospectus of a Plan for the Improvement of Naval
Gunnery, without any additional Expense."
243
Smith's argument before the public in a pamphlet publishe
in early 1630.1
Pinal].y, on 19 June 1830, the Melville administration
decided to establish H.M.S. Excellent at Portsmouth as an
experimental gunnery ship. Smith was appointed her first
commander. By August the first detachment of 40 instructors
from the Royal Marine Artillery was on board, and the Ordnance
Department had. delivered most of the weapons and. equipment
considered necessary by Smith. Sir Howard Douglas returned to
England in the summer of 1830 to receive the oongratul tions of
both Smith and Pechell on Britain's attainment of the establishment
1. See Bowles, ava1 Pamphlets, pp. 1, 46-64. Bowles had
joined the n vy in 1796, and. after service on several stations was
appointed Commander-in-Chief of the forces off Brazil (1813-20).
In 1820 he married Palmerston's daughter, and in 1822 captained the
Royal Yacht William a d Mary. From 1823-41 he was Comptroller
General of the Co at Guard, on the Board of Admiralty 1844-46,
and M.P. for Launceston in 1848 and 1851. The pamphi t in question
was th first of several dealing with various n val problemi,
particularly that of manning. These were gen rally signed "Flag
Officer" an h ye been erroneously attributed to Sir Ch ries
Penrose.
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he had. so long desired. to see in the na'vy.1
The raham administration granted. xce1lent permanent
establiebmey t in 1832, with the twofold, purpose of training
gunners and experimenting with new gunnery equipment proposed
for service. 2 The experimental part of Excellent's duties are
described. below. First, ho ever, it is necessary to describe
briefly her role as a gunnery training ship.
1. Adin.1/472, draft of Admiralty Order on the management of
Excellent, 29 Sept. 1830; 4029, Ordnance to Admiralty, 23 June
1830. See also Bartlett, p. 4],; C. Lloyd., "The Origins of H.M.S.
Excellent", N.M. xli. 193-97; R.D. Oliver, ed., H.M.S."Excellent"
1830-1930 (Portsmouth, 1930), pp. 10-21; R.T. Young, The House That
Jack Thiilt; th Story of E.M.S. "Excellent" (Aldershot, 1955),
pp. 1-7; Douglas 3rd ed., p. 21, note. Smith had. joined the Navy in
1808, made Lieutenant in 1815, Commander in 1829. His brief
command of Excellent was perhaps uninspiring; in any case he was
repl ced in 1832 and. saw no further service except as sup rintendent
of packets at Southampton in 1849. He died. in 1850. Prior to his
appointment to Excellent he had. invented a "movable target" in
1825, and had. twice written to the Admiralty in favour of a gunnery
ship. D.N.E. O'Byrne's Nay . Blog. Diot.
2. so Adm.1/3476, 13 April 1832, for the revision of the
orders of 1830. See also Appendix B of this work.
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Between 1832 and. 1851, more than 3,500 gunners of all ranks
(2,500 were able seamen) graduated from Excellent. Arrangements
were also made to systematically train members of other
services including the coast guard, the Royal Marines and men of
the Ordinary. Thu8, although there were seldom more than 200
trainees aboard Excellent in any given year during the thirties,
their subsequent dispersal through the fleet brought high
gunnery standards to gun crews that had. never studied. at
Portsmouth. Indeed, by 1836 the Admiralty had found. it
necessary to set up a new sub section in its filing system to
handle the immense correspondence dealing with the movements of
Excellent graduates.1
Thus, although on average only slightly more than 100
1. Excellent expanded. gradually, at first merely overseeing
the training aboard. guard.ships in addition to its original duties,
but in 1839 acquiring additional barracks at Portsmouth, and in
1851 the Edinburgh, 58, as a sea-going complement to Excellent.
Trainees rose from 200 per year in the early thirties to 1100
per year in 1851. Douglas, 4th ed., pp. 14-22, 440. Adin.1/4032,
Ordnance to Admiralty, 9 Nov. 1836.
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gunners graduated from Excellent each year, it would appear that
these graduates exercised an influence disproportionate to their
actual number. The Admiralty were determined that this should
be sos only first class candidates were accepted for the course,
prize money was set aside for top graduates, and a further
incentive was provided by offering a commission to the gunner
passing out top in his class. After graduation seamen gunners
were granted increases in pay ranging from two to seven shillings
per month according to length of service, and. Captain Hastings
was granted the power to recruit instructors for periods of
from five to seven years. The Admiralty insisted that the
course work aboard Excellent be of the high order "absolutely
necessary to sustain the Character of the Institution."1
The course open to officers was of a very high standard.	 K
indeed - 80 high that Montagu Burrows, Chichele professor of
Modern History at Oxford and. a former naval officer, believed.
1. md.. 5045: 59-4, 21 Dec. 1830. See also md. 5025: 59-4,
4 June 1830; 5038, 12, 13 April and 12, 16 Oct. 183 2 ; 5053, 2 and
4 June 1834. Bartlett, pp. 41-42; Oliver, ed., "Excellent", pp. 20-30.
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that only the most exceptional officers could. turn to practical
account the highly theoretical knowledge imparted. Few others
benefitted, according to Burrows, from the study of d.ifferential
and integral calculus, hydrostatics, hydrodynamics and. optics
to a level equivalent to that required for a degree at
1Cambridge. To this impressive list were added. theory and.
practice courses in steam engineering, mechanical drawing,
fortifications and. gunnery. Instruction was also given in
the construction of rockets, fuzes and. tubes. The training
for seamen gunners was a more practical version of the same
course and hence perhaps more appropriate. Men trained. first
as seamen gunners, went to the fleet, and. returned. to qualify
in turn as gunners, gunnerat mates and yeomen of the powder
2
room.
Montagu Burrows was not alone in viewing the practical
1. Bartlett, Pp. 319-23. P.R. Colomb, Memoires of Sir
Astley Cooper Key (London, 1898), pp. 65-72.
2. Douglas, 4th ed., p. 16.
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benefits of Excellent with some reservation. His belief that the
officers' course was too theoretical was reinforced by Admiral
Moresbye contention that the seamen graduates were overpaid
lay-abouts, and that the course they had followed left something
to be desired. Moresby thought that the lowest rating (3.3)
required almost no knowledge of gunnery on the part of the
candidate, that 1.1, the highest rating,was adequate, but that
as the rating attained made little difference to future
a&vancement there was no incentive to work for top grades.1
There would also appear to have been some dissatisfaction
with Excellent among members of the Admiralty. According to
3.H. Briggs, in 1835 the First Lord, De Grey, intervened when
Admirals Beresford and. Rowley dismissed a lieutenant's passing
examination as "some of Tom Hastings' scientific bosh", and.
suggested that Hastings and. the Excellent be dismissed as well,
De Grey supposedly avoided the issue by stating that Parliament
1. Oliver, ed., pp. 28-30.
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would. not accept such a move. Apocryphal this story might be;
nevertheless it is interesting to note that in the same year an
Admiralty memorandum observed. that long-range gunnery, one of
the raisons d'tre of Excellent, had not been proved. superior
to the traditional close-quarters action.'
The fact that very few opportunities arose during the
period. under study to prove or disprove the effect of long-range
fire in action makes it difficult to assess the exact influence
of Excellent on the gunnery of the day. Nevertheless her worth
would appear to have been proved. at Acre in 1840s
... if the gunnery of the ships had been inefficient this
mistake of the enemy Cthey had fired. too high3 might have
been rectified., but the very first broadsides were
murderous and. the smoke very shortly enveloped. all of them,
as there was very little wind. It is also a historical
fact that for guns of that period in wooden ships, something
like perfection had been attained.2
This, it should. be
 pointed. out, was written by Montagn
I. Bartlett, pp. 41-42. Briggs, pp. 4 6
-48. Adin.1/3486, memo,
13 July 1835.
2. Young, House that Jack Built, pp. 18-19.
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Burrows who fought at Acre as battery officer on Edinburgh's
lower deck, and who has already been cited as a critic of
standards. Burrows was not alone in attributing
British success to good. gunnery, and. perhaps Acre, occuring at
a time Then Excellent's annual cost of £30,000 was troubling
reactionary admirals and. economy-minded politicians, did. more
than anything else to silence opposition to the gunnery ship.
Certainly the Admiralty believed that their faith in such an
establishment had been completely vindicated. "by the brilliant
success of the fleet on the Coast of Syria." 3
 And it was no
doubt with Acre in mind that Minto, on quitting the Admiralty
in 1841, expressed the hope that his successor would permit
Excellent to continue her good work. No serious doubts arose as
to the need for a gunnery ship following Acre.2
Graham's granting of regular establishment to Excellent in
1. md.. 12188* 59-4a, 24 Jan. 1841.
2. Adm.3/265, Minto memo. 6 Sept. 1841. See also Oliver,
pp. 9-11; Young, pp. 18-19.
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1832 coincided with his decision to reform the naval
administration. He replaced the old semi-autonomous civil
departments such as the Navy and. Victualling Boards by five new
departments, each under a permanent head, and. each under the
direct supervision of one of the Lords of the Admiralty. These
reforms have been amply described in other works and need. not
be discussed here. What does pertain to this study is Graham's
inquiry into the troubled nature of Admiralty-Ordnance
relations, and the influence on these relations of the setting
1
up of Excellent.
The relationship between the Ad iralty and the Ordnance
Department in 1832 was briefly this: by Order in Council of
10 July 1679, Ordnance was given the responsibility of supplying
armaments to all the British forces, including the Royal Navy.
In providing weapons for the navy, Ordnance was "bound to obey
1. Bartlett, pp. 8-12. Sir R. Veeey Hamilton, Naval
Administrations (London, 1896), pp. 5-6, 15, 20-24. For other
works praising or criticizing Graham's reforms, see Bartlett,
p. 10, note 2.
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equally the Lord. Admiral and. the Lord. Treasurer", in respect
- of production and. costs; and. as for arming the forces in
general, it soon became a cardinal rule that the navy should.
take priority over other forces.1
This arrangement did. not always function smoothly, owing
to the fact that the Ordnance Department had. three responsibilities
that could. quite easily come into conflict with one another.
The first responsibility was to furnish Admiralty requests for
weapons; the second. was to account to the Treasury for the
expenditure involved.; thirdly, Ordnance had at the same time to
meet the insistent demands of all other military units for
weapons.
Thus arose the unusual situation where the estimates for
naval ordnance were carried in Vote 6 of the army estimates,
while the administrative direction of these funds was in the
1. Adm.7/677, "Establishments of Ordna Ce", Order in Council
of 10 July 1679. P.P. (1887), viii. 82t. For a broader view




difficulties" involved when two boards shared one r sponeibility,
neither had. kept adequate a000unts of the exp nditure on naval
armaments, and. that such items as gunpowder, small arms, locks
and tubes, h d. never even been recorded.1
The unusual financial arrangement between Admiralty and.
Ordnance occasionally resulted in bad feeling between the two
Boards. For example, in 1835 the Admiralty grudgingly allowed
their requisition for 60 8-inch shell guns to lapse when
Ordnance claimed that the money for them could. not be found.
Again, in 1838 Admiralty patience was strained when Ordnance
insisted that a cheaper, and. in the Admiralty's opinion, an
inferior and. unsafe, mode of storing shells aboard ship be
adopted. Other such examples of Ordnance's control of the
purse strings h ving influence on the production of naval
armaments could be cited. But on the whole they were minor
affairs, more irritants than serious threats to the adequate
arming of the navy. Much more serious was the complete absence
1. p . p . (1887), viii.&?L..23. See also P.P. (1847-48),
xxi. I. 670-77.
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of cost figure8 for gunnery production and. experiment.1
While the Ordnance De 	 financial control of
armament production seldom affected dmiralty plans, its actual
control of the means of production had a tremendous influence
on the manufacture of naval armaments • For in carrying out
Admiralty instructions it was the military men at Woolwich who
drew up specifications and. plans, decided whether the order in
question was to be made up at Woolwioh or at one of 4 number of
private firms, and carried out experiments to determine whether
the finished product met Ordnance Department standards. To
these military men also belonged the responsibility for
suggesting 4nd. testing innovations in naval weaponry. It was at
this point that Admiralty-Ordnance relations were most liable
to become strained.
The testing of all armament inventions was left to the
1. Adm.1/4031, Ordnance to Admiralty, 7 Mar. 1835; 4034, 29
Sept., 28 Nov. and 21 Dec. 1838. Other instances of Ordnance
financial influence are to be found in Adm.1/4026, Ordnance to
Admiralty, 10 Jan. 1826; 4027, 8 Jan. 1828; 4029, 15 Dec. 1830
and. 26 Jan. 1831; 4031, 23 April 1835.
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Ordnance Select Committee, a group set up in 1805 under the
presidency of the Director General of the Field. Train and.
staffed in part by the heads of various Ordnance departments.
These officers, together with the Colonels and. Field Officers
Committee, which had begun as two separate committees in 1765,
comprised the Select Committee. Together they assessed all
inventions and. improvements by observation, discussion or
trial, and. reported. their findings to the Board of Ordnance)
Composed largely of elderly soldiers promoted to their
ranks almost solely on the basis of seniority, the Select
Committee tended. on the whole to be cautious and not readily
amenable to innovation. Thus it was this committee that
frequently dissuaded the Admiralty from introducing shells and.
percussion powder into naval service. And it was the Select
Committee, with their conservatism and. internal division, who
1. Hog , Royal Arsenal, II, 1432-33. In special oases the
Master General of the Ordnance could appoint his own select
committee to report directly to him. Dupin, 'i1itary 'orce,
I. 249-52.
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thwarted the Admiralty when that by no means revolutionary body
decided to adopt Congreve's 24-pd.r. medium ship gun in 1813.
It is not necessary to repeat in full the conflict that
arose between Admiralty and Ordnance, and indeed within the
Ordnance Department itself, over Congreves new gun. Suffice
it to say that this episode perhaps beat exemplified Brigadier
Hogg'a observation that "the Royal Arsenal had always been prone
to petty squabbling." 1 It also demonstrated the manner in
which these purely internal conflicts at Ordnance could be
reflected within the Select Committee, with serious repercussions
on Admiralty planning. For although suggested in early 1813 for
service against the Americans, prouction of Congreve guns was
held up sufficiently to ensure that they never served their
intended, purpose. And the reports or the Select Committee
illustrate brilliantly Brigadier Hogg's generalization that
the Select Committee was hidebound, steeped in
traditional methods, lacking in imagination and.
op osed. to change. Another of its failings was
1. Hogg, II. 735.
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its peculiar aptitude for secrecy and reserve, and
its assumption of oracular wisdom.1
These characteristics did. not ensure that the navy's
specialized problems received sympathetic study. In the case
of the Conreve gun, it will be recalled from Chapter One, the
Select Committee would not admit that its successful testing was
anything more than accidental. The marked prejudice of both
the Committee and. the Inspector of Artillery, Sir Thomas
Blomefie].d, against the new configuration lay behind Ordnance's
refusal to provide the Admiralty with Congreve guns. Ordnance's
rebuke to the Admiralty's declaration that in naval matters
Admiralty decisions had. ultimate authority, again illustrates
the delicate relationship obtaining between the two Boards:
"I am directed to state that the Board of Ordnance
are always ready to take upon themselves the
responsibility which results from the exercise of
that discretion vested in them by their public
duty; and without commenting upon the terms in
which the Communication of Their Lordahips'
sentiments is couched in your letter, or upon the
1. Ibid. II. 1453.
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inadmissable and unprecedented. tone of authority
assumed. in it, the Board desire to remark, with
regard to the provision of these Guns, that it is
not necessary for them to justify that measure to
the Lords of the Admiralty, and that they receive
orders from the Master General of the Ordnance
only.
Ultimately, of course, the Admiralty's contention was
upheld., and. Ordnanc, did, reluctantly, provide the desired. €una.
But the delay and acrimony involved in the procedure suggested
that some alteration in the Admiralty-Ordnance relationship
would be desirable,
In fact the only improvement that took place in the testing
of naval ordnance came in 1819. In that year, Wellington, as
Master General of the Ordnance, insisted. that naval officers be
attached to the Select Committee whenever equipment of interest
to the navy was undergoing trials. 2 It was thus not surprising
that, with the growing interest in gunnery and gunnery traiming
1. Ad.ni.1/4021, Ordnance to Admiralty, 18 Oct. 1813. See
above Chapter One.
2. Adin.1/4024, Wellington to Admiralty, 30 Aug. 1819.
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depots during the 1820's, attention was drawn to the fact that
in the whole matter of gunnery the navy had. practically no
representation. Critics such as Bowles, Pechell and, Sir Charles
Napier pointed out that the Admiralty consisted. largely of
civilian personnel and. contained no gunnery expert, whi]e Ordnance
had a predominance of military men and. contained no naval expert.
To this fact they attributed the profound lack of interest in
gunnery on the part of many naval officers.'
1. Bowles, pp. 81-82. Napier, The Navy, pp. 29-30, 44-45,
91
-96 . Pechell, pp. 12-14. See also Parkinson, Exmouth, p. 273,
Between 1810 and 1835 only three naval officers served on the
Board of Ordnance: Vice Admiral Sir Robert Moorsom as Surveyor-
General, 1810-20; Rear Admiral Sir E.W.C.R. Owen in the same
office 1827-28, and again as Clerk of Ordnance 1834-35; and
Captain Sir Henry Duncan as Principal Storekeeper, 1831-34.
p . p . ( 1837), xl. 253. In 1845, Peel, seeking to transform the
sinecure of Principal Storekeeper into a strong link between the
Admiralty and the Ordnance, appointed. Sir Thomas Hastings.
Hastings had been appointed to the Excellent by the Whigs in
1832. Peel wrote Sir George Murray, Master General, "I hope
you will give me credit for this bit of political virtue."
Add. MSS. 40570, Peel to Murray, 16 July 1845.
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It is thus understandable that the whole question of
Admiralty-Ordnance relations caine under review in 1832, when
Graham was initiating his administrative reforms, and. when
Excellent had become a new factor in this relationship. From
1833 to 1837 it was debated whether or not the navy should.
establish its own ordnance department. All members of the
Ordnance, including the Inspectors of Artillery and. of the
Royal Carriage Department, together with Sir James Kempt and.
his successor as Master General, Sir R. uasey Vivian, were
again t such an expensive duplication of effort. Naval
opinion, as expressed by Sir John Barrow and. Captain George
Elliot, Seoretarie8 to the Admiralty, was in favour of the
duplication. Captain Henry Duncan, one of the few naval
officers to sit at Ordnance (he was Principal Storekeeper of
the Ordnance from 1831 to 1834) saw the desirability of such a
change but believed it would. be much too expensive. A Select
Committee report of 21 February 1837 therefore advised that no
change be made in the Admiralty-Ordnance relationship, but that
the matter come under periodical review. Not until 1891 did.
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1the Admiralty assume complete responsibility for its ordnance.
For the period under study, therefore, the Ordnance
Department exercised tremendous Influence on the development of
naval armaments. But the establishment of Excellent as both an
experimental depot and. a gunnery training ship, provided the
navy with an unprecedented opportunity to study those armament
problems peculiar to naval service. And although Ordnance, with
its vastly superior laboratory and. range facilities, continued
to dominate armament developments, the role of Excellent In the
improvement of naval weaponry during the thirties and. forties
was enormous.
1. P.P. (1887), viii. 94-95. Eamilton, pp. 81-83.
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Chapter Six
THE EVOLUTION OF TEE LAST GENERATION
OF SMOOTH-BORE ORDNANCE, 1830-53
Throughout the eighteen thirties and. forties continuous
weapons trials were carried, out at Portsmouth and. Woolwich.
And. although lack of relevant documents makes difficult the
t sk of assessing the contribution made to armaments development,
either by Excellent or the Ordnance Department, sufficient
information survives to indicate the nature of this development.
The search for satisfactory guns to fulfill Melville's scheme
of uniform oalibre combined with shell guns occupied the
greater part of the thirties. During the decennial review of
naval armaments held in 1838-39 exhaustive artillery trials at
Deal brought about the adoption of a new generation of smooth-
bore ordnance, to ether with more scientifically precise
windages, powder charges and. ran0e-tables. The increased.
numbers of paddle-wheel steamers throughout the forties, an
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increase attributable 1 rgely to British apprehension over
France's renewed. maritime vigour, resulted. in the development
of very heavy solid shot and. shell guns for bow and stern
armament. By 1853 cast iron naval guns had. attained the
greatest range and. size compatible with safety and. sea
service, and. simiooth-bore ordnance had. reached. the peak of its
development.
The period between 1830 and 1853 presents several problems
to the historian seeking to describe the evolution of naval
artillery. In the first place, there was no radical
difference between naval guns in service as late as 1860 and
those that had. been in use three centuries earlier. Certain
refinements had been made in, for example, the casting of
the metal, more precise fitting of the projectiles to their
bores, and. gunpowder; but there had been no basic change in
the principle of their construction. Therefore to define
the many modifications and. improvements made between 1830 and.
1853 in guns that differed. in no essential characteristic is
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no easy task.1
Another problem is the scant documentation of this period.
For little of the correspondence between Admiralty and Ordnance
from 1639 to 1850 survives, and. what survives is often obscure.
This obscurity can be attributed to two main causes first,
those reporting on experiments, either as members of the
Ordnance Select Committee or as officers aboard E.M.S. Excellent,
were experts addressing themselves to experts. They consequently
felt little need to enter into minute detail on the subject of
their report. If, for example, they were evaluating two
similar guns, the report usually included little more than
their respective ranges together with the committee's
1. This writer has seen no information on the precise nature
of the improvements in casting and mensuration in armaments
manufacture. It is interesting to note in this respect, however,
that it was in the 1830's that a true metal surface and the
standard inch arid foot were established, and. that measurements
to one ten-thousandth of an inch became possible. P.C. Lea,
Sir Joseph Whitworth, a Pioneer of Mechanical Engineering
(London, 1946), pp. 3-23.
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recommendation as to which gun best answered the purpose
intended. No analysis of the reasons for the difference in
performance was attempted.
The security arrangements of the time also contributed to
the obscurity of existing documents on mid-nineteenth century
gunnery. For throughout the entire period under study, all
major innovations in this field were studied and introduced
in complete secrecy. Thus, instructions for itting gunsightB
in 1824 were issued as secret orders, the Admiralty believing
that "particular explanations of this nature should not be made
generally public." 1 A similar secrecy surrounded the activities
at Excellent from which the public, and. especially foreign
officers, were officially barred, and. where great precautions
were taken to keep the results of tests secret from the Press.
To assist in keeping military secrets from the public and.
foreign powers, both Admiralty and. Ordnance further insisted
that no service personnel be trained in the manufacture end use
-	
1. Adin.1/4025, Ordnance to Admiralty, 20 Jan. 1824, minute.
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of "some of the Articles manufactured or arranged in the
Laboratory ... if the nature of their Service does not
absolutely require it."1
 This desire for secrecy thus explains
to a considerable degree the lack of documents and. the obscurity
of those that survive,
But while these problems make difficult an absolutely
thorough study of the improvement of armaments between 1830
and 1853, it is nevertheless possible to observe the significant
improvements made in this period. Surviving documents are
adequate to enumerate the nature of guns tested and adopted, to
reveal the extensive experimentation and. trial carried out at
Woolwich, Portsmouth and Shoeburynesa, and to demonstrate that,
during the eighteen thirties, the many problems of smooth-bore
ordnance were being solved.
Britain's first shell gun was the 50 owt. 8-inch gun of
1. Ad.m.1/4024, Wellington to Melville, privat., 15 Feb. 1821.
See also Adxa.1/4033, Ordnance to Admiralty, 2 June 1837 and.
minute; Add. MSS. 41581, Sir Alexander Dickson to Lieutenant
Colonel C.C. Dansey, 4 July 1839; Ind. 5064 s 59-4, 18 Feb. 1835,
5076; 59-4a, 21 and 23 July 1836; 12328s 59-4a, 1 Aug. 1850.
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6 feet 8 inches designed by William Millar and tested aboard
H.M.S. Northumberland. in 1821. Somewhat later Mi1].ar designed.
a 10-inch shell gun, 9 feet 4 inches in length and weighing
84 cwt. In 1829 Melville ordered 10-inch guns for steamers
under construction and. allocated two 8-inch guns to each ship
of the line. Craham's Board, succeeding that of Melville in
1830, agreed with these armament proposals but found. certain
practical difficulties in their implementation.1
It was soon discovered that the 50 cwt. gun had. limited.
ranging power and. was too short to throw its fire completely
clear of the gun port. The 84 cwt. 10-inch gun, on the other
hand., while having neither of these failings, was much too
heavy for use in ships of the line. Experiments were
immediately begun to test the feasibility of heavier 8-inch and
lighter 10-inch guns. 10-inch guns of 57 and 62 cwt. proved.
to be failures, and. the original 84 owt. gun, first used on
the steamers	 and. Rhadamanthus, continued to arm the heavier
1. For Melville's policy see above Chapter Four.
269
classes of steamers well into the fifties.1
Better fortune attended the search for an adequate 8-inch
weapon. The 50 owt. version was soon displaced by three
varieties of 60 owt. 8-inch guns, and. these in turn were, by
1834, found to be inferior to models 9 feet in length and
wei hing 65 owt. The 50 owt. model was at first retained for
frigate .ee, the 60 cwt. for 74's. By 1850 however, the
65 cwt. had. become the most popular shell gun in the navy for
"all rates and. classes, for broadside batteries as well as for
the pivot-guns of steamers."2
This search for the most suitable shell gun did not end.
until 1836. For this reason the decision of 1829, that each
ship of the line be armed with two shell guns, was not fully
carried out. The two 10-inch guns aboard. Talavera since 1829
were not, in fact, fully tested untIl 1831; and. it was not until
1. .Ldm.1/4030, Ordnance to Admiralty, 23 Jan. and. 22 May 1833;
4031 , 29 Oct. 1834 and. minute.
2. Douglas, 4th ed., p. 1 98. See also Atha.1/403l, Ordnance
to Admiralty, 7 Mar. and 30 Dec. 1835; 4032, 29 Jan., 8 April,
30 July and 30 Sept. 1836.
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the following year that the Admiralty ordered. that "such a
proportion of dead shells and. fuses as may be necessary, should.
be issued to every ship having on board. 68-pd.r. carronades
or Major Millar's large guns."1 It is unlikely that such an
issue of shells took place, for not until 1834 was any apparent
effort made to provide ships of the line with shell guns and
shell rooms. In that year the 104-gun ships Camperdown,
I!npregnable, Princess Charlotte, queen Charlotte and Royal
Adelaide were prepared. to receive six 68-pdr. guns or
oarronad.ea
In February 1835 the Admiralty were still uncertain as to
the dimensions these Bhell guns should have. To determine
this point seven models numbering 76 guns in all underwent
trials at Woolwich, on Excellent, and. aboard the steamers
1. Adm.1/4030, Ordnance to Admiralty, 29 Oct. 1832. See also
Adin. 1/4029, Ordnance to Admiralty, 4 Mar. 1831, enclosure, and
9 May 1831; 1687, Captain David Colby of the Palavera to
Admiralty, 12 April 1831.
2. Ad.m.1/4031, Ordnance to Admiralty, 4 March 1834. Production
of the 68-pdr. carronade was discontinued in the same year. Ibid.
17 Dec. 1834 and. minute.
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Phoenix and. Medea at sea. At the close of 1838, the Royal
Navy still had only 167 shell guns on hand, and. of these only
30 were aboard. ships in commission. Nevertheless, the two
models of shell gun that were to provide the mainstay of the
Royal Navy until the sixties, the 65 cit. 8-inch and. the 84 cwt.
10-inch guns, had been settled upon.1
The solid shot armament that emerged by 1838 also differed.
considerably from that planned. for by Melville in 1829-30.
Melville had ordered four different weights of 32 pd.r. - 65,
56, 48 and. 25 owt. - for ships of the line and. frigates. The
63 cwt. version soon proved. to be much too heavy for
extensive broadside armament, the 205 cast serving only as
solid shot armament in large steamers. The three remaining
models continued in production, but the number required was so
enormous that It soon became apparent, not only that foundries
1. &dm.1/403l, Ordnance to Admiralty, 17 Feb. 1835, enclosure.
There were 20 shell guns abo rd first- and. second-rates, 4 on
third and fifth-rates, and 6 on steamers. Adm.]./4034, Ordnance
to Admiralty, 14 Nov. and 21 Dec. 1838, enclosures.
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mi ht riot have sufficient productive capacity, but that
Parliament would be reluctant to pa for them in a period of
economic austerity and. at a time when the advent of shell guns
threatened large broadside armaments with extinction. Under
these circumstances the Admiralty decided to achieve 32-pdr.
uniform calibre as cheaply as possible. The simplest way to
accomplish this aim was to ream out 24-pdr. guns to fire
132-pdr. projectiles.
This expedient had been used successfully in 1817 when
at the suggestion of Sir Howard Douglas, oarronades were bored
up to the diameter possessed by guns of equa1 calibre. The
success of this measure indicated that guns as wil as
carronades could be given enlarged bores without dangerously
weakening them, and. this was shown to be the case in 1831, when
6 ft. 6 in. 24-pdrs. bored up to 32-pdrs. withstood the full
proving charge without bursting. In 1835 the policy of
boring up be,, n in earnest when Congreve 24-pdrs. as well as
1. Athn.1/3489, me o. of William B. Dund.as, Inspector of
Artillery, undated, 1839.
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certain patterns of 12- and 18-pdrs. were bored up to the
next, a d. in som cases the second higher calibre. By 1837
1,152 guns had been bored up, 911 of them to 32-pdrs.,
	 d. in
1838 over 3000 24-pd.rs. and 492 18-pdrs. awaited the drill at
1Woolwich,
Not one of these guns had burst by 1839, indicating that
the fears expressed over the safety of bore-ups had been
groundless. The navy therefore had. a cheap and. ready supply
of 32-pdrs. with which to attain the desired uniform calibre;
moreover, no extensive alterations, such as those made in
ships of the line in 1826-28, were necessary: with bore-ups,
most British ships could deliver 32-pd.r. broadsides, while
retaining the same armament weight as had been carried when
they mounted 18- end 24-pcIrs. Yet another advantage of these
guns was that a reduction in windage gave them a range and
1. Ad.m.1/4029, Ordnance to Admiralty, 25 July 1831, minute;
4031, 18 Mar., 15 and 20 July, 14 Dec. 1 35; 4033, II April and
7 Nov. 1837; 4034, 7 Feb. 1835; 4035, 15 Apr11 1839. See also
Douglas, lat ed., pp. 71-72, 91-95; 3rd. ed., pp. 123-25.
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penetration, often with reduced charges, superior to that
possessed by 24-pdrs.1
The bored up 32-pdr. nevertheless h d grave shortcomings.
Superior though it was to its old self, it was decidedly
inferior to the regulation 32-pdr., not only in range end
penetration, but in stabilitys for when what was basically a
light 24-pd.r. gun fired a heavy 32-pd.r. shot, the recoil was
often sufficiently *tolent to break the breechings, smash the
carriage and sometimes maim the crew, as well as to propel
the shot wildly from the bore. 2 Moreover, although the navy
adopted uniform calibre more quickly by employing bore-ups, it
is doubtful whether there was much of a gain in terms of
efficiency over the old multi-calibred system. For while the
guns were indeed 32-pdrs. there were in fact three sizes of
bore, 6.30 inches, 6.35 and. 6.41 inches, requiring three
1. Windage was the term applied to the difference in diameter
between shot and. bore. See above Chapter Two.
2. Douglas, 3rd. ed., pp. 206-12. Simmons, Present
Arinam nt, pp. 5-6, 18.
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sies of shot hardly distinguishable one from the other if
wind.age was to be constant. These three dimensions of bore
greatly increased the difficulties confronting xce1lent in her
attempt to establish valid range tables, difficulties aggravated
by the necessity to provide for 10 models of 32-pdr. rather
than the four envisaged in 1529-30, each model recuiring its
particular charge and elevation to attain a given range.1
y December 1838 ships in commission were almost entirely
armed with 32-pd.rs., there being only 38 24-pd.ra. mounted in
ships of the line. 2 Nevertheless, the standardization
implied was, for the reasons noted above, illusory. As early
as 1835 the Ordnance Department was complaining that
although the ships of His Majesty's Navy
are classed, it is not found. that any two
ships of any one class (except that of 10 guns)
1. In addition to the 25, 48, 56 and 63 owt. models envisaged
by Melville, there emerged ones of 32, 39, 4Q, 41, 43, 48 and 50
owt. Adm.1/4034, Ordnance to Admiralty, 7 leb. end 10 Aug.
1838. Neither France or America used bore-ups to any extent.
Douglas, 3rd ed., pp. 206-07.
2. Adm.1/4034, Ordnance to Admiralty, 21 Dec. 1832,
enclosure.
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are armed with ordnance of the same nature,
which occasions a considerable variation as
to the powder and anmunition allowed....1
To difficulties of supply were added problems in gunnery. It
could have taken years to compile range-tables for this
hodge-podge of 32-pdrs., and. without these tables the
valuable work of Excellent in providing trained gunners was
wasted. It is not surprising, therefore, that in 1838 a new
series of 32 .-pdr. was brought forward for trial.
These guns were designed by Mr. T.B. Monk, a civilian
worker at the Royal Arsenal, on the lines of the controversial
Congreve 24-pdr. of 1813. This entailed strengthening the
breech around. the charge by a redistribution of the metal from
the barrel. Monk's A-type 32-pd.r., 9 feet 6 inches in length
and. weighing 50 cwt., proved to be a most efficient gun.
Although 6 inches shorter and. 6 cwt. lighter than the
regulation 32-pdr., it was thicker around the cylinder of the
charge than the 56 cwt. gun, and propelled its shot as far with
1. Ad.m.1/4031, Ordnance to Admiralty, 2 Mar. 1835.
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sudden vigour were the decennial review of the state of the
navy and increasing world tension.
During the decennial review, usually undertaken during
the last two years of the decade, Aduiiralty and Ordnance
assessed weapons and equipment in service, studied and.
experimented with new equipment, and. determined. the innovations
to be made during the next ten years. Thus the decision to
introduce Congreve 24-pd.rs., gunsights and vent tubes, taken
in 1818-19, was gradually carried out during the eighteen
twenties. Similarly, Melville's decision of 1828-29 to adopt
war steamers, shell guns and 32-pdr. uniform calibre, and. to
set up a gunnery school at Portsmouth was, broadly speaking,
implemented during the thirties, although satisfactory guns
for the program were not forthcoming until 1838. In July of
that year the third decennial review of the century commenced
with experimentation on "recent and improved contrivances in
gunnery." Improved guneighte and. fuzee, percussion tubes and.
locks, together with a variety of lesser "contrivances"
were studied, tested and. in turn recommended or rejected
/
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for service. The opportunity was also taken to finalize plans
for the storing and handling of shells in ships of the line.1
The review of 1838-39 undertook more ambitious projects
than the *tudy of innovations in materiel. In 1838
experiments commenced. at Excellent to assist in preparing
range-tables for all heavy ordnance. These experiments were
continued on a larger scale in 1839 when the Ordnance
Department, assisted by the Admiralty, drew up a program for
exhaustive artillery trials. In April of that year
Lieutenant Colonel Charles Cornwallis Dansey-, LA., was
appointed by the Master General of the Ordnance "to super-
intend and. carry into effect certain practice and experiments
with h avy ordnance at a station near Deal, to determine
1. Ada.1/4034, Ordnance to Ad.iniralty, 17 July 1838,
enclosure. It was finally decided that shells should be issued
filled and with the fuzes in place, stored in boxes on shelves
in a special room amidships and beneath the water line. See
Adin.1/4030, Ordnance to Admiralty, 29 Oct. 1832; 4032, 2 June
and. 12 Aug. 18 3 6 ; 4034, 29 Sept., 1, 5, 10 Oct., 28 Nov. 1838;
4035, 2, 7, 28 Jan., 26 Mar. and 15 July 1639.
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questions of infinite importance to the Service of Artillery
"1by sea and. land.
Between May and November continuous trials were
carried out on 13 types of heavy naval ordnance and 14
varieties of powder; more than 2600 rounds of a11 descriptions
of shot and shell were fired to determine the range and
effect of each. The results of these trials were to
confirm the earlier choice of the 8-inch 65 cit. gun and
the Monk 32-pdrs. for general armanent purposes, to
establish the windage for the latter at . 175 inches, and.
1. Add. MSS. 41581, Sir Alexander Dickson, Deputy
Adjutant General of Artillery, to Dansey, 5 April 1839.
Dansey had served in most Peninsular actions, and had been
severely wounded both at Burgos and Waterloo, In 1828 Dickson
pushed hard to h ye Dansey appointed Major of a rocket
bataflion, and he served as Chief Firemaster at the Royal
Laboratory from 1839 until 1846. W.H. Askwith, List of
Officers of th Royal Regiment of Artillery from the Year
1716 to the Year 1899 (London, 4th ed., 1900), p. 241.





watch for armament development throughout the thirties.' France
h d. cautiously led the way in introducing uniform calibre and
shell guns in the twenties; dunn the thirties her
determination to learn the lessons of past defeats put her
well ahead of other powers in the scientific pursuit of
gunnery perfection. To the School of Naval Instruction set up
at Brest in 1830 was added the publication Tactique in 1832,
as well as auadron of exercise, all with the purpose of
providing excellent instruction for a new generation of
naval officers. In 1833 a corps of Marine Artillery on the
British model was established to provide 500 picked gunners
annually, and foLir years later additional schools of artillery
were set up at Brest and Toulon, complete with gunnery frigates
for practice at sea. In June 1834 the Conseil des Travaux, a
1. The Americans did not adopt uniform 32-pdr. calibre until
1845, nor a gunnery training ship until the early fifties. In
1838, when the Canadian Rebellions were still taking place,
Palmerston was assured that the American Navy presented little
threat. Dahigren, Shell nns, preface, p. 13, pp. 23-25.
Bartlett, p. 121, note 4.
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body created in 1831 and. composed. of naval officers, constructors
and. artillerists, initiated an exhaustive three-year series of
artillery experiments at Gavres and Metz which included. tests
of all types of weapons and. projectiles in service against
armoured. and. unarmoured. targets. Finally, by a Regulation of
Apr11 1838, French first-rates were to receive 34 30-pd.r. shell
guns on their upper decks, and. four of the powerful Paixhans
guns of 80 on their lower decks. All theee activities, to ether
with the openly expressed. conviction of a growing number of
Frenchmen that their fleet was second to none, including that
of Britain, was not lost upon the Admiralty and. some members of
the cabinet.1
The Admiralty had already determined on the 65 cwt. 8-inch
shell gun and. in February of that year had ordered. the immediate
production of 100. But the French decision to use 30-pd.r. shell
1. Bartlett, p. 118. Baxter, pp. 28-29. Douglas, 4th ed.,
232-33. H. Busk, The Navies of the World; Their Present State
and Future Capabilities (London, 1859), po. 34-35. B. Jouan,
Kistoire de la Marine Frangaise (Paris, 1950), pp. 275-7.
ELL/2l8, Palmerston to unto, 2 Nov. 1838.
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guns came as a surprise. It was not until autumn,
however, after the beginning of the decennial review in
July, and. in the midst of the panic over the expected. arrival
of the Baltic Fleet, that the Admiralty took firm measures.
In September and October range tests were held. with
8-inch and. 6-inch 32-pdr. shells at Southsea, and against
the hulk Prince George at Portsmouth, It was soon
apparent that little progress had. been made in increasing
the accuracy of shells, or in preventing their tendency to
burst prematurely or to be snuffed. out on ricochet. Thus,
of 32 8-inch shells fired. in ricochet, five burst prematurely
while others were extinguished, and at 400 yards ten out
of eleven 32-pdr. solid shot found the mark as compared.
with only three out of eleven 8-inch shells. Better
accuracy was attained with the 32-pd.r. shell, a projectile
that also served well as shot should it fail to explode.
Despite what appeared. to be disappointing results the
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Admiralty ordered 10,000 8-inch and. 5,000 32-pd.r. shells.1
It was not until 21 January 1839 that the final draft of
the 4dmiralty's plan for the new armament was published. To
comply with the specifications laid. out in this document,
every ship in commission, down to and including the first
class sixth-rate of 26 guns, was to carry between two and.
twelve he11 guns. First-rates of 104- and. 120-guns were to
mount four 8-inch guns of 65 cwt. on the lower deck and a
further two on the middle deck, while 110-gun vessels were
ordered. to carry six on the lower and four on the middle decks.
Second-rates were to be equipped with eight, ten or twelve,
third-rates and large frigates with either four or six. The
small 58-, 42- and. 44-gun fifth-rate frigates each received.
two 8-inch guns of 60 or 52 cwt., and. four 52 cwt. guns were
1.Adm . 1/4034, Ordnance to Admiralty, 27 Aug., 18 and 24 Sept.,
29 and 31 Oct. 1858; 4035, 30 Jan. 1835; 5498, Inspector of
Artillery and. Director of the Royal Laboratory to Ordnance,
4 Oct. 1838. See also Douglas, 3rd ed., pp. 281-86, 291-92;
Admiralty publication !xperiments in LM.S. "Excellent"
1832-54 (London, 1854), pp. 6-14.
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assigned to each 36-gun frigate. Smaller vese1e were to set
aside two 32-pd.rs. as shell guns and. the proportion of sheila
was fixed throughout the fleet as 40 filled shells per shell
gun.
Solid shot armament was to consist of the three sizes of
Monk 32-pdr. together with either the 25 cwt. Dickson gun or
17 cwt. carronade. As it happened, supplies of the Monk gun
were so limited, that the Admiralty had. to resort to using the
old. 32-pdrs. Thus, for a considerable period. great dependence
was placed on the 56 and 48 cwt. guns, and the Congreve and.
Blomefield. 24-pd.rs. served until well into the fifties as
bored up 32-pdrs.
The lack of documents from 1839 to the end of the period
under study, makes it impossible to determine with any accuracy
the extent to which the armament proposals of 1839 were carried
1. See Ad.m.1/3498, bound. correspondence entitled "Guns of
heavy calibre and shells proposed to be introduced. into the
fleet". It ii dated 21 Jan. 1839, but contains correspondence
of various dates and sources.
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out. The order of 1839 was directed to the entire fleet in
commission, and provision was also made in it for casting the
necessary weapons for ships of the ordinary between 1840 and.
1842. At the same time it is possible that the navy was slow
to receive its new weapons, a possibility that would. appear to
be enhanced. by the fact that in 1850 many Congreve bore-ups
were still in service, while only 4,000 Monk 32-pdrs. had been
cast. The rate of supply of shell guns is unknown, but it is
instructive to note that in 1841 Minto was convinced that the
proportion of shell guns in ships of the line should be
increased, and. that such an increase did take place in 1849,
when second-rates of the Rodney and. Albion classes had their
allocation doubled from 12 to 26.1
It would appear that the proportion of shell guns to solid
shot guns in ships of the line was never satisfactorily worked
out. As Dah].gren wrote in 1850, thi8 question perplexed. naval
1. Adm.3/265, Miuto memo. 6 Sept. 1841. Douglas, 4th ed..,




other than fore and. aft, was to have a profound influence on
naval ordnance. For not only were paddle-wheels and. their
bulky machinery extremely vulnerable under enemy fire, but they
also rendered extensive broadside armaments impossible. In
consecjuenoe of this limitation, guns tended to be few in number
but large in size and. power. 1 It is not possible, owing to the
dearth of relevant documents, and to the tendency to experiment
with a variety of guns on the same steamers, to give the exact
armament of individual steamers throughout their service.
Nevertheless the general pattern of armament is quite clear.
The earliest, larger class of steamer such as the 800 ton
vessels	 Salamander, Phoenix and Medea were, in 1831,
carrying one 10-inch gun aft, and a heavy 32-pdr. "elsewhere".
Medea, and later Thunderer, had their armament doubled t two
10-inch guns and. two 32-p&rs. at bow and stern, an arrangement
that remained in favour throughout the thirties and forties,
although occasional variations took place for the purpose of
1. See Robertson, pp. 231-34.
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experiment and. trial. 1 It was the "extraordinary effects of
live shells" from Gorgon's two 10-inch bow guns that proved. so
successful against the entrenched. positions of the Carlists
near San Sebastian in May of 1837, and. that encouraged. a more
vigorous program of steamer construction in 1838.2 This program
in turn contributed. to France's decision in 1839 to construct
ten armed. mail steamers suitable for war purposes, a move that
drove Britain to a more ambitious building policy than the
Admiralty considered wise in the light of the many technological
problems that continued. to p1agie war steamers.
Throughout the forties war steamers increased. in number,
size, horse-power, and. strength of armaments. Nevertheless,
the largest steam-frigates could mount only a fraction of the
guns carried. by the sailing frigates and. ahips of the line they
were coming to approximate in size. Thus the Terrible, a
paddle steam-frigate launched at Deptford. in 1845, weighed
1. A&m.1/4031, Ordnance to Admiralty, 17 Feb. 1835. See
also md.. 5031; 59-4, 26 May 1831; 5038, 3, 4, 5 and. 10 Oct.
1832; 5045, 21 Dec. 1833; 5053, 3 and. 27 Jan. 1834.
2. Douglas, 3rd ed.., p. 284, note.
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1,850 tons, was 226 feet long, and. was expected to mount only
28 heavy guns. With her machinery installed, it was discovered
that she settled too low in the water when carrying more than
16. Siniil r problems of flotation do ged. smaller steam-frigates
such as the Penelope, Retribution and. Leoperd, and the five
classes of steam-sloop that emerged could. mount only three or
six gus1
The severe restriction on the number of guns that a paddle-
wheel steamer could. carry lead to an intense interest in large,
solid shot guns that could be fired. at high elevations to
attain range, while at the same time remaining sufficiently
mobile to permit the widest possible arc of fire through
pivoting. This interest had first been demonstrated at Deal
in 1839, when particular attention had. been paid to the effects
of 42- and 56-pd.r. guns cast by Monk on the same principle as
his 32-pdrs. Monk had. originally intended. these guns for
1. Sir Alan Moore, Selling Ships of War 1800-1860 including
the Transition to Steam (London, 1926), pp. 51, 54, 61. See also
Brodie, p. 42-43.
295
coastal defense, and. such was to be their ultimate role. But
so great was their battering power and range that inquiries
were soon launched. as to the feasibility of mounting them on
steamers for use against shell guns at sea or against coastal
fortifications,
On May 16 1842 the Admiralty informed Ordnance that several
very large steamers were soon to be built and that it would
be desirable to renew trials at Deal on all large guns to
determine their range, power and. suitability for such vessels.
In addition to Monk's 56-pd.r. of 91 owt., 42-pd.rs, of 84 and.
75 cwt, and. 32-pd.re . of 63 cwt. were tried. Also tested. at
Deal were 68-pd.r. solid shot guns of 90, 95, 110 and. 112 cwt.
and the formidable li-ton 13O-pd.r. prepared for the Pasha of
Egypt. These very heavy guns had in fact little or no
advantage in range over the more manageable 56-pdr. which
ranged. 4087 ards at 15 degrees of elevation and. 5720 yards at
32 degrees, None of the other guns was tried at the second
elevation, apart from the 32-pdr. of which there was a
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considerable supply. This gun ranged. 4860 yards at 32 degrees
before it burst.1
The result of these trials which were carried out between
1842 and 1846, was that the 8-inch 65 owt. was retained as the
most common shell gun for sailing vessels, but became more
widely used. aboard. steamers; the 10-inch gun, given a heavier
breech that increased its weight from 84 to 86 owt., remained. the
most pojmlar steaaer armament. At hia gun could. be 1elevated
only 15. degrees, wit a rang. some 2,000 ar&s less then the
56-ptr., solid, shot 56-pdrs. were conee9uently ntrod.uoed. Zor a
ims to aereral of the larger class o,f steamers $uc. ae, Terrible,
but soon gave way to the more powerful end, only slightly heavier
68-pd.r. pivot guns of 95 cwt.2
The heavy guns developed. during the thirties awl forties to
meet 'the special requirements of paddle-wheel steamers were
1. Adm.1/5519, Admiralty to Ordnance, 16 lay 1842. Douglas,
4h ed.,,pp. 188-96. See also md. 12188, 59-4a, 17 May, 7, 9,
and. 2 D4i; '±22lI?2?1'eb. ant 6a*. )e43 12232, 10 aM
18 Dec. 1844.
2. md. 12264, 59-4a, 6 and. 20 May, 3 July 1644; 12312, 27
Jan. 1849.
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almost double the weight of the largest broadside ordnance. Yet
the recoil of these massive weapons had to be confined to very
limited deck space, and. the guns themselves subjected to
elevations 5 to 6 times those of broadside cannon. Slide
carriages were 800fl produced. with screw compressors to retain
recoil, and. elevating screws to provide the necessary elevating
controls, while designed to permit pivoting the gun. But it
1. Robertson, Chapter Six, is devoted to gun carriages. While
satisfactory on earlier truok carriages it is less so for heavy-
gun mounts in steamers. Douglas credits William Millar, the
inventor of England's shell gune, with provi ding suitable
oarriages1 They apparently consisted. of a slide with grooves
along which the gun recoiled, the recoil being taken up by friction
that could be increased by tightening "compressor" wing-nuts on
the chocks. Although the slide did. not itself recoil, it was
fixed to the deck by bolts at front and rear, bolts that could.
be fitted to a number of different bolt-holes in the dock, thus
permitting slide and. gun to pivot through a wide are. Douglas,
4th ed., pp. 203-06. Thomas Hardy did. invent a "compressor-
plate" type of carriage as described in Robertson, but as the
plates were found to rust stuck it never progressed. beyond the
trial stage. md.. 12174* 59-4a, 29 Aug. 1840; 12188, 13 Jan.
1 841. For the plan of a carriage similar to those of Millar
see W.0.44/500, Select Committee Report, 1 Nov. 1838, enclosure.
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was SOOfl discovered that large guns fired at long.range and.
under sharp recoil control became strained. and. liable to burst.
Thus the 63 cwt. 32-pdrs. that could fire at 6 degrees of
elevation indefinitely, burst at Deal in 1839 on the sixtieth
round at 32 degrees, and. at the same elevation at Shoeburyne s
in 1852, a 10-inch gun burst on the fifty-fourth round.1
The tendency of large guns to burst during long-range
firing was believed to be the result of additional "lateral
pressures" attending high elevation recoil. Thus at 6 degrees
elevation the gun recoiled more or less horizontally, and. in
free and. direct reaction to the f].i ht of the projectile; at
32 degrees, on the other hand, the gun was entirely out of the
horizontal so that it recoiled downward. upon the comparatively
unyielding carriage and deck. The force of the recoil was
therefore only partially translated by the carriage with the
result that the sides of the gun absorbed a much greater
1. W.O.44/502, Ca tam E.D. Ch ds of Excellent to Admiralty,
7 Oct. 1852. Douglas, 4th ed., p. 192.
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proportion of this force than was normal, "8haking and.
disintegrating the crystelline ic structure of the metal"
in such a way as to cause the gun to fracture.1
But "monster guns", as cannon above the 32-pdr. were called,
were prone to bursting at moderate elevations as well. High
elevation firing merely accentuated. the inherent weakness of
cast iron for heavy ordnance. Basic to this weakness was the
fact that it was almost impossible to achieve the necessary
homogeneity of metals cast in such large mould.s, and. it was
equally difficult to ensure uniform cooling of the mould..
Fiirther, when the barrel exceeded. a certain thickness, it was
impossible to secure the proper distribution of intense heat
and. great force caused. by the explosion in the chamber; the
resulting disparity in interior and exterior barrel temperature,
together with the unequal distribution of force, produced
strains sufficient to rupture the
1. Greener, Gunnery, pp. 88-89.
2. Ibid. 87-89, 101-04. Brodie, p. 184.
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It was this weakness in cast iron that gave impetus to the
search for stronger metals for gun construction. Wrought
iron, an early alternative metal, proved stronger than cast
iron, but it was equally difficult to form homogeneously, and.
in addition was highly expensive. The idea of shrinking a
wrou ht iron envelope over a cast iron barrel, first suggested
in Prance, was tried in 1843 when Professor Daniel Treadwell
of Harvard University built a sinai]. number of guns on this
"built up" principle for the American Government. A. more
elaborate and. successful application of the same principle
was to be made after the Crimean War, when William Armstrong
used it in constructing his first rifled guns. During the
forties, however, there was little British activity in this
respect, apart from a demonstrated willingness to inspect and
test the wrought iron or rifled ordnance of Cavalli,
Tahrendorff and Norton. In any case, the d.isasterous
explosions of wrou lit iron ord.nanoe abroad, notably that of
"Peacemaker" aboard V.5.8. President in 1844,
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damped. the enthusiasm for different metals until after Crimea.1
The naval armaments decided upon during the decennial
review of 1848-49 remained, therefore, roughly those adopted
in 1839. Sailing ships continued to mount 32-pd.ra. and. between
two and twelve 8-inch guns, with the exceptions of the Albion
and. Rodney classes of second-rate, which were to carry 26
8-inch guns, and a number of 42- and. 46-gun frigates Nreduced
to 19 and 20 guns, just under half being 8-inch and 56-pd.rs.
All guns, with the exception of those of 10-inch, were supplied
with both shot and. shell, and a very destructive 32-pdr. shot
and shell combination had been issued to all ships since 1847.
Every ship was thus capable of fighting any style of sea-battle
that was envisioned in 1850, whether it be at long- or close-
range, with solid shot or shell, against ships or coastal
1. Brodie, 193-97. On these guns, none of which was
successful, see Douglas, 3rd ed., pp. 245-53 . Norton's rifled
l-pdr. shell was first tried. in 1832, when it was un ble to




The armament schemes of 1839 and 1849 had been adopted
with the French in mind as the potential enemy. In the early
fifties fear of France continued to dictate the n tu.re of
British artillery experiments, with the result that in late
1852 heavy naval guns were tested at xoe1lent with the sole
purpose of determining their usefulness in bombaHin€ French
coastal batteries with impunity. The guns under trial were a
10-inch with its weight increased from 86 cwt. to 116 cwt. to
strengthen the breech and sides sufficiently to permit high-
elevation firing, and. the 95 owt. 68-pd.r.
At 32 degrees elevation the 10-inch gun projected 100-
pound. shells 5,860 yards, and. at the same elevation and. using
"eccentric" solid shot, the 68-pdr. ranged 6500 'yards. For
1. W.0.44/501, Captain Chads to Ordnance, 13 ug. 1847,
Select Committee report to Ordnance, 6 Oct., and. ld.miralty to
Ordnance, 30 Oct. 1847. Douglas, 4th ed., Appendix F, pp.
601-07. In 1846 Captain Hastins pr nounced. the shell system
"as safe in use as ehot." Add. MSS. 41581, astin,s to Lord.
Cl rence P get, 14 Dec. 1846.
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smooth-bore ordnance these ran;es were unprecedented. and.
satisfied the Admiralty that French coastal batteries could be
destroyed from the sea. As a result of these trials every
large steamer, whether propelled by screw or paddle-wheel,
received at least one heavy 68-pd.r., generally in the form of
a pivot gun mounted in the bow.'
The 95 owt. gun was the last smooth-bore heavy cannon to
be used extensively in British naval armaments; for larger
cast iron ord.na'ice could not reasonably be constructed wijh
due regard to safety and the requirements of naval servloe.
Of warrior's original 40 guns, 36 were of this nature, and.
loaded with steel shot, 65-pdrs. remained the favourite
armour-piercing gun until well into the sixties when muzzle-
loading rifled guns, constructed on a different principle and
1. W.O.44/502, packet entitled "Experiments with eccentric
shot and. shells". See especially Captain Chads to Admiralty,
confidential, 7 Oct. and 23 Dec. 1852. 	 ccentric shot an. shell
were, on the suggestion of Sir Howard Douglas, deliberately cast
with the center of gravity above the center of the projectile.
When p1 ced. in the gun with the wei hted. segment up a sizeable
increment in range resulted.
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before the formidable Russian batteries. Before the end of the
war both Britain and Trance were experimenting with ironclad
floating batteries and rifled artillery. The era of the





heiht of its efficiency and power.
America did not again influence naval developments to any
appreciable extent until the time of the Civil War. Neverthe-
less, the heavier solid shot armaments she inspired were directly,
if only in part, responsible for the introduction of shell guns
into naval service. Paixhans in Prance had studied these
increasingly heavy armaments, and. the larger and. more expensive
ships necessary to carry them. He belieyed. that one shell
exploding at the waterline of such a ship would sink it. He
further believed that by mounting shell guns in war steamers,
France would bring about a revolution in naval archiectu.re
that would force ritain to abandon her sailing fleet in order
to compete on equal terms with French steamers. By 1829 shell
guns mounted on war steamers had demonstrated their value for
warlike purposes, and the Admiralty ordered both introduced into
service.
Shells did not at once cause the revolution predicted by
Paixhans. They did., however, create an immedi te need for highly
skilled. unnere who could. fire this complex projectile safely
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and. accurately. The failure of the Royal Marine Artillery to
train such men, a failure revealed. at Navarino in 1827, le,d the
Ad.zniralty to establish a gunnery training school and. experimental
depot-aboard. H.M.S. Excellent at Portsmouth on the model
suggested by Sir Howard Douglas in 1617. The navy thus assumed
responsibility for training its gunners, and. Excellent provided
unprecedented. facilities for the study of armament problems
peculiar to naval service.
Between 1830 and. 1853, continuous experimentation and. trial
at Portsmouth and. Woolwich brought forth better gunsights, new
percussion locks, accurate range-tables and. improved. powder
ch rges. A new generation of smooth-bore ordnance was also
developed during these years; and. although 32-pdrs. remained the
standard broadside armament, increasingly h avy and. more powerful
artillery was provided to meet the special needs of paddle-wheel
steamers. By 1853 both 32-pd.rs. and. 8-inch pivot guns were
capable of firing shot or shell, and. cast iron naval ordnance bad.
attained the greatest size and power compatible with safety arid
sea service.
311
The greater part of the artillery developments that occurred
between 1815 and 1853, including those th t took place following
the establishment of Excellent, were carried out by the Ordnance
Department, the department responsible for providing and
financing weapons for all the ritish services. It is thus
hardly surprising that misunderstandings and. delays occasionally
occurred in a situation where one department developed and paid
for armaments used by another department. For the moat part,
however, the arrangement worked well enough, and the Admiralty
was not only able to make its own suggestions and decisions, but
had. authority over Ordnance in naval matters, although that
authority required great tact in its exercise. Thus if much of
the machinery for armament development was not in Admiralty hands,
the ultimate responsibility for policy was.
The Admiralty's policy was simply to adopt nothing of
importanoe until forced to do so by armaments developments in
foreign navies. So long as Britain's naval supremacy could be
maintained with the weapons at hand, it would have been absurd
to herself undertake the considerable effort and great expense
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to render them obsolete. Thus it was th t BUCh major
innovations of the p nod under study as gunsights and. gunnery
training, uniform calibre and. shell guns, were adopted. by the
Royal avy only after France or America had. forced their
adoption. By keeping careful watch on the activities of foreign
powers, by holding con tant and. secrettrials on a small scale
both at Woolwich and aboard. ships at sea, and by reviewing all
gunnery equipment every ten years, the Royal Navy was never in
danger of falling behind, other powers in armaments development.
To impatient inventors and. visionaries who saw little of
this unceasing activity, Admiralty policy a peared to consist
of nothing more than a violent prejudice against pro ress.
Prejudice there undoubtedly was, bothat the Admiralty and
among naval officers. But there is every reason to believe
that, on the Ad iralty's part at least, a very real sense of
duty ultimately prevail d over any "etrograd.e proclivities"
when innovation could no longer be safely avoided.
Indeed, where rearmament on a major scale was concerned,
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9-pd.rs.	 7	 6	 26













68-pd.rs.	 5	 4	 36
	
42-pd.rs.	 4	 6	 22
	
32-pers.	 4 0	 17
Carronaclee
	
24-pd.xs.	 3	 9	 13
	



































l8-pd.rs.	 8	 0	 38
9 0	 34
	
12-pdrs.	 7 6	 29
	
9-pd.rs.	 7	 6	 26
	
____________ 6-pd.rs.	 6 0	 17
8 0	 60
	
68—pd.rs.	 6	 8	 50
	
68-pcIrs.	 5	 4	 36
	42-pdrs.	 4 6	 22
Carronad.es
	
32-pd.re.	 4	 0	 17
	
24-pd.rs.	 3	 9	 13
	
18-pdrs.	 3 4	 10

















10-inch.	 7	 6	 57.
13-inch.Mortars.
10-inch.
















56-pd.rs.	 10	 0	 87
	
42-pd.re.	 9	 6	 67
	10-inch.	 9 4	 86
	
____________	 9 4	 84
	
9 0	 65
	8-inch.	 6 10	 60
	  0	 52
	
9 6	 61*


















18-pd.rs.	 6	 0	 20
	
___________________ ____________ 	 5 6	 15
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Table III - cont'd.





68-pdrs.	 5 4	 63
	
42-pdrs.	 4 6	 22
	
32-pdrs.	 4 0	 17
Carronad.es	 24-pd.rs.	 3	 9	 13













Guns	 9-pdrs.	 6 0	 13
	
6-pd.rs.	 5	 0	 6
	
24-pd.rs.	 4	 8	 13




Douglas, Naval Gunnery, 3rd. ed., pp. 581-82.
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Appendix B
Prospectus compiled by Sir S.L. Peche].1
from Douglas s Naval Gunnery
for the establishment of Excellent
as a gunnery Training School
From Douglas, Naval Gunnery,
3rd. ed., pp. 592-97.
322
Their Lordshipa having had under their consideration the
propriety and. expediency of establishing a permament corps of
seamen to act as Captains of Guns, as well as a dep8t for the
instruction of the officers and. seamen of His Majesty's Navy in
the theory and. practice of Naval Gunnery, at which a uniform
system shall be observed. and. communicated. throughout the Navy,
have directed, with a view to the formation of such Establishment,
that a proportion of intelligent, young, and active seamen shall
be engaged for five or seven years, renewable at their expiration,
with an increase of pay attached to each consecutive re-engage-
ment, from which the important situation of Master Gunners,
Gunners' Mates, and Yeomen of the Powder-room shall hereafter
be selected, to instruct the officers and. seamen on board. such
ships as they may be appointed. to, in the various duties at
the guns, in consideration of which they will be allowed. 2s. per
month, in addition to axy other ratin they may be deemed
qualified to fill, and will be advanced according to merit and
the degree of attention paid. to their duty, which, if zealously
performed, will entitle them to aspire to the important
situations before mentioned, as well as that of Boatswain.
Their Lordehips have therefore directed. the Excellent, with
her present fittings (already placed. in a situation where
practice may be carried on with shot without risk of injury
to any individuals), to be established as a 6th rate, with a
complement of 200 men, and appointed Captain . . . . to the
command of her.
The following instructions are sent for your guidance and
that of Captain . . . . in the execution of these duties,-
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Complement
Captain	 .	 .	 .
Lieutenants	 .	 4
Surgeon .	 1




Warrant officers	 •	 3
Ship's cook
	 •	 •	 1
	
mate	 .	 •	 1
Carpenter's crew	 •	 2
Armourer •	 •	 .	 1
Purser's steward	 •	 1
Sick-boy •	 •	 .	 1	 Boys of
Second class




Midshipmen's berth •	 2	 1
arrant officers' ditto	 .	 3
Purser's steward	 •	 1
Marines	 •	 34
Seamen gunners •	 .	 116
	
1 90	 10
As in the establishment of the officers and. crew of the
Excellent, a Lieutenant, three non-commissioned officers, and.
two privates of the Marine Artillery are included. in her
complement of Marines, it is intended. that the theoretical
instruction required for the officers a d seamen gunners
should. be furnished by them, and. you will take care th t every
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facility and. assistance be given them to insure the performance
of this duty, the most material points of whioh are the names
of the different parts of a gun and carriage, the dispart in
terms of lineal magnitude and. in degrees, how taken, what
constitutes point blank and what line of metal range, windage,
the errors and. loss of force attending it, the importance of
preserving shot from rust, the theory of the most matexial
effects of different charges of powder applied to practice,
with a sin le shot, also with a plurality of balls, showing
how these affect accuracy, penetration, and splinters; to
qualify them to judge of the condition of gunpowder by ins ection;
to ascertain its quality by the ordinary tests and. trials, as
well as by actual proof, these being very indispensable
qualifications; to instruct them also in the laboratory works
required for the n val service, such as making rockets for
signals, filling tubes, new priming them and. filling cartridges,
preoautions in airing and. drying powder, care and inspection of
locks, choice of flints, correct mode of fitting them, &c., &c.
You are to understand. that it is the intention of their
Lordships that the Gunners from his Majesty's ships in ordinary,
and also from the ships in commission when they can be spared,
should asse ble on board the Excellent, in divisions of such
numbers as the Commander may deem convenient, to carry on
(assisted by the Marine Artillery already embarked in h r) the
fullest experiments as to the power and. ranges of the various
natures of sea ordnance from point blank to the highest
elevation the ports of the Excellent will admit of (or as may
be safely tried without danger of the shot reaching the shore
beyond the mud banks), also the ranges at similar elevations
with different reduced charges of powder, likewise the
difference in the ranges when two shots are introduced instead
of one, and in such cases to observe arid note down the apparent
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d.ivergence of both shots from the direct line. Also, if it can
be tried with safety, the range and. foroe of grape and. canister
shot; and., in short, every experiment of such description which
will tend to give the gunners and. others who may attend such
practice the moat perfect knowledge of the exact powers of each
nature of gun in every manner in which it can be tried.
To facilitate these experiments their Lordahips consider
that Beacons may be fixed. in the mud at different measured
distances from the ship, say at every hundred. or every two hundred
yards, or at such other distances as may be found most convenient.
At the same time that the above-mentioned experiments are
going forward it will be the duty of the Captain, and. of the
Lieutenants to assist him, to endeavour to ascertain the
comparative value of the several descriptions of sights for
cannon which have been submitted. by various individual., some of
every kind of which the Board of Ordnance has been desired to
cause to be put on board the Excellent.
It is also their Lordships' intention that the efficiency
of the improved. tube boxes, powder flasks, and. all other
implements of every desoription connected with sea gunnery
practice, should. be proved, as far as may be done, on board. the
Excellent, and. Captain . . . . is to consider it an important
part of his duty to report impartially his opinion on all the
implements in question, and. to submit for their Lordship.'
consideration any alteration of any of them deemed. likely to
prove advantageous by himself or any of the officers assisting
him in conducting the duties hereby ordered.
The Captain is also to make known to their Lordships any
improvements he may have been informed of, either in guns
themselves, or in the mode of mounting, or fitting or fihting
them, or of the implements for serving the4 which may not have
been furnished by the Ordnance Department to the Excellent, in
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order that they may cause them to be also supplied for trial
and. report.
Another material branch of the duty of Captain .
will be to perfect the gunners and all others who may attend
on board the Excellent for that purpose, in the established
exercise or service of the guns, to the end that each of them
may fully understand and be able to explain the object of
every movement ordered; that they may likewise understand
perfectly the principle of the sights, moveab].e targets, and
everything used in gun practice, either for exercise or real
service.
All these points, after being fully considered and. tried
in the various exercises and. practice to be daily carried
forward, are to be fully reported upon to their Lordehips, in
order that they may give directions for the general adoption of
that system which shall be found and. admitted. upon full and
fair trial to answer best in practice.
It is further to be understood that any ships in commission,
the Captains of which are desirous of sending any portion of
their officers, captains of guns, or others of their crews, to
attend the practice or exercise on board the Excellent, to gain
instruction on any of the points detailed, are to be at liberty
to do so, and. it is to be an essential part of the duty of
Captain . . . . and the Lieutenants to give every useful
information to persons so sent for instruction, and. to advance
them on the points most useful for them to understand, to such
extent as the short time they can probably be spared will admit.
Their Lordshipa have requested the Board of Ordnance to
give instructions to their officers to render every assistance
in forwarding the objects of these instructions, and. to supply
such quantities of ammunition or other articles as may from
time to time be required by Captain . . . . and. approved by
you for the purposes above detailed.
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Captain . . . . is to be assisted in conducting these
duties by the officer of .!arine Artillery to the utmost of
his abilities, and. the latter officer is to be directed to
obey whatever directions he may receive from Captain .
or the Lieutenants for the objects stated whilst on this
servioe.
Their Lord5hipe desire that you send. a copy of this letter
to Captain . . . ., that he may be fully apprised of the duties
he is to execute, directing him to govern himself and, those
placed under him accordingly. And you are also to give such
further directions and assiBtance as you may deem necessary
or advisable for the more perfect accomplishment of the objects
explained; and you are to cause Captain . . . . to make a
weekly return to you of each daye transactions and, practice,
noting the number and descriptions of persons attending on
board each day; to which also is to be added. any remarks the
Captain may deem it right to offer relative to the occurrences
or details, and. these weekly returns are to be regularly
transmitted, by you to me for their Lordehips' information.
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Appendix C
Succession of Inspectors, Superintendents, etc.
of the Manufacturing Departments, Royal Arsenal.
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Ro7al Gun !actory" - Inspector of Artillery
Sir Thomas B].omefield., 5 Mar. 1780
Sir Alexander Dickson, 9 Sept. 1822
William Millar, 22 April, 1827
Sir Joseph Maclean, 1 May 1858
William B. Dund.aa, 1 Oct. 1839
James A. Chalmer, 1 April 1852.
Royal Carriage Factory - Inspector
Edward Page, Jan. 1803
George Scott, April 1805
William Cuppage, 1 April 1806
Sir John May, 10 Nov. 1832.
Richard. 3. Lacy, 20 Oct. 1841
Renry W. Gordon, 16 Nov. 1844
James N. Colquohoun, 1 April 1852
Alexander Thlloh, 18 Sept. 1853
Royal Laboratory - Comptroller**
Sir William Congreve, Bart., 1785.
Sir Wm. Congreve, 2nd. Bart., 18 June 1814
* Formerly Royal Gun Foundry.
** The title of Comptroller of the Royal Laborator wa g changed
in 1828 to Director, and in 1855 to Superintendent of the
Royal Laboratory.
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oya1 Laboratory - Sir Augustus Frazer, 29 May 1828
Steven G. Adye, 15 June 1835
Janea P. Cockburn, 19 Oct. 1838
Richard Hardinge, 1 Jan. 1847
William Cator, 1 April 1852
Jobn Wilson, 19 Aug. 1852
Edward M. Boxer, 14 June 1855
This list is taken from General W.H. 1kwith, L1t of Officers
of the Royal Regiment of Artillery from the Tear 1716 to the
Year 189 (4th ed. London, 1900), p. 170.
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